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 I 
 
 
Post-Tridentine Western Christian theology introduced the notion of natura pura, 
which holds that one can know created nature in fact without reference to God or 
divine grace. The orders of grace and nature are thus on different plains. This 
ontology creates an extrincism between God and the world. Maximus ConfessorÕs 
doctrine of grace offers the paradox of nature already presuming grace but awaiting 
the supernatural grace of deification at the resurrection. Further, divine grace, or 
energy in MaximusÕs theology, are not separate ontological realms between God and 
the world. Grace does not separate GodÕs essence from his energies. The Incarnation 
of the created and uncreated natures in Christ fully manifests the paradox of GodÕs 
grace as being fully on the side of creation and on the side of God, without 
remainder. Finally, MaximusÕs theurgic ecclesiology in his Mystagogy reinforces the 
mediation of grace through created reality. All of these aspects of Maximus the 
ConfessorÕs theology of grace provide a Christian rendering of participation that 
does not result in the extrincism of grace from nature, their conflation together, or 
a real distinction in the being of God. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
ÔMan is a hungry being. But he is hungry for God. Behind all the hunger of our life is 
God. All desire in finally a desire for HimÉAll that exists lives by eatingÉBut the 
unique position of man in the universe is that he alone is to bless God for the food 
and the life he receives from Him. He alone is to respond to GodÕs blessing with his 
blessingÉThe world was created as the Ômatter,Õ the material of one all-embracing 
Eucharist, and man was created as the priest of this cosmic sacrament.Õ1 
 
1.1 Grace, Nature and the Problem of Extrincism 
Fr. Schmemann beautifully comments on one of the signature characteristics 
of Eastern Orthodox theology: a strong sacramental view of the cosmos. The reason 
why a Eucharistic cosmos organically expresses the irreducible relationship 
between God and the world is because grace is not extrinsic to created nature in the 
Eastern Orthodox theological worldview. This is not to say that God and the world 
are conflated or mixed in a pantheistic manner, but the Christian East does affirm 
that created nature already assumes the gift of grace, which then awaits the 
consummation of supernatural grace and deification.2 The grace of creation and 
supernatural deification are not, as Maximus Confessor attests, Ôa reward given to 
the saints in requital for righteous works, but is proof of the liberality of the 
                                                             
1 Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World (Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 1973), 
p. 1. 
2 Maximus Confessor, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 77). 
2 
Creator.Õ3 God is the beginning of creatures as Creator and their end as the giver of 
eternal life, but the middle journey of existence is up to the creatureÕs free-will.4 For 
Maximus, there is a synergy at work between the human being and God in the 
process of deification that is at the same time entirely based upon the utter gratuity 
of divine gift. The synergy of grace and nature provides the foundation for a cosmic 
dance and harmonious symphony that allows the whole creation to fully and 
wilfully participate in the vita Trinitatis. In MaximusÕs theology, grace, nature and 
metaphysics all coalesce into a single theophanic revelation of, and participation in, 
the triune God.  
After the Counter-Reformation of the Catholic Church in the sixteenth 
century, there emerged an ontology in the West that differed from the patristic and 
medieval understanding of nature. Post-Tridentine Catholic theology developed the 
notion of natura pura.5 Hans urs Von Balthasar describes three ways in which grace 
and nature have been understood since this time period: the first path, held by 
Ripalda, assumes that every act is shored up with grace; the second middle path 
argues that nature is intact, and then it is intercepted by grace in order to be 
                                                             
3 Maximus, Th. Pol. 1 (PG 91: 33A-36A). 
4 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1073B-1076C).  
5 For a recent argument for natura pura and a counter to Henri de LubacÕs thesis of nature 
presupposing graceÑand subsequently a rebuff against concerns of some in the contemporary 
Radical Orthodoxy movementÑsee Bernard Mulcahy, AquinasÕs Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian 
Integralism of Henry de Lubac: Not Everything is Grace (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2011). 
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directed towards its supernatural end; and the third path, held by Billot, suggests a 
finality of pure nature in the world order.6 Von Balthasar concludes that after the 
high scholastic period, all of the systematics of grace and nature removed theology 
from the identity of nature:  
In all these systems that have been developed since the Counter-
Reformation, we notice a distinct tendency to protect the concept of nature 
from the danger of Protestant subversion. But the tendency goes so far that 
post-Tridentine Catholic theologians not only try to set off nature from sin 
and grace but also feel obliged to prove that the sphere of nature can be 
isolated and depicted in fact.7 
 
 A vacuous notion of being and nature did not just develop in post-Tridentine 
Catholic theology and twentieth century Protestant theologyÑas for instance in 
Karl BarthÕs resounding ÔNein!Õ to natural theology or any theology relating to the 
analogia entis.8 There was an abstraction from nature in the philosophy of Being as 
well. In HegelÕs The Science of Logic, he argues that Ôpure being and pure nothing are 
therefore the same. The truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being 
                                                             
6 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation (San Francisco, CA: 
Ignatius Press, 1992), p. 289. 
7 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, p. 289. 
8 For an in-depth collection of articles on the nuances of the analogia entis debate, see Steven A. Long, 
Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2011). Also, Thomas Joseph White, The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or 
Wisdom of God? (Grand Rapids: MI, William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2010). Maximus will develop his 
own analogia entis, but it transforms into what I call the analogia Christus. 
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has passed over into nothing and nothing into beingÕ9 Being is only affirmed 
through the absolute negation or abstraction from Being.  In HegelÕs dialectical 
philosophy, which subsequently influenced Karl BarthÕs refutation of natural 
theology, abstraction and negation undermine paradox and participation in God. 
The Post-Tridentine Catholic notion of natura pura, the Hegelian abstraction from 
Being, and the Protestant rejection of natural theology and the analogia entis lead to 
a very extrinsic relationship between nature and grace. As Steven A. Long notes in 
reference to Thomas Aquinas: 
Nature is not merely a negative concept, a sort of empty theological 
Newtonian space providing a hold ÔplaceÕ or vacuole for grace. And precisely 
insofar as human nature has an ontological density and proportionate end, 
just so far is the knowledge of these essential to the work of the theologian. 
This is precisely why St. Thomas held that grace presupposes natureÑnot as 
an empty placeholder, but with its own created perfection positively ordered 
toward God within natural limits while being capable with divine aid of 
elevation to divine friendship and the beatific vision.10 
 
In order to avoid nature being merely a Ôvacoule for grace,Õ several Catholic and 
Anglican theologians in the twentieth century argued for an integralist perspective 
on nature and grace rooted in the church fathers and later Catholic tradition.  
1.2 Twentieth Century Debates on Nature and Grace 
                                                             
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 59-60. 
10 Stephen A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York, NY: 
Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 2. 
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In 1953, Catholic, Orthodox and Reformed Protestant scholars met at the 
monastery of Chevetogne in France to discuss the theology of grace that each 
tradition affirms. After a thorough investigation of their respective positions, the 
difference between the three groups of Christendom was summarized as follows: 
All Christians appear to agree perfectly, until one comes to express in 
systematic formulae the very complex encounter of divine and human 
activity in grace. On the one hand, all the Christian confessions accept some 
change in man, brought about by justification; on the other hand, the 
Christian life that follows this change is not described in the same way. An 
Orthodox would say that the change made by grace makes a divine life 
possible; a Catholic, a holy life; while a Protestant would stress the battle 
against sin and the Devil. The encounter between God and man, in the 
process of salvation would be described as a ÔsynergismÕ (Orthodox), an 
Ôenduring creationÕ (Protestantism), or Ôactuation creÕ par acte incrÕ 
(Catholicism)ÉThe divisions due to different systematizations are more 
serious when we come to the question of created grace, of ÔvirtuesÕ and gifts. 
Two things are presupposed here: the first, which explains the scholastic 
theory of the habitus, assumes the philosophical idea of a distinction 
between the soul and its faculties; the other, much more important, implies 
different views of the relations between man and the supernatural. For 
Catholicism, the fundamental distinction is between nature and 
supernatural, and the problem of grace results from the nature of man; for the 
Protestant, on the other hand, grace is essentially Ôwhat comes down 
towards the sinner.Õ In short, one side contrasts natural and supernatural, the 
other sin and grace.11 
This summary of the ecumenical meeting of minds at the monastery of Chevetogne 
illustrates that each tradition attempts to address the question of how a 
transcendent God connects and relates to His creation. I will briefly discuss the 
                                                             
11 C. Moeller and G. Philips, The Theology of Grace and the Oecumenical Movement, trans. R. A. Wilson 
(London: A. R. Mowbray, 1961), pp. 37-38. 
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Catholic retrievals of integralism in the twentieth century, and then elucidate how 
their theology of resourcement will be connected with this study of grace and 
metaphysics in Maximus Confessor.   
Catholic theologian Henri de Lubac argued around the middle of the 
twentieth century that the extrinsic position on nature and grace was not the 
patristic and medieval view. Neoscholastic theology held to a two-tier account of 
nature and grace, where grace is interpreted to be something supernaturally added 
to human nature, which was already complete and sufficient in itself. It was 
assumed that this way of thinking would avoid Pelegianism and re-emphasize the 
Augustinian view of the absolute gratuity of grace. De Lubac believed that there 
were several critical problems with this viewpoint. If humans have a Ônatural desire 
for the beatific visionÕ (desiderium naturale visionis beatificae), then how can grace be 
super-added and not destroy human nature? How is an extrinsic understanding of 
grace to be avoided? De Lubac argues in his book The Mystery of the Supernatural, that 
modern theology: 
Sees nature and supernature as in some sense juxtaposed, and in spite of 
every intention to the contrary, as contained in the same genus, of which 
they form as it were two species. The two were like two complete organisms; 
too perfectly separated to be really differentiated, they have unfolded 
parallel to each other, fatally similar in kind. Under such circumstances, the 
supernatural is no longer properly speaking another order, something 
7 
unprecedented, overwhelming and transfiguring...they will no longer be 
taken to be anything but affirmations of a purely natural philosophy.12 
The unprecedented aspect of the supernatural does not correspond to 
human nature in a two-tiered hierarchy of different orders, but as a paradox of two 
aspects of the same order. 13 De Lubac further argues that for the fathers and early 
medieval theologians, there is permanence between human action and supernatural 
grace, so that the desire for the beatific vision already points to grace in the 
creature.14 This means that grace is not just a potential thing to be given to a person, 
but already a living reality within nature, a ÔpromiseÕ already Ôinscribed and 
recognized in the beingÕs very self.Õ15 De Lubac holds these two perspectives in a 
paradox without allowing the collapse of the two ideas or the banality of their 
separation.  
The gift of this natural desire for the supernatural is also not one of 
necessity for God or the basis for offering the gift of grace.16 For De Lubac, God freely 
                                                             
12 Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroad 
Herder), p. 37. 
13 See John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2005); see also Eric Lee, ÔParadoxes of Faith in 
Kierkegaard and de LubacÕ in Belief and Metaphysics, eds. Connor Cunningham and Peter Candler 
(London: SCM Press, 2007). pp. 236-259. 
14 Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 27. 
15 Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 207. 
16 Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 207ff. 
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gives this desire as the author and creator of nature. Further, patristic and early 
medieval theologians changed the definition of nature from that of Aristotle, who 
held that the end of the creature must be reachable using its own resources.17 Pace 
De Lubac, Rudi te Velde and John Milbank have more recently commented that 
Aquinas denied this restriction of nature through his real distinction between 
existence and essence in creatures. Aquinas understood grace from a teleological 
interpretation of nature, but he still argues that beatitude is a supernatural 
consummation.18 Humans were created to participate in the life of the Trinity; 
however, this natural desire does not have its fulfilment from within the human 
being. 
1.3 The Scope of Maximian Grace 
Since the Christian East did not deal with the Augustine vs. Pelagius issue to the 
same degree as the West, it is sometimes asserted that the East does not really have 
a theology of grace, but this is far from the case. The Christian East did not 
emphasize the role of grace to the extent that the West did in their theological 
development, but grace is the prior term that grounds most of their doctrines. The 
core of MaximusÕs metaphysics is the grace of God. Maximus states that deification 
                                                             
17 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2 (1024a 20). 
18 Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God: The Divine Science of the Summa Theologiae (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2006), p. 150 ff. See also John Milbank and Kathrine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), pp. 24-39. 
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is Ôto reunite by love created with uncreated nature, showing the two in unity and 
identity through the acquisition of grace.Õ19 The greatest act in a creatureÕs 
existence is a union of love with its creator. Maximus, as well as the Greek patristic 
tradition, holds that this union is only due to the grace of God.  
The grace vs. nature debates in twentieth century theology encountered a 
radical twist in thought of Henri de Lubac his notion of the paradox of grace. This 
paradox has two main results for Christian theology that follow one upon the other. 
The first is that grace and nature are two aspects of the same order, not two 
opposing orders. The second is that grace is both created and mediated within the 
creation and uncreated with its source in God. Grace is thus a Ôsuspended middleÕ20 
because there is no ontological intermediary between God and the creation.  
Since de LubacÕs critique of the neoscholastic reading of Aquinas on the issue 
of created grace, a new avenue for dialog about grace opens up for Eastern Orthodox 
and Western Christian traditions. What de LubacÕs thesis offers for a study of 
Maximus Confessor is the schema of paradox with the two-fold result mentioned 
above. Maximus describes the relationship between divine grace and nature (that is, 
the natural relationship with grace that the human person has through the logoi of 
                                                             
19 Maximus, Amb. 41  (PG: 91, 1308 B). 
20 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle. 
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created being coupled with the telos of deification and beatitude beyond human 
nature given by God) in several places.21 He almost always frames grace and nature 
within an eschatological consummation of all creation in deification. Paul Blowers 
describes nature and grace in Maximus as Ôthe protological endowment and the 
eschatological vocation of humanity.Õ22 The coalescence between grace and nature is 
a part of MaximusÕs created ontology, but the eschatological fulfilment of 
deification is something that transcends human nature and must be given by God. It 
is the paradox of something already given and created but awaiting consummation 
from beyond in the uncreated God: 
Deification does not belong to what lies within our potentiality to bring 
about naturally, since it is not within our power. For no logos of that which 
transcends nature lies within nature. Therefore deification is not an 
accomplishment that belongs to our potentiality: we do not possess the 
potentiality for it by nature, but only through the divine power, since it is 
not a reward given to the saints in requital for righteous works, but is proof 
of the liberality of the Creator, making the lovers of the beautiful by 
adoption that which he has shown to be by nature.23 
Maximus Confessor offers a vision of the whole cosmos that is without the 
extrincism of post-scholastic theology precisely because he connects created grace 
and uncreated grace in an irreducible manner, which is exemplified in the 
                                                             
21 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 1.55; De. Char. 3.25; Ad Thal 35; Th. Pol. 1.  
22 Paul Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ (Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 
2003), p. 93 n. 18.  
23 Maximus, Th. Pol. 1 (PG 91: 33A-36A). 
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Incarnation and revealed through his ontology of what I call the analogia Christus. 
Through participation (which is another word for grace in Maximus), his theology 
holds the divine and natural worlds both together and apart, in union and 
distinction.  
The proposal of this study is that the theology of grace in the thought of 
Maximus Confessor unites God and the creation together in an irreducible 
relationship, all-the-while avoiding any hint of pantheism. Further, Maximus does 
not separate the essence and energies (or grace) of God. Instead, grace is always 
being created or infused directly in the soul of the creature, and through the soul to 
the body. The uncreated grace of God is the sharing of the divine nature with the 
creature through the grace of participation. The Confessor thus offers an alternative 
model to the extrinsic understanding of grace and nature.    
1.4 The Reason for Studying Grace in Maximus 
Maximus Confessor (C. 580 Ð 13 August 662) is a man of both East and West in 
that, more than any other Eastern patristic writer, he discussed: the role of the will 
in human anthropology, original or ancestral sin, grace, adoption, justification, the 
primacy of the Roman Pope, and the filioque clause. Sometimes Maximus interprets 
these theological topics differently than Western theologians, but he shows us that 
the East was not without some reflection on these supposedly important Latin-
Western theological concepts. Maximus also spent time at the Lateran basilica 
12 
during the Monothelite controversy (October 649 CE) supporting Pope Martin I 
against the Typos of Constans II.24 His support of the Latins during this period was 
not due to submission to the Pope qua Pope, but more to Pope MartinÕs adherence to 
orthodoxy.  
In the account of his first trial in Constantinople in June 654 CE written by 
his disciple Anastasius, Maximus is asked by his questioner, ÔWhy do you love the 
Romans and hate the Greeks?Õ To this the blessed saint replied, ÔWe have a precept 
which says not to hate anyone. I love the Romans as those who share the same faith, 
and the Greeks as sharing the same language.Õ25 The Confessor moved in the worlds 
of both Byzantium and Rome, and his thought reflects these relationships. By fully 
embracing the implications of the paradox of grace and nature in Maximus, both 
Eastern and Western Christian traditions could find common theological ground 
once again. 
So, then, an analysis on MaximusÕs doctrine of grace is needed for three key 
reasons. First, there has not been an in-depth study on grace in the Greek patristic 
tradition that treats the whole breadth of the literature. While a full analysis of the 
Greek fathers on grace is well beyond the range of this study, an investigation of 
                                                             
24 Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor, The Early Church Fathers Series (New York, NY: Routledge, 
1996), p. 17. 
25 The Trial of Maximus, trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 26. 
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grace in MaximusÕs thought will greatly contribute towards a better understanding 
of the Greek fathers on the topic. Second, by looking at the diverse and multifaceted 
reflections on grace in the East, perhaps Western theologians might be compelled to 
correct interpretations of grace that have contributed to the continuance of 
extrincism in modern times. In the spirit of De LubacÕs resourcement, going back to 
patristic sources can address the problem of extrincism. Finally, as stated above 
there is an ecumenical imperative in such a study of MaximusÕs thought. Since the 
schism of Eastern and Western Christendom in 1054 CE, there has been a great deal 
of misalignment and misunderstanding between the two great traditions.  
While studying grace in Maximus may not dissolve all differences between 
East and West into some kind of a homogenous unity, there is still the need to bring 
to the surface a broader recognition of the common ground between the two 
traditions.26 For Maximus, this is true both for grace and for the other traditionally 
                                                             
26 Since the Second Vatican Council's Decree on Ecumenism and Decree on the Catholic Eastern Churches, 
there have been several develops in ecumenism between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 
churches. The North American Catholic-Orthodox theological dialogue has produced two major 
agreements: 1) the Eastern Orthodox signatories to a detailed study and ÔConsultation StatementÕ on 
the Filioque (October 25, 2003) are in agreement that the Filioque doctrine should no longer be seen 
as heretical; and 2) The result of the Agreed Statement on ÔBaptism and 'Sacramental Economy,'Ô also 
issued by the North American Orthodox Catholic Theological Consultation (June 3, 1999), which calls 
upon the Orthodox Patriarchs to repeal the 1755 decree denying the validity of Catholic baptisms. In 
relation to the Anglican Communion and the Eastern Orthodox Church, there have been three 
phrases of dialog by the International Commission for Anglican-Orthodox Theological Dialogue: the 
Moscow Agreed Statement of 1976; the Dublin Agreed Statement of 1984; and more recently the Cyprus 
Agreed Statement of 2006. For the Protestant branch of the Church, see eds. John Meyendorff and 
Robert Tobias, Salvation in Christ: A Lutheran-Orthodox Dialogue (Minneapolis: Augsburg Press, 1992). 
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Western subsets of it, such as adoption, justification, atonement, sanctification, etc. 
This study of Maximus Confessor will not seek to ignore the important differences 
that exist between these two Christian traditions, but simply to point out areas of 
agreement and continuity between them. The greater ecumenical desire would be 
to see at least a small step towards reconciliation and communion between the 
Greek East and the Latin West, and Maximus the Confessor is a key theologian to 
provide such a bridge. 
1.5 The Scope of this Study 
I will begin this study on grace and metaphysics in Maximus Confessor in 
Chapter Two, where the essence and energies distinction will be analysed. This 
important theological debate between Christian East and West is directly related to 
the understanding of grace as uncreated and created. Then in Chapter Three, I will 
investigate the divine processions of Pseudo-Dionysius and their relationship to 
energy and grace in Maximus. Chapter Four will elucidate how the divine 
processions/energies were received in the Byzantine and Latin traditions, and I will 
argue that Gregory of Palamas is not an accurate reader of Maximus on the divine 
energies. I will demonstrate that grace provides the necessary element in 
understanding what Maximus means by divine energy. Chapter Five will evaluate 
how MaximusÕs Christology completely encapsulates his theology of divine grace 
15 
and the revelation of the logoi of essences through the analogia Christus. Finally, in 
Chapter Six, I will show that MaximusÕs Ecclesiology is thoroughly theurgic. A 
strong theology of descending grace is mediated in MaximusÕs metaphysics through 
liturgical act.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
ÔChrist in his love unites created reality with uncreated realityÑHow wonderful is 
GodÕs loving-kindness towards us!Ñand he shows that through grace the two are 
become one. The whole world enters wholly into the whole of God and by becoming 
all that God is, except in identity of nature, it receives in place of itself the whole 
God.Õ1  
 
2.1 The Essence and Energies Debate: East and West 
          In order to understand how metaphysics and grace coalesce in MaximusÕs 
theology, one must first query about the nature of God and the problem of how a 
completely transcendent and simple divine being touches and unites with creation. 
In the Eastern Orthodox tradition this problem is answered through a distinction 
between GodÕs essence (ουσία) and His energies (ενέργειαι). Grappling with this 
dense theological debate is necessary because the position one takes on the essence-
energies debate will determine how one understands grace from a metaphysical 
point of view. On the one hand, if GodÕs energies are uncreated and transcendent 
from the world, then GodÕs grace is also uncreated and transcendent from the 
world. This is the Eastern Orthodox perspective on the metaphysics of divine grace. 
On the other hand, if GodÕs energies are created in the economy of salvation (a  
                                                             
1 Maximus, Amb. 41, (PG 91: 1308B). 
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simple God cannot have energies proper), then GodÕs grace is also created. This is 
the Western perspective on the metaphysics of divine grace. 
          Aside from the filioque clause, there are few theological topics between Eastern 
and Western Christian theology that creates as much division as the theological and 
metaphysical distinction between the essence and energies of God. Contemporary 
Eastern Orthodox scholars contend that this distinction (although not a division 
according to them) in God between His essence and energies has been neglected by 
the West both philosophically and theologically.2 For Western theologians, God is 
understood to be simple and non-compounded, and there is no room in the Divine 
nature for a separate metaphysical distinction of energy that would cause a division 
in the Godhead and create a composite divine nature (σύνθετος).3  
In the Western schema of GodÕs essence and energy, energy is understood as 
his actions in the cosmos as part of his economy, not as something separate from his 
essence ad extra. GodÕs essence and GodÕs existence are also one without remainder.4 
An analogy would be that a human person has a natural energy through activity, 
                                                             
2 David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge; CUP, 
2004). 
3 Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed: The Apophatic Way and the Essence-Energies 
Distinction,Õ Eastern Churches Review 7 (1975), p. 135. 
4 Rowan Williams, ÔThe Philosophical Structures of Palamism,Õ Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977), p. 39. 
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but his or her actions and being are not separate from one another. You could not 
identify a person by his or her being alone without his or her actions. When God 
acts in the cosmos, his activity is truly his divinity. While the West generally sees 
the unity of GodÕs nature with his activities as an economic determination in the 
mind of the creature, there is still adherence to divine simplicity in the nature of 
God in se.  
The unity of God with his actions does not elicit ontotheology (that is, God 
and creatures being on an equivocal scale of being with one another), because the 
mystery of who God is in himself is not fully comprehendible due to GodÕs infinite 
nature.5 Divine simplicity holds that, with God, His being and his energy (or one 
could insert any of the divine attributes such as goodness, immutability, 
omnipresence, etc.) are one and not distinguished from one another. GodÕs energy 
and his essence are united into pure actuality (actus essendi), and the energies that 
the creation experiences are generally understood as created realities but from a 
divine source. As Thomas Aquinas notes in the Summa Theologica, ÔGod is the same as 
His essence or nature.Õ6  
                                                             
5 Duns Scotus understands infinity in God as basic to his nature. Divine simplicity and unity would 
then be secondary to infinity in God, which is the opposite of the Thomistic schema whereby Divine 
Simplicity is properly basic in God and infinity flows forth from it; see Richard Cross, Duns Scotus 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 25. 
6 Summa Theologica 1.2 Q. 3. 
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Not only is God the same as his essence or nature, he is also Ôhis own 
existenceÕ as pure actuality.7 This means that God is fully knowable as pure 
actuality, but also that His infinite nature makes him incomprehensible to the 
creature.8 Aquinas sees the union of essence and existence in God as central in 
understanding his nature because if GodÕs essence were separate from his existence, 
then he would be a participated being instead of the cause or suppositum of Being 
itself. Thus, there are no real separate accidents in the divine being. However, the 
activity of God in creation is understood as something separate from God but only in 
economic terms.9 For Thomas, divine simplicity provides a needed barrier between 
God and world, which prevents both pantheism and a purely materialist ontology. 
The connection of divine being with divine energy is why the theological 
understanding of divine simplicity is crucially important for the Eastern and 
Western Christian debate on the essence-energies distinction.  
In the Christian East, the essence and energy of God are distinguished by a 
Ôreal distinction,Õ but when the creation participates in the energy or energies 
                                                             
7 Summa Theologica 1.2 Q. 3. 
8 Rowan Williams, ÔThe Philosophical Structures of Palamism,Õ pp. 40-41; Fran OÕRourke, Pseudo-
Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 24, 
55-58. 
9 This is where the theological principle of Ôcreated graceÕ begins to enter into the West and becomes 
a part of the common vocabulary of Scholasticism. This phrase will require much qualification in 
relation to MaximusÕs understanding of grace and nature and will be addressed in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five. 
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(energia, energiai)10 of the Godhead, it is really participating in God. Many 
contemporary Eastern Orthodox scholars, such as Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, 
argue that the essence-energies distinction in God is a real and objective principle, a 
Ôpragmatiki diakrisis.Õ11 What this means philosophically is uncertain, because even 
Gregory of Palamas (1296Ð1359), the father of the essence-energies distinction, calls 
the energy of God a Ôquasi-accidentÕ (συμβεβηκός πως) of the divine being.12 A local 
synodical council under the presidency of Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos in 1351, 
also called the Fifth Ecumenical Council in the East, established the essence-
                                                             
10 Kallistos Ware notes that it is equally legitimate to use the term energy in either the singular or the 
plural since they refer to the natural energy that God has apart from his essence, but the difference 
in usage among the Church Fathers, who use energeia in the singular far more often, suggests a 
greater importance in using the term in the singular; see Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed,Õ 
p. 130.    
11 Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed,Õ p. 134. 
12 Gregory of Palamas, Cap. 150, 135. Torstein Tollefsen points out the term ÔaccidentÕ (συμβεβηκός) 
could mean something like ÔpropertyÕ of God in GregoryÕs argument. Gregory is using this participle 
as an adjective in this passage. In PorphyryÕs Isagoge, which MaximusÕs created ontology follows to a 
great extent in his theology of expansion and contraction, there are four types of meanings that 
ÔpropertyÕ (τὸ ἴδιον, ἰδίωμα, and ἰδιότης) connotes. One nuance of the term in Aristotle and Porphyry 
is that is does not define the whatness or essence of a being. Tollefsen presents a way in which God 
can have a property that does not belong to his essence. He says it is like the capacity a person has to 
laugh, but laughing is not an essential part of the definition of a human being. This is indeed a 
helpful analogy to understand what Gregory is here trying to say about energy being a kind of 
accident, but philosophically this analogy would break down when speaking of the Godhead. From an 
Aristotelian point of view, a Ôquasi-accidentÕ would still not make any sense. Either something is an 
essential property or it is an added property. This also raises issue with understanding theosis and 
participation being a real ontological reality and not just a logical-causal relation to the divine; see 
Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus Confessor (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2008) pp. 
142-43. 
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energies distinction, although this local council did not carry ecumenical authority. 
The council stated that the essence-energies distinction was not merely a notional 
one but also Ôin the being of God,Õ which moves GodÕs activities or energies from 
economy to metaphysics.13 Kallistos Ware14 has extracted eight main points from the 
proceedings of the 1351 council that I would like to present verbatim: 
 
(1) There is in God a distinction (διάκρισις) between the essence and the 
energies or energy. (It is equally legitimate to refer to the latter either in the 
singular or in the plural). 
(2) The energy of God is not created but uncreated (άκτιστος). 
(3) This distinction between the uncreated essence and the uncreated 
energies does not in any way impair the divine simplicity; there is no 
ÔcompositenessÕ (synthesis) in God. 
(4) The term ÔdeityÕ (θεότης) may be applied not only to the essence of God 
but to the energies. 
(5) The essence enjoys a certain priority or superiority in relation to the 
energies, in the sense that the energies proceed from the essence. 
(6) Man can participate in GodÕs energies but not in his essence. 
(7) The divine energies may be experienced by men in the form of light Ñ a 
light which, though beheld through menÕs bodily eyes, is in itself non-
material, ÔintelligibleÕ (νοερόν) and uncreated. This is the uncreated light 
that was manifested to the apostles at the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor, 
that is seen during prayer by the saints in our own time, and that will shine 
upon and from the righteous at their resurrection on the Last Day. It thus 
possesses an eschatological character: it is Ôthe light of the Age to Come.Õ 
(8) No energy is to be associated with one divine person to the exclusion of 
                                                             
13 Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed,Õ p. 134. 
14 Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed,Õ p. 129-30; for the Greek text of the Synodical Tome of 
1351, see I. N. Karmiris, ÔTa dogmatika kai symvolika mnimeia tis Orthodoxou,Õ in Katholikis Ekklisias, Vol. 1 
(Athens, 1960), pp.354-410. 
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the other two, but the energies are shared in common by all three persons of 
the Trinity. 
 
This synod effectively established the diakrisis between God and his energy in the 
Eastern Christian tradition, and it solidified a mystification of theology for this great 
branch of Christianity. God in his essence is unknowable, and access to the divine 
life is only available through a triadic ontology of the imparticipable OneÑ
participable energyÑand participant. In many respects this qualification and 
distinction in the divine being is a positive move away from much of the late 
Scholastic rationalism and Aristotelianism that places God at a great distance from 
his creation.  
In the West, the theologoumenon of the essence-energies distinction is seen as 
a shift in theology away from orthodoxy. The theology certainly did not carry 
ecumenical authority as a major council of the whole Church. Despite this charge of 
innovation, Eastern Orthodox theologians retain the belief that creatures cannot 
know the inner ousia of God, which is what they appear to understand as being the 
Western position.15 Knowledge of God for the Orthodox is only obtained through the 
                                                             
15 Rowan Williams notes that in the Aristotelian framework an ousia is not really an inner core of a 
thing but merely a marking of what kind of thing one is talking about. It is important to add that the 
Iamblician neoplatonic tradition did hold that you can know the ousia of a thing, even God, but that 
with God this was really inconceivable given the limitless nature of God as being not on the same 
scale as the being of creation. In the neoplatonic metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, God is knowable, 
but given his unlimited and infinite nature, any beautific vision of God is a revelation of grace; see 
Rowan Williams, ÔThe Philosophical Structures of Palamism,Õ p. 32. For an examination into the 
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uncreated energies of God, which is described as a theophany of the uncreated glory 
to created eyes much like the transfiguration of Jesus to the disciples. In order to 
explain how God can be simple and separate from the creation, yet intimately 
connected to it, Gregory of Palamas argued that Ônature and energy are not 
identical.Õ16  
Despite the anthropomorphism of such a statement, GregoryÕs dialectic of 
ousia and energia provides a way for him to describe how the unparticipable 
transcendent God can divinize creation. Gregory believes that deification (θέωσις) is 
the reason why this distinction must be made real in God. Without the energies in 
God being distinct from the essence, the Christian is not deified or touched by the 
uncreated light of glory. Much like the Messalian heresy, Gregory thinks that 
understanding energy as created rather than uncreated would remove GodÕs grace 
from deification. Palamas even goes so far as to say that deification, in relation to 
the essence-energies distinction, is ÔenhypostaticÕ like the persons of the Holy 
Trinity. Quoting MaximusÕs Ad Thal. 61, Gregory remarks that: 
Deification is an enhypostatic and direct illumination which has no 
beginning, but appears on those who are worthy as something exceeding 
their comprehension. It is indeed a mystical union with God, beyond 
                                                                                                                                                                              
apophatic nature of AquinasÕs Trinitarian theology, see Karen Kilby, ÔAquinas, the Trinity and the 
Limits of Understanding,Õ International Journal of Systematic Theology, 7/4 (2005), pp. 414-427   
16 Gregory Palamas, Capita 143. trans. and ed. Robert E. Sinkewickz, 150 Chapters (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988), p. 249. 
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intellect and reason, in the age when creatures will no longer know 
corruption. Thanks to this union, the saints, observing the light of the 
hidden and more-than-ineffable glory, become themselves able to receive 
the blessed purity, in company with the celestial powers. Deification is also 
the invocation of the great God and Father, the symbol of the authentic and 
real adoption according to the gift of grace of the Holy Spirit, thanks to the 
bestowal of which grace the saints become and will remain the sons of God.17 
The proceedings of the 1351 council also indicated that the enhypostatic nature of 
the energies was rooted in the Trinity itself and commonly shared among the 
persons: 
[God] is not revealed in his essence (ousia), for no one has ever seen or 
described God's nature (physis); but he is revealed in the grace (charis), power 
(dynamos) and energy (energia) which is common to Father, Son and Spirit. 
Distinctive to each of the three is the person (hypostasis) of each, and 
whatever belongs to the person. Shared in common by all three are not only 
the transcendent essence--which is altogether nameless, unmanifested and 
imparticipable, since it is beyond all names, manifestation and participation-
-but also the divine grace, power, energy, radiance, kingdom and 
incorruption whereby God enters through grace into communion and union 
with the holy angels and the saints.18 
                                                             
17 Gregory Palamas, The Triads, in the Classics of Western Spirituality series, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. 
Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulinist Press, 1983), p. 84. The term enhypostatic in reference to 
deification and the energies of God is a term derived from the Christology of Leontius of Byzantium 
(c. 485 Ð c. 543); see F. LeRon Shultz, ÔA Dubious Christological Formula: From Leontius of Byzantium 
to Karl Barth,Õ Theological Studies 57 (1996), p. 436. For the Cyrillian roots to LeontiusÕs distinction, see 
John J. Lynch, ÔLeontius of Byzantium: A Cyrillian Christology,Õ Theological Studies 36 (1975), pp. 455-
71. For a study on enhypostatic and other words in Leontius, see A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian 
Tradition, vol. 2 (Louisville, KY: Westminter John Knox Press, 1995) pp. 180-205. Maximus will revise 
LeontiusÕs Christology into a synthetic hypostasis with two natures (Ep. 14, PG 91: 489BC); see Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to St. Maximus Confessor (San Francisco, CA: 
Ignatius Press, 2003) pp. 240-60. 
18 trans. Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed,Õ p 408. 
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Gregory also discusses the Ôthree realitiesÕ in God of substance, energy, and the 
three hypostases of persons in his work 150 Chapters.19 The importance of this book 
for our study on grace in Maximus Confessor is the equivalence of the terms Ôgrace,Õ 
Ôpower,Õ Ôenergy,Õ and Ôradiance.Õ Many Orthodox theologians use these common 
theological terms as synonyms when speaking about divine activity. The same is 
also true whether one is speaking about one or many energies of God.20 There is a 
similar connectivity between power, grace, and energy in MaximusÕs thought that is 
crucial for understanding the essence-energy distinction. My argument is that 
divine grace is the best filter to interpret MaximusÕs metaphysics in the essence-
energy question. By interpreting the divine energies as grace, and then rooting 
grace in the Incarnation of Christ, we will avoid reading Maximus as either a 
Palamite or a Neo-Thomist. In both perspectives the full paradox of grace as being 
both uncreated and created at the same time is lost.  
With the essence-energies distinction in the East there is a type of 
paradoxical leap, although not paradoxical enough, into the incomprehensible 
divine life. The union which emerges from this leap is not a fusion of essences; 
rather, everything that God has is communicated through his uncreated energies. 
                                                             
19 Gregory of Palamas, Cap. 150, chapter 75, trans. and ed. Robert E. Sinkewickz, 150 Chapters, p. 171. 
20 Kallistos Ware, ÔGod Hidden and Revealed,Õ p. 130. 
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However, in the Eastern perspective, there is not a tertia quid even if the logic of 
their explanation of the distinction points in this direction. The energies of God are 
not a thing that can come in between God and the creation. However, if the energies 
have an ontological reality, then they technically are a third thing between God and 
creation.  
We will first need to examine how the doctrine of the essence-energies 
distinction emerged in the fourteenth century in Byzantium before discussing 
whether or not this distinction is present in Maximus Confessor. I will argue that 
reading the essence-energies distinction back into Maximus is not justifiable 
textually or theologically, even though many individual passages in his writings 
could lend to the distinction. Gregory did not establish the essence-energies 
distinction in a vacuum. While there are many difficult passages in the Church 
FathersÕs writings that could provide a basis for the distinction, MaximusÕs 
metaphysics of grace presents a better solution to the question of the relationship 
between God and world than a metaphysical distinction. 
2.2 The Emergence of Palamism 
Gregory of Palamas was a monk, archbishop of Thessalonki, and a 
preeminent theologian of Hesychasm. In the words of the great twentieth-century 
theologian John Meyendorff, GregoryÕs theology centralized around one essential 
truth: ÔThe living God is accessible to personal experience, because He shared His 
  27 
own life with humanity.Õ21 Growing up in the court of Byzantine Emperor 
Andronikos II Palaiologos, Gregory received an extensive classical education in 
philosophy. GregoryÕs father was a courtier of the emperor until his early death, and 
the emperor saw to his upbringing and education.  
Instead of pursuing a secular life in government, Gregory retreated into the 
Vatopedi monastery on Mount Athos at the age of twenty. After moving around to a 
couple of monasteries on Athos due to the growing threat of Turkish invasions, 
Gregory founded a community of hermits in Veria just outside of Thessaloniki. The 
practice of hesychasm was common within the communities of monks on Mount 
Athos. The term hesychasm comes from the root hesychia (ἡσυχία), which means 
Ôstillness,Õ Ôrest,Õ Ôquiet,Õ or Ôsilence.Õ22 Hesychasm stemmed from an ancient eremitic 
tradition of prayer found in the communities of the desert of Skete. Hesychasts in 
the Eastern Orthodox tradition practiced the discipline of stillness. Palamas taught 
that when the hesychast is in deep prayer, he or she sees the theophany of the 
divine in an uncreated light with spiritual eyes. The divine ray or energy is not 
something graspable by the created intellect because it transcends the created 
sphere. Gregory asserts one Ôshould hold that intellectual activities are entirely 
                                                             
21 John Meyendorff, ÔIntroduction,Õ Gregory Palamas, The Triads, in the Classics of Western Spirituality 
series, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulinist Press, 1983), p. 1. 
22 eds. Ken Parry, David Melling, The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity (Malden, MA.: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1999), p. 230. 
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bypassed by the light of union and by the action of this light.Õ23 Since the light is the 
direct uncreated experience of God, it cannot be reduced to a created entity or 
energy. Thus, for Palamas the grace and energy of God are an uncreated 
phenomenon that transcend the immanent world yet penetrate it at the same time. 
Coterminous with the experience of the true uncreated divine energies is the non-
experience of the essence of God in his simplicity. The simple and utterly 
transcendent divine essence cannot be identified with the experience of the divine 
energies. As Gregory notes time and again, Ôit [divine illumination] is uncreated and 
not identical to the divine substance.Õ24  
Around the year 1330, Barlaam of Calabria (Seminara in southern Italy more 
specifically) came to Constantinople and began debating the Latin insertion of the 
fillioque clause in the creed. For Barlaam, the Trinity and the procession of the Holy 
Spirit were completely unknowable.25 He took this agnostic stance based upon a 
selection of writings from the fifth or sixth century theologian Pseudo-Dionysius. In 
BarlaamÕs reading of Pseudo-DionysiusÕs work The Divine Names, he emphasized the 
negative or apophatic method of knowing God. Pseudo-Dionysius made numerous 
                                                             
23 Gregory of Palamas, The Triads, trans. Nicholas Gendle, The Triads, p. 91. 
24 Gregory of Palamas, 150 Chapters, chapter 65, trans. and ed. Robert E. Sinkewickz, 150 Chapters, p. 
159. 
25 Gregory of Palamas, Dialogue Between an Orthodox and a Barlamite, trans. Rein Ferwerda, intro. Sarah 
J. Benning-Bolle (Binghampton: NY, Global Publications at SUNY Binghampton University, 1999), p. 3.  
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statements on apophaticism in his works, such as the following:  
God is therefore known in all things and is distinct from all things. He is 
known through knowledge and through unknowing. Of him there is 
conception, reason, understanding, touch, perception, opinion, imagination, 
name, and many other thingsÉHe is not one of the things that are and he 
cannot be known in any of them.26   
Palamas communicated through several letters that Barlaam did not read 
the full text of Pseudo-Dionysius, which showed that there are participations and 
aspects of God that can be known through mystical experience.27 Barlaam then 
sought to completely discredit Gregory by mocking the practices of the Hesychasts 
on a visit to Thessaloniki:  
Miraculous separations and reunions of the spirit and the soul, of the traffic 
which demons have with the soul, of the difference between red lights and 
white lights, of the entry and departure of the intelligence through the 
nostrils with the breath, of the shields that gather together round the navel, 
and finally of the union of Our Lord with the soul, which takes place in the 
full and sensible certitude of the heart within the navel.28 
Barlaam thought that the monks were committing the heresy of Messalianism, 
where GodÕs essence was completely knowable by created intellect. Barlaam made a 
                                                             
26 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 7.3 (PG 3: 872A), trans. Luidheid, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), pp. 108-09. 
27 J. Konstantinovsky, 'Dionysius the Areopagite versus Aristotle?' in Studia Patristica vol. XLII, eds. 
Frances Margaret Young, Mark J. Edwards, and Paul M. Parvis (Leuven: Peters, 2006) p. 318. 
28 Steven Runciman, The Great Church in captivity: a study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the eve 
of the Turkish conquest to the Greek War of Independence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), p. 141.  
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quip about seeing the divine light, ÔI must confess that I do not know what this light 
is. I only know that it does not exist.Õ29 
 Gregory wrote a series of triads in response to BarlaamÕs attacks, where he 
develops his argument for the essence-energies distinction. In his triad ÔEssence and 
Energies in God,Õ Gregory Palamas makes the distinction that there are aspects of 
God that are not his essence but are also ÔunoriginateÕ powers, such as knowing, 
prescience, creating and deification.30 With great cleverness, Gregory presents the 
dialectic that either God acquired these powers subsequently from himself, which 
would make him not God, or God possessed these faculties and powers from 
eternity. Therefore, the powers or energies of God are uncreated (the light of 
Hesychasm). Holy Tradition also requires that God have a single unoriginate 
essence. The combination of these two theological beliefs about the nature and 
activity of God led Gregory to affirm both a single unoriginate essence in God and 
uncreated energies or Ôworks.Õ31  
Gregory cites Basil, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius 
and Maximus in several places as teaching the doctrine of the distinction in the 
                                                             
29 Steven Runciman, The Great Church in captivity: a study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the eve 
of the Turkish conquest to the Greek War of Independence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), p. 141.  
30 Gregory Palamas, The Triads, trans. Nicholas Gendle, The Triads, p. 93. 
31 Gregory Palamas, The Triads, trans. Nicholas Gendle, The Triads, p. 93. 
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nature of God between the essence and the energies.32 St. Cyril of Alexandria said 
that Ôthe divine nature is ineffable and cannot be comprehended by us in its fullest 
possible form, but only in what it accomplishes and effects.Õ33 St. Basil made the 
same point earlier in the famous debate with Eunomius. In Letter 234 to 
Amphilochius Basil writes:  
Do you worship what you know or what you do not know? If I answer, I 
worship what I know, they immediately reply, What is the essence of the 
object of worship? Then, if I confess that I am ignorant of the essence, they 
turn on me again and say, so you worship you know not what. I answer that 
the word to know has many meanings. We say that we know the greatness of 
God, His power, His wisdom, His goodness, His providence over us, and the 
justness of His judgment; but not His very essence. The question is, 
therefore, only put for the sake of dispute. For he who denies that he knows 
the essence does not confess himself to be ignorant of God, because our idea 
of God is gathered from all the attributes which I have enumerated. But God, 
he says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him you have reckoned as 
knowable is of His essenceÉIf they [Eunomians] say, yes, let them not ask if 
we know the essence of God, but let them enquire of us whether we know 
God to be awful, or just, or merciful. These we confess that we know. If they 
say that essence is something distinct, let them not put us in the wrong on 
the score of simplicity. For they confess themselves that there is a 
distinction between the essence and each one of the attributes enumerated. 
The operations are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we know 
our God from His operations, but do not undertake to approach near to His 
essence. His operations come down to us, but His essence remains beyond 
                                                             
32 See particularly chapters 71-81 in Gregory of Palamas, 150 Chapters, trans. and ed. Robert E. 
Sinkewickz; The Triads, pp. 167-79. 
33 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John 3.2 (PG 73: 259D-260A), trans. by Russell Norman, Cyril of 
Alexandria (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 23. 
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our reach.34 
In this passage, Basil is discussing the way in which the creature can know God. It 
should be noticed that Basil assails the Eunomians for affirming a distinction 
between GodÕs essence and his energies. Basil rejects the metaphysical distinction 
proposed by the Eunomians in order to affirm the limit of human knowledge of 
GodÕs essence in the realm of epistemology. GodÕs essence is ÔincomprehensibleÕ and 
Ôinfinite,Õ says John Damascene,35 and the only truths that we can know about God 
are his infinity and incomprehensibility. In the midst of conflict with the 
Eunomians, this appeal to creaturely ignorance is certainly a pious response on 
BasilÕs part. The other two great Cappadocian fathers, Gregory Nazianzen and 
Gregory of Nyssa, also verify this critique of Basil by affirming that no man will ever 
be able to determine GodÕs essence or nature.36 Gregory of Nyssa avows that only the 
energies of God come down to creaturely existence, but the essence remains 
transcendent and unreachable.37 Though there are basic Palamite elements here 
                                                             
34 Basil of Ceasarea, Letter 234, trans. by Blomfield Jackson, From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second 
Series, Vol. 8., eds. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 
1895). 
35 John of Damascene. An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 1.4 (PG 94: 800B), trans. by E.W. Watson and L. 
Pullan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series, vol. 9, eds. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 
(Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1899.  
36 Gregory Nazienzen, Oration 28 (PG 36: 25A). 
37 Gregory of Nyssa, Homily on the Beatitudes (PG 44: 1269A). 
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concerning the essence of God not being reachable and his energies reachable, there 
are no averting metaphysical distinctions being made in the Cappadocians. Torstein 
Tollefsen, who consequently does accept the essence-energies distinction in 
Maximus, acknowledges that at least with Basil and Gregory Nazianzen the conflict 
with Eunomius supports the view that they are mainly dealing with knowledge of 
God and not with a metaphysical distinction in God.38 Gregory of Nyssa is more 
difficult on this point since he does talk about God being within himself and around 
himself (περί αὐτό),39 but as David Balas points out, the logic of understanding the 
divine attributes or perfections as lesser than God would render our language about 
him superfluous.40 Gregory states that the essence of God and the Good are not 
separate but are one and the same.41 He clearly describes the consequences of not 
holding the essence and perfections of God together: 
If we grant the view of the impious that the good does not reside essentially 
(κατ' ουσίαν) in the Vivifying Power (ζοποιου δυναμος) but is added to it 
(προσγινεσθαι) by participation (εκ μετουσιας), we should not call it good in 
the proper sense, but would be compelled to regard it as something 
differentÉneither will the good be found in it (i.e. in the Vivifying Power) 
eternally, nor will it be comprehended according to its essence (αυτό ὅπερ 
                                                             
38 Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus Confessor, pp. 73, 151. 
39 Gregory of Nyssa, Homily on the Beatitudes (PG 44: 1263D). 
40 David, Balas, ManÕs Participations in GodÕs Perfections According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa (Rome: 
Pontificium Institutum, 1966), p. 59. 
41 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 1.19. 
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ἐστί) in the nature of the goodÉfor if they become good by partaking (το 
μετεχειν) of the better (τοῦ κρείττονος), it is plain that before the 
participation (μετουσιας) they were not such.42 
This passage from the Contra Eunomium demonstrates that an essence-
energies distinction is not justifiably present in Gregory of NyssaÕs theology. 
However, in this tractate Gregory does appear to hold both positions that the 
perfections (i.e., energies) of God are unitary with God, such that He is the giver of 
Being instead a participant in Being, and also that the perfections come forth from 
God as being around him (περί αὐτό). Tollefsen43 is right to suggest that this cluster 
of ideas in Gregory could lend to a Palamite distinction, but there is nothing explicit 
in GregoryÕs writings to suggest that the perfections, in which creatures participate, 
are not created realities. With the Cappadocian fathers there is more of a noetic 
response to the question of the essence and energies of God rather than a 
metaphysically real distinction in the Godhead.  
There were Eastern Fathers who did unite GodÕs essence with His energy. In 
book one of his An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, St. John Damascene (or Damascus, 
c. 675Ð749 CE) describes the divine nature as a unified single act or energy 
                                                             
42 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, quoted and translated by David, Balas, ManÕs Participations in 
GodÕs Perfections According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, p. 58, Greek inserted by me. 
43 Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus Confessor, pp. 156-159. 
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(ενέργεια).44 God is also Ôperfect, without blemish in goodness, and wisdom, and 
power, without beginning, without end, everlasting, uncircumscribed 
(απερίγραπτον) and in short, perfect in all things.Õ45 Damascene even states that the 
energy of the Godhead is simple and one, Ôthe Deity is simple and has one simple 
energy, good and energizing in all things, just as the sunÕs ray, which warms all 
things and energizes in each in harmony with its natural aptitude and receptive 
power, having obtained this form of energy from God, its Maker.Õ46  
Damascene is just emphasizing the Maximian and Cappadocian principle 
that every existing nature has a natural energy.47 Still, the point of this passage by 
Damascene is to emphasize the unity of God with his actions, and the assertion that 
God has a natural energy does not thereby mean that it is distinguished from the 
essence, and by terming the divine energy itself as simple would indicate that 
Damascene does not note a division between energy and the essence. Similarly, the 
Apostolic Fathers, such as Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria, deal with the unity 
                                                             
44 John of Damascene. An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 3.15, trans. by E.W. Watson and L. Pullan, in 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series, vol. 9. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, 
NY: Christian Literature, 1899).  
45 John Damascene, The Orthodox Faith 1.5. 
46 John Damascene, The Orthodox Faith 1.10; see also Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, 5.2; Gregory 
of Nazianzen, Oration 37 and 45; Gregory of Nyssa, On ÔNot Three GodsÕ to Ablabius; and Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, I, 1.11, Art. 4. 
47 Maximus, Pyrrh. 33 (PG 91: 340D).  
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of God in writing against the Marcionites and the Manich¾ans. Through the 
Cappadocian FathersÕs engagement with the Eunomians, divine simplicity is 
maintained, and the divine attributes and energies are not separated from the 
essence of God.48   
Maximus uses infinity as the basis for not knowing the essence of God: ÔFor 
the wonderful grandeur of GodÕs infinity is without quantity or parts, and 
completely without dimension, and offers no grip to take hold of it and to know 
what it is in its essence.Õ49 In talking about the nature of the infinity in Amb. 10, 
Maximus states Ôif no kind of essential difference can exist from eternity as the 
infiniteÕs other, then the infinite can be in no way receptive of duality [the dyad].Õ50 
The creature cannot circumscribe the Creator or be on par with Him. This is an 
orthodox Christian belief in the absolute ontological divide between God and all 
things after God. However, for Maximus this does not mean that the Ôdivine activityÕ 
is divided from the one God or not simple in itself. God is Ôshared without division,Õ 
                                                             
48 For a newer study that argues that simplicity does change in the Cappadocian fathers, see Andrew 
Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity, Oxford 
Early Christian Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
49 Maximus, Myst. 5 (PG 91: 677A0), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p 192. For comments 
concerning knowledge of essence in a Christological sense, see Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 7:79).  
50 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1185A), Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 142; the Greek here for Ôessential 
differenceÕ is οὐσίαν διάφορον. 
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and this reflects the Ôsimplicity and indivisibilityÕ of His natural energy.51  
2.3 False Generalizations 
The methodological tool of divine simplicity takes priority in Latin patristic 
theology, but that does not mean that this methodology is inconsistent with the 
Greek fathers understanding of divine simplicity and the participatory framework 
in which divinization is presented in the Greek tradition. Such an ascription would 
be incorrect to apply to the Western tradition as a whole. 
There are many Western theologians, such as Nicholas of Cusa, who embrace 
both divine simplicity and full participation in God. In De Coniecturas 1.11, Nicholas 
of Cusa describes the complete paradoxical participation in God yet also non-
participation of God at the same time. It is arguably the best statement of full 
participation52 using the paradoxical reading in the Western tradition: 
Created minds do not receive into themselves the ray of Divine Light as if by 
their nature they preceded their partaking [of the Divine Light]. Rather, the 
intellectÕs partaking of that unimpartible, most actual Light constitutes the 
[respective] quiddity of created minds. Therefore, the actuality of our 
intelligence consists in its partaking of the Divine Intellect. But since that 
most actual Power can be received only with a variety-of-otherness (a 
variety, that is, which is received somehow concurrently with the power), it 
happens that the participant-minds partake of the most actual Intellect with 
                                                             
51 Maximus, Myst. 5 (PG 91: 677B). 
52 I am indebted to John Milbank for pointing out this incredible passage of Nicholas of Cusa. 
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a degree of othernessÑi.e., with that degree of actuality which (in relation to 
the Divine Intellect) is otherness or potency. Therefore, it is rather the case 
that our entire intelligence consists of participation in the Divine Actuality 
with a degree of potency. For in this way the ability actually to understand 
truth, as it is, befits created mindsÑeven as it is proper to our God that the 
Divine Actuality be partaken of with various degrees of potency by created 
minds. Therefore, the more Godlike an intelligence is, the nearer its potency 
is to Actuality as it is; but the more obscure an intelligence is, the more 
distant [it is from Actuality]. Therefore, Actuality is partaken of differently 
and variously by near, by remote, and by very remote potency. Moreover, 
that Inaccessible Loftiness is not to be approached as if there could be no 
access at all to it. Nor, having been approached, is that Loftiness to be 
supposed actually to have been [perfectly] apprehended. Rather, [we are to 
believe] that it can always be approached more closely, while it remains ever 
unattainable as it is [in itself]. By way of comparison, time advances toward 
everlastingness, with which it can never attain equality, even though it 
approaches continuallyÉLet one who keeps in mind these statements make a 
surmise about participation in the following way. Since whatever can be 
partaken of is partaken of only with a degree of otherness, it will have to be 
partaken of in fourfoldness; for oneness both goes forth from itself into 
otherness and exists in a fourfold way. Whatever is partaken of by 
something else cannot be received either maximally or minimally or equally. 
Moreover, since onenessÕs simplicity is not partaken of insofar as it is simple 
but is partaken of otherwise, it is partaken of with a degree of 
compositeness, so to speak, or with a falling away from that simplicityÑi.e., 
with a degree of difference from simplicity. Therefore, simplicity, since it is 
simplicity, is not partaken of in parts but in the way in which what-is-simple 
can be partaken of according to itself as a whole. However, since onenessÕs 
simplicity is unimpartible maximally, minimally, and equally (for it is 
partaken of, as it is, [only] by means of a coincidence, as is shown in Learned 
Ignorance) it will have to be partaken of with a certain fourfoldness that falls 
short of maximality, minimality, and equality. Therefore, oneness is 
partaken of not insofar as it is an enfolding simplicity or insofar as it is 
unfolded in otherness but insofar as its changeable and unfolding power-to-
be-partaken-of is understood (by means of a certain coincidence) as a mode-
of-power of the enfolding, unpartakeableoneness.53 
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In the essence-energies debate there is much in the way of generalization 
that causes division instead of understanding. The West can hold that the creation 
both participates and does not participate in the godhead. Confusion and ideological 
difference comes into view in the essence-energies debate with the way both 
Christian traditions understand participation and deification. There is a 
generalization of the Christian East by the Christian West that the logic of the 
essence-energies distinction infers a metaphysical distinction in God that was 
considered in patristic thought to be merely an epistemological point, and thus the 
Christian East advocates compositeness in God.54  
Even the then young Rowan Williams in his 1977 article on the essence-
energies distinction glossed over the Neoplatonic concept of participation as being 
only a causative and logic point.55 In point of fact, the Neoplatonic absorption of 
Plato and Aristotle created a harmony between understanding the God as immanent 
in the world and transcendent from it. So, there is a much greater ontological 
connection in the philosophy of participation in Neoplatonic thought than the West 
often will admit, and it is this ontological paradox of participation in God that gives 
the Orthodox tradition immense explanatory power. However, for a more complete 
                                                                                                                                                                              
pp. 189-91. 
54 Rowan Williams, ÔThe Philosophical Structures of Palamism,Õ p. 39. 
55 Rowan Williams, ÔThe Philosophical Structures of Palamism,Õ p. 34. 
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answer to the problem of participation, Eastern Orthodox theology needs to move 
towards a more radical trajectory than a real distinction in God between his essence 
and energies.  
Metropolitan Kallistos Ware also notes that the ditheistic charge (i.e., 
compositeness in God) was laid against St. Gregory of Palamas by his detractor 
Barlaam the Calabrian (ca. 1290-1348 CE) in the fourteenth century Hesychast 
controversy, but Gregory was conscientious of the issue of divine simplicity and 
emphatically affirmed that there is between the essence and energies of God Ôa 
union without confusion, a distinction without division.Õ56 He used the analogy of 
the faculties of the soul that are distinct aspects of the one soul.57 Despite difficult 
and conflicting passages on the nature of the essence-energies distinction in 
GregoryÕs argument, he did not move away from the conviction of divine simplicity. 
As Tollefsen notes, Ôa Palamist, even if he speaks about the ÔenergyÕ as Ôoutside of the 
essence,Õ does not mean that it is established as some kind of quasi-hypostasis 
ÔbetweenÕ the essence and the things on which it operates. The activity does not 
ÔfollowÕ the essence in this external fashion.Õ58 From my own reading of PalamasÕs 
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writings, I would agree that not separating God from his activity is at the heart of 
his intensions, but he does not add clarity to this intention through the use of 
muddled definitions, such as the energies being Ôquasi-accidents.Õ59  
In defending the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit against Barlaam, as opposed to 
the Spirit being an energy of God, Palamas affirmed Ôthat the divine energy, even 
though it is referred to somehow as an accident, is nevertheless contemplated in 
God but does not bring about composition.Õ60 So Gregory rejects the charge that the 
essence-energies distinction creates a composite or synthetic being.61 Instead, the 
energy of God 'is not separate [from the essence] but is distinct from the substance 
of God because it is from the substance, though it is participated by creatures.'62 In 
the third triad, Palamas uses the example of the soul, which is simple but has 
multiple powers to it.63 He further uses the example of the hypostasis of the Trinity 
that are three yet not separated from the oneness of the Godhead. This may be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
there is no separation between them, then this is not philosophically different from the Western 
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241. 
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helpful conceptually in understanding how the essence-energies distinction can be 
both a separation and union in God, but comparing energy to hypostasis in the 
Trinity breaks down on a fundamental level.  
Maximus verifies the logical breakdown of this argument in his debate 
against Pyrrhus. In referring to PyrrhusÕs position of a single energy in Christ, 
Maximus counters that Pyrrhus is actually committing an argument ad absurdum: ÔIf, 
as you [Pyrrhus] say, a person be introduced with an operation, and you support 
[the fact that] many energies proceed from the same Person of God the Word 
Incarnate, then you must also support as many persons [in Christ] as there are 
energies. So His Persons and His energies are found to be infinite!Õ64 For Gregory to 
apply his Trinitarian analogy in a literal manner, he would have to concede that in 
God the divine energy would be in three just as there are three hypostatic persons. 
Also, as Rowan Williams has noted, ousia in Aristotelian terms (second substance) 
generally refers to the ÔkindÕ of thing you are dealing with, not with the inner 
nature or principle of a thing.65 So there is a confusion of terms here when Gregory 
discusses the divine ousia.  
MaximusÕs response to the Monothelite controversy provides another 
defense of the essence-energies distinction for Gregory and the 1351 council. 
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Barlaam says to Gregory, ÔI have heard that this grace and glory [energies] are 
supernatural and akin to God, for it is said that like is contemplated by like. So, since 
this reality is uncreated and unoriginate, I say that it is the essence of God.Õ66 
Gregory retorts that this is the worst impiety because by equating energy with 
created realities, one does not allow God to have a natural energy and existence. 
Palamas reiterates MaximusÕs position against Pyrrhus that everything that exists 
has a natural energy, and if the divine essence had created energies, which were 
equated with the essence, then the essence of God would also be created.67 Gregory 
argues, following Maximus, that if the divine nature of Christ were created, then 
there would not be an identifiable distinction between two created natures. 
Juan-Miguel Garrigues has pointed out in an important article entitled, 
ÔLÕEnergie Divine et Grace chez Maxime le Confesseur,Õ that just because the 1351 
council affirmed the essence-energies distinction using the theology of the two wills 
and energies of Christ formula of Maximus does not mean that Maximus therefore 
thought that the divine nature has a further distinction of the energy from the 
essence.68 Garrigues posits that, ÔIf the energies were formally distinct from their 
essence, nothing prevents the energies of the two natures of Christ from 
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superseding the natures, such as His divine energy over his human operation.Õ69 The 
logic that Garrigues presses here is that nature and activity in Christ must not be 
distinct or else the tension between the human and divine gives way to the power of 
the divine energy over his human nature. Essentially, a Palamite reading of 
Christology will lose the very synergy that Maximus argues for in his disputation 
against Pyrrhus. Divine energy would most certainly override human energy, which 
reverts back to the Monothelite position. In MaximusÕs Christology, there is a 
harmoniously equal union of the two natures without confusion.  
Gregory has a pious goal throughout his polemics with Barlaam because he 
wants the worship and experience of God by the creature to be real knowledge and 
experience of the divine life. At the same time, Gregory does not want to bring the 
Creator down to the level of the creature. The problem is that Palamas does not 
allow the paradox of participation that he is arguing for to go far enough into God. A 
real distinction creates an ontological limbo zone between God and the world that 
the traditional Christian understanding of creation will simply not allow, and the 
problem of ontotheology still remains in place.  
Gregory paradoxically holds together both truths that God is not 
participable in his essence but fully participle in his energies, which are both other 
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than the essence and God. For Gregory, God Ôalso possesses that which is other than 
substanceÕ (έχει ὅ Θεός και ὅ  μέν ἐστιν ο ὐσία), which he calls energeia. Recent 
scholarship has pointed out that this dialectic is possibly drawn from the Plotinian 
idea of a double activity of the One ÔofÕ and Ôout ofÕ the essence (ενέργεια της ουσίας, 
ενέργεια εκ της ουσίας), but there are no textual links in the Fathers with this 
concept that I have been able to find.70 This double activity is more of a formal 
distinction than a real distinction within Plotinus and later Neoplatonism (this idea 
is not the same in Proclus, who is the main source of Dionysius and MaximusÕs 
metaphysics). There is also the issue of internal and external activity in 
Neoplatonism, which refers to the generation of forms by the hypostasis of Intellect, 
not the One. Plus, the Athenian school of Neoplatonism never made a real 
distinction between essence and energy in divinity.71 Neoplatonism in general held 
that the higher levels establish the formal reciprocity of the lower levels. This, 
however, does not fully solve the problem of participation in a Christian context 
where creation ex nihilo requires the ontological difference of the creature from the 
Creator.  
GregoryÕs argument for the essence-energies distinction has been compared 
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to the parallel debate in the West over the Scotist Ôformal distinctionÕ in God. John 
Milbank notes that Barlaam held the view that God only acts in the world through 
mediating powers, which are created.72 Gregory, much like Duns Scotus, looks at God 
and the soul on analogous levels. GodÕs essence is not identical with his energies 
(nor his omnipresence identical to his essence73), and this distinction is like the soul 
in that the faculties of the soul, such as hearing or seeing, are not what the soul is in 
itself.74 Milbank contends that Palamas indulges here in a somewhat univocalist and 
onto-theological association between God and the human being.75 Further, by 
prioritizing infinity (Plotinian transcendence beyond intellection) over simplicity, 
Gregory brings the same problem of ScotusÕs formal distinction into metaphysics.  
For Scotus, infinite Being separates God and the soul, but they are still 
univocally the same with regard to their formal character. So, participation in GodÕs 
energies would then be in an intermediate sphere between the concept in the mind 
and in reality. This would cut deification off from the whole of the Godhead, which 
is in opposition to what Gregory is attempting to do in his defense against Barlaam. 
Torstein Tollefsen posits the question whether the term ÔrealÕ in the Ôreal 
                                                             
72 John Milbank, ÔChristianity and Platonism: East and WestÕ (forthcoming). 
73 Gregory Palamas, The Triads, trans. Nicholas Gendle, p. 96-97. 
74 Triads, III 2.22. This passage is not in MeyendorffÕs edition of the Greek text. 
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distinctionÕ is the problem that causes misunderstanding.76 It appears though that 
PalamasÕs pious and creative theology of the essence-energies distinction creates a 
problem for deification whether it is metaphysically formal or real. However, 
interpreting the essence-energies distinction as a formal does open up a pathway 
for Eastern and Western theology to have dialogue together. But, as postmodernism 
and secularism in the West has shown, a formal ontology between God and the 
creation still leads to ontotheological metaphysics.    
2.4 Conclusion 
The West still continues to affirm that such a distinction between the 
essence and energies of God in Gregory of Palamas and by the 1351 council violates 
the holy tradition and logic of divine simplicity.77 There are a few contemporary 
Roman Catholic theologians, such as Jeffrey Finch, who assert that the essence-
energies distinction does not posit an insurmountable obstacle to ecumenical 
relations or theology.78 On the other side of the debate is Greek Orthodox theologian 
Nikolaos Loudovikos, who says that the essence-energies distinction requires a 
Ônon-confessional esprit large.Õ Is there such a spirit in the theology of St. Maximus?79 
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We will now turn to the emergence of MaximusÕs concept of divine energy and 
grace through an examination of the divine processions of Pseudo-Dionysius. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
   
 
3.1 Metaphysics and Grace 
 Maximus Confessor was a remarkable Byzantine theologian who synthesized 
the theological tradition before him and offered his own unique contributions. One 
major transformation that Maximus made to Greek patristic theology was the 
remoulding of the Pseudo-Dionysian doctrine of the divine processions from the 
Godhead. Instead of emphasizing the procession of divine gifts from God in more 
emanative language, Maximus generally used the language of divine energy 
(ἐνέργεια), but as we will see energy is conceived in his system in a dual manner. 
However, both Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus rejected the theory of emanation as 
found in several strands of Neoplatonism.1 Grace in MaximusÕs theology is 
metaphysical, in that the divine gifts of God ineffably descend into the cosmos in an 
infinite sea of effable energies or activities.2 For the present chapter, I would like to 
analyse how Maximus, along with later interpreters, received the divine processions  
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of Pseudo-Dionysius. Such an analysis will provide a clearer picture as to whether 
Maximus understands grace to be uncreated, created or both.    
3.2 Participation in God According to Neoplatonism,  
Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus 
 
A student of Patristic theology will know that Christian beliefs often 
countered many of the philosophic assumptions of Hellenic thought, but they also 
often adapted philosophic categories to explain or communicate divine mysteries 
and revelations.3 One of the most radical theological oppositions to Hellenic thought 
and philosophy is the Christian claim of the creation of the world ex nihilo, out of 
nothing. Maximus will describe this doctrine through his theology of the divisions 
of nature, in which the first division is between created and uncreated natures (i.e., 
the world and God).4 Despite this strict ontological divide between God and the 
world, the Divine nonetheless shares the gift of his very self with the intelligible and 
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2008) pp. 6-16; idem., ÔSt. Maximus Confessor, Philosopher or Theologian,Õ in Byzantino-Nordica 2004: 
papers presented at the international symposium of Byzantine studies, eds. Ivo Volt and Janika Pll 
(Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press, 2005), pp. 73-79; A. Edward Siecienski, The Filioque: History of a 
Doctrinal Controversy, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp. 73-86; Polycarp Sherwood, An Annotated Date-List of the 
Works of Maximus Confessor, (Rome: Herder, 1952), pp. 1-2; Eric Perl, ÔMethexis: Creation, Incarnation, 
Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor,Õ (PhD. Dissertation, Yale University, 1991), pp. 1-28; and 
Melchisedec Toronen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of Saint Maximus Confessor, (Oxford: OUP, 
2007), pp. 13-34. 
4 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1308A-C). 
  51 
sensible cosmos. The gift of existence itself is derivative from the highest levels of 
ontology to the lowest. 
In Amb. 7, Maximus attacks the substance of what is perhaps falsely 
understood and termed the ÔOrigenist myth.Õ In this myth, there is an original fall of 
souls from a primitive henad before the creation (due to a desire of something other 
than God).5 The Origenist cosmology contains the triad of restÑmovementÑ
creation, while the Confessor reverses this order to be creationÑmovementÑrest.6 
It is impossible, says Maximus, Ôto have movement before something has come into 
being.Õ7 It is also untenable to hold that rest can occur before movement, for Ôunless 
that which is ultimately desirable is possessed, nothing else is of such a nature as to 
bring to rest what is being driven by desire.Õ8 If souls were driven by desire for 
something other than God and subsequently fell into movement, then Maximus 
                                                             
5 Origen, De Principiis. 2.9.1. Origen uses the term ÔPrimitive MonadÕ to describe this original unity 
before Creation. Evagrius uses the term ÔHenad.Õ See John BambergerÕs discussion concerning these 
terms in Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos, Cistercian Studies Series: Number Four (Spencer, MA: 
Cistercian Publications, 1970) pp. lxxv-lxxix. Guillaumont also analyzes the Henad, Les 'Kephalaia 
Gnostica' D'evagre Le Pontique, in Patrologiae Orientalis vol. 28, ed. R. Griffin, F. Nau (Paris, 1897-). Later in 
De Principiis 2.9.8, Origen argues that just as there will be a final judgment of all, so there must have 
been a previous judgment in this pre-existent state that initiated the fall. This metaphysical schema 
is the basis for the development of the logoi (λόγοι) by Maximus. 
6 Cf. Sherwood Polycarp, The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, 
(Rome: 1955), pp. 92-3. 
7 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1072A). 
8 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1069B). 
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posits that there is nothing to prevent this from happening ad infinitum.9 Maximus 
therefore attributes this myth to a reductio ad absurdum.  
So, as an orthodox theologian, Maximus affirms the Christian understanding 
of creation ex nihilo, which rejects the notion of creation as a fall into corporeality. 
What MaximusÕs metaphysics of creation and motion also reveal is a more 
Aristotelian understanding of the relationship between God and the cosmos. Instead 
of emanative procession (though Maximus is not without any language of 
emanation), Maximus uses the language of energy to describe the Neoplatonic 
notion of participation (μέθεξις) in the One. However, as we will see, Maximus 
understands participation in divine energy as being that of grace. Before 
investigating the dynamics of grace and energy in Maximus, we need to ask if it is 
possible to speak of the philosophical notion of participation in the thought of 
Maximus?  
While Maximus does not directly cite Neoplatonic sources in his writing, 
many of the philosophical structures and terminology of Neoplatonic thought can 
be found throughout his oeuvre. Even though most of MaximusÕs philosophical 
metaphysics were most likely received through the filter of Pseudo-Dionysius and 
                                                             
9 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1069C).  
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the Cappadocian Fathers, the mechanisms of Neoplatonic metaphysics are still 
essential aspects of his system even if theology and mystical experience transcend 
the limits of philosophical description and speculation. This is evident throughout 
MaximusÕs theology of grace and deification. In a well-known passage from Amb. 7, 
Maximus presses the bounds of logic by describing how the Christian can become 
god by grace without losing or disintegrating the logos of his or her nature: Ôhe 
places himself wholly in God alone, wholly imprinting and forming God alone in 
himself, so that by grace he is God and is called God.Õ10 Given that according to 
traditional accounts, Maximus received a classical education in Constantinople, it 
would not be over-speculating to say that he would have been familiar with some 
Neoplatonic philosophy and Aristotelian commentators.11 In terms of method, there 
is a difficulty in delineating whether there is merely a common vocabulary being 
employed or if indeed there is a Ôdespoiling of the Egyptians.Õ However, I believe the 
thought of Plotinus (CE 204 - 270) and Proclus (CE 412 Ð 485) forms the general 
philosophical background for MaximusÕs thinking on participation in God (although 
not directly stated by him) and his theological thinking in relation to participation 
mostly follows the insights of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius. 
                                                             
10 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084C), trans. Paul Blowers, On The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ 
(Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 2003), p. 60. 
 
11 A. Edward Siecienski, The Filioque, pp. 73-86. 
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Again, it might also be the case that said philosophical influences were filtered 
through the theological ones.  
Participation in Greek philosophical thought has a varied history. In general 
the verb μετέχειν (and also the noun μέθεξις) means Ôto share inÕ or Ôto partake of.Õ12 
Since physical things cannot have a whole form or an ideal Form, such as in the 
thought of Plato, there must be a way to understand how the parts can share in the 
wholes. Forms are also separated from their particulars, and particulars are 
dependent upon the Forms for their determinant existence.13 Plato used several 
alternative words to describe sharing in the Forms, such as communion (κοινωνία), 
imitation (μίμησις), and imaging (εἰκασία), but the material implications of μέθεξις 
leads to a Ôthird manÕ argument whereby when a part is shared of the whole, then 
the whole no longer retains simplicity and self-integrity, which requires another 
connecting aspect, ad infinitum.14 A symmetrical relationship between part and 
whole, or particular to form, does not hold up to philosophical scrutiny. Later 
                                                             
12 Maximus also frequently uses ÔμετουσίαÕ (sharing the essence of something) and τὸ μετέχον (the 
having of a portion of something, a ἕξις). For a discussion of the various terminology of participation 
in Maximus, see Torstein Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus Confessor, pp. 193-94. 
 
13 Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1996), p. 72. 
14 Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus, p. 72. See also Vivian Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: 
Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, vol. 69 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), p. 
130. 
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Neoplatonism affirms an asymmetrical relationship between copies and patterns of 
Forms. Proclus demonstrates the asymmetrical relationship of particulars to 
principles in his Elements of Theology through an elaboration on the four ontological 
levels of unity: substantive being, intellect, soul and body.  
For all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language, pertains 
to beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of truth. For it comes 
into contact with conceptions, and subsists in intellections. But the Gods are 
beyond all being. Neither, therefore, that which is divine doxastic 
[δοξαστόν], or the object of opinion, nor is it dianoetic [διανοητὸν], nor 
intelligible [νοητόν]. For every being is either sensible, and on this account 
doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account intelligible, or it is 
between these, subsisting as being and at the same time generation, and on 
this account is dianoetic. If, therefore, the Gods are superessential 
[ὑπερούσιον], and subsist prior to beings, there is neither any opinion of 
them, nor science and dianoia, nor intellection. But the nature of their 
peculiarities is known by the beings that are suspended from them. And this 
by a necessary consequence. For the differences of participants are co-
divided conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And 
neither does every thing participate of every thing; for there is no 
coordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any causal thing 
participate of that which is causal. But that which is kindred is conjoined to 
that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it is allied.15 
Maximus will follow this model for the rules of participation up and down the 
ontological hierarchy, but he will also transform this metaphysical notion into a 
Christian metaphysics of grace. This will be important for the larger question of the 
                                                             
15 Proclus, ET 123, trans. Thomas Taylor (Dorset, UK: The Prometheus Trust, 2006), p. 72, Greek 
inserted by me. 
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essence-energies distinction because of the notions of necessary ontological 
intermediaries between the One and the many in some schools of Neoplatonism. 
The metaphysical problems of participation just outlined began with the 
central deliberation of PlatoÕs Parmenides: is Being a single reality or monism, or do 
we have a reality of multiplicity or dualism? Parmenides answered that Being is one, 
but Plotinus argued that Being or Intellect (his second hypostasis) is understood as 
multiple and not one. For ÔBeing itself is manifold within itself, and whatever else 
you may name had Being.Õ16 He uses the language of predication and the 
categorization of genus and species to describe the nature of Being as one and many 
at the same time: ÔFor that which is common and one in many things must employ 
differentiations which belong to itself and make specific forms and make them in its 
essential being.Õ17 Being is a one-many through a Ôwonderful power of one into all, 
both appearing many and becoming many.Õ18 There is in PlotinusÕs discussion of 
Being the language of participation, where a single principle is present in each 
                                                             
16 Plotinus, Enn. 5.3.13, trans. Stephen MacKenna, The Enneads (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 
381. 
17 Plotinus, Enn. 6.2.10, trans. Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ p. 30. 
18 Plotinus, Enn. 6.2.3, trans. Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ p, 30. 
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participant both as a differentiated and unified whole.19 Plotinus makes this clear in 
another passage from the Enneads: 
Now, in beings whose unity does not reproduce the entire nature of that 
principle, any presence is presence of an emanant power: even this, 
however, does not mean that the principle is less than integrally present; it 
is not sundered from the power which it has uttered...Nor does the 
placelessness of Being make it surprising that it be present universally to 
things of place; on the contrary, the wonder would beÑthe more than 
wonder, the impossibilityÑif from a place of its own it were present at allÑ
and, especially present, as we assert, integrally. But set it outside of place, 
and reason tells us that it will be present entire where it is present at all and 
that, present to the total, it must be present in the same completeness to 
every several unity; otherwise something of it is here and something there 
and at once it is fragmentary, it is body.20 
Being and Intellect in Plotinus are thus one and many, unified and 
differentiated, and transcendent and immanent. Since Being and Intellect are 
immaterial substances, and not a body that is divisible by parts, the simplicity of the 
OneÕs nature is retained.21 However, Plotinus does affirm that the Intellect-Principle, 
Ideas and Being are still compounded because Ôany member of the realm of Forms is 
an aggregation, a compound.Õ22 In order to have an even more simple principle than 
                                                             
19 Eric Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ p. 30. 
20 Plotinus, Enn. 6.4.3, trans. MacKenna, p. 442. 
21 Paulina Remes, Neoplatonism (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2008), pp. 70-71. 
22 Plotinus, Enn. 6.9.2, trans. MacKenna, p. 537. 
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Being and Intellect, Plotinus affirms an even higher principle, the One, which does 
not participate in anything nor can anything be predicated of it. ÔThe Unity [the 
One] cannot be the total of beings for so its oneness is annulled; it cannot be the 
Intellectual-Principle, for so it would be that total which the Intellectual-Principle 
is; nor is it Being, for Being is the total of things.Õ23 The infinite ineffable One that 
transcends Being and Intellect creates a problem for the metaphysics of 
participation. How can the ontological gap be bridged between the One and Being 
without the One losing its status as that which is not participated and Being having 
its origins in the One? If one concedes that Being participates in the One, then the 
One becomes intelligible and onto-theological. One would then have to create a 
higher principle to unify the One and Being, and so on and so on ad infinitum. 
Plotinus does not wish to establish a principle of otherness (a hypostasis of non-
being or of matter) outside of the One, so his metaphysical solution is the doctrine 
of emanation,24 in which the One pours itself out into the lower ontological levels. 
This still does not address the metaphysical conundrum of difference.25 Proclus will 
                                                             
23 Plotinus, Enn. 6.9.2, trans. MacKenna, p. 538. 
24The outpouring of the OneÕs goodness is also termed by Pseudo-Dionysius as: an effusion (χύσις), 
overflowing/bubbling over (ὑπερβλύζειν), outflowing or gushing forth (ἐκβλύζειν); see Fran 
OÕRourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2005), pp. 217-18. 
25 Enn. 5.1.6, Here Plotinus tries to describe emanation of the One in such a manner to be the principle 
of otherness, but he still does not really offer a logical explanation to show how emanation produces 
difference from the One without a separate principle of otherness. Maximus will address this 
Neoplatonic problem through the Christian notion of creation ex nihilo and the embracing of all 
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take up and modify PlotinusÕs emanation theory of participation into a theory of 
causation of being. This innovation of Proclus will have the greatest impact on 
Pseudo-Dionysius and MaximusÕs metaphysics. 
All multitude in ProclusÕs system participates in the One.26 If this were not 
the case, the whole would not be a whole or the many a part of the whole. Affirming 
an unparticipated complete distinction of the One from the many will lead to an 
infinite series of infinities from the multitude.27 Therefore, all multitude must 
participate in the One to avoid this infinite regress. Proclus further claims that 
everything which participates of the One is both one and not one.28 Within this 
tension, the participant is indeed other than the One since it is not the One itself, 
but the participant is the One as it participates in it. Proclus says that the 
participant thus ÔsuffersÕ the One, or is passive to the One according to participation, 
which causes a desire in the participant to become one.29 Participation, however, 
does not operate in the opposite direction from One to multitude. If the One 
                                                                                                                                                                              
existence, both λόγος and διαφορά in the providential pre-existing plan of God. Pseudo-Dionysius 
also makes this an important part of his system in DN 5.8-9. 
26 Proclus, ET 1. 
27 Proclus, ET 1. 
28 Proclus, ET 2. 
29 Proclus, ET 2, 3. 
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contained or participated in a part, then it would have both One and not one, which 
would create another infinite regress.30 The same argument can be applied to the 
existence of multitude alongside the One.31 The One as One requires its own self-
subsistence prior to all multitude so that all multitude is posterior or after the One.32 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus will both follow this position by affirming that 
creatures are always Ôafter God.Õ33 Christians and Neoplatonists differed over the 
question of creation ex nihilo, but the logical requirements of having an absolute 
Cause prior to its effects is retained. For Proclus, the importance of affirming the 
participation of the many in the One and the One being prior to multitude is that 
without them, there would not be science.34 
                                                             
30 Proclus, ET 4. 
31 Proclus, ET 5. 
32 Proclus, ET 5.  
33 Maximus often uses the expression Ôthose after GodÕ to denote this uni-directional nature of 
derivation and procession from the One, and the status of being created by the One: ÔAnd by time, it 
is indicated that everything is certainly in time, since everything that possesses existence after God 
possesses this existence in a certain way and not simplyÕ Amb. 10, (PG 91: 1180D). Maximus also 
applies the phrase to an Aristotelian conception of motion in Epistle 2 (PG 91: 401A): ÔNor is it likely 
that anything may be gathered to what is simple, and the same which has become not the same as 
itself nor simple, but by inclination is still divided from nature in many parts, unless first through 
love for humankind the inclination embraces nature, and there is manifest from both an inner 
meaning [logos], peaceful and undisturbed, not at all primarily moved to any of those things that are 
after God.Õ  Motion and energy are the ways Maximus utilizes the language of participation more so 
than the Dionysian terminology of procession and return. 
34 Proclus, ET 11. 
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Proclus agrees with Plotinus that the many participate in the One through 
ontological difference and union, but he alters PlotinusÕs doctrine of the One by 
affirming that the One is both imparticipable (ἀμέθεκτον) and participable 
(μεθεκτόν). The first term in any metaphysical derivation is always imparticipable, 
but it then produces participable terms that divide and remain in participable 
beings. The triad of imparticipable (ἀμέθεκτον), participable (μεθεκτόν), and 
participant (μετέχον) is ProclusÕs way to account for monism and multiplicity 
together without falling onto one side or the other of the ontological divide.  
For on the one hand the unparticipatedÉgenerates terms capable of being 
participated. For either it must remain fixed in sterility and isolation...or else 
it will give something of itself, whereof the receiver becomes a participant, 
whilst the given attains substantial existence as a participated term. Every 
participated term, on the other hand, becoming a property of that particular 
by which it is participated, is secondary to that which in all is equally 
present and has filled them all out of its own being. That which is in one is 
not in the others; while that which is present to all alike, that it may 
illuminate all, is not in anyone, but is prior to them all...But a principle 
which was in all would be divided amongst all, and would itself require a 
further principle to unify the divided; and further, all the particulars would 
no longer participate the same principle...Inasmuch, then, as it is both 
common to all that can participate and identical for all, it must be prior to 
all: that is, it must be unparticipated.35 
                                                             
35 Proclus, ET 23, trans. Thomas Taylor, p. 16. 
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Proclus answers the question of the One and the Many in PlatoÕs Parmenides, by 
affirming participable terms, the divine henads or unities (ἑνώσεις), which can 
unite the One with the Many. Each term in the hierarchy also has both a 
participable aspect and an imparticipable aspect to it.36 Human thinking cannot 
access the reason for how the henads can be in both of the higher orders, but it can 
see the effects of such activities in the lower orders of the hierarchy.37 The henads 
transcend both thinking and being as a unity in differentiation.38 What is 
particularly important in this passage of Proclus for our study on Pseudo-Dionysius 
and Maximus is the notion that participated terms take on substantial existence as a 
participated term. I believe this is what Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus refer to as 
Ôprimary beingsÕ (ὄντα πρῶτον),39 Ôoriginating and creative beings and substancesÕ 
(ἀρχικὰς τῶν ὄντων καὶ δημιουργιακὰς οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεις),40 and Ôparticipated 
beingsÕ (ὄντα μετέχοντα).41 Such primary beings are existents such as being-itself, 
life-itself, and wisdom-itself.42 Maximus also uses the same description of the logoi 
                                                             
36 Proclus, ET 67. 
37 Remes, Neoplatonism, p. 73. 
38 Proclus, ET 123; Remes, Neoplatonism, p. 74. 
39 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.6 (PG 3: 953C). 
40 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.6 (PG 3: 953D). 
41 Maximus, Cap. Gnost.1.48 (PG 91: 1100D). 
42 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.6 (PG 3: 953C). 
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that pre-exist in God but receive concrete and substantial existence at the proper 
time according to divine Providence.43 We will delve further into these intriguing 
metaphysical principles in Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus below. 
The remaining issue with ProclusÕs formulation of the participle and 
imparticiple is the need for further participable terms to unite the participable 
terms with the One. For if the participable terms are really distinct from the 
imparticipable One, then they exist by participation and therefore need further 
terms to participate, so ad infinitum.44 The difficulty of the participables could be 
addressed by understanding them in a non-realist sense as some kind of immaterial 
substance or hypostasis as attempted by Plotinus (a participation of form). In 
Proposition 23 of the Elements of Theology quoted above, Proclus indicates that a 
participable obtains substantiality only as a participated term. This would simply 
mean that the participable was a self-impartation of a cause and would not come 
into existence until it participates,45 but this still leaves open the question of the 
real existence of the participables, their postulation despite the already established 
                                                             
43 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91 1080D); Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1329A). 
44 Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ p. 39. 
45 This would mean that the participables are merely the process of participation in the One itself. 
They are not truly autonomous beings or principles outside of the relationship to the originating 
principle of the One.  
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doctrine of the Forms, and the existence of some sort of principle of otherness. 
Further, the non-realist reading would also lead to a Plotinian position where 
formality trumps essence. Proclus, though, still affirms that the One is both 
imparticipable and also immanent and participable through the henads. Thus, 
Proclus brings together identity and difference together without falling into either 
monism or dualism while still remaining in the logical antinomy of the metaphysics 
of participation.  
The dynamic relationship of imparticipable with participable is captured in 
the well-known Neoplatonic metaphysical motions of remaining, procession, and 
return (μονή, πρόοδος, and ἐπιστποφή). Basically, this metaphysical motion is where 
an effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and returns to it.46 All three 
metaphysical motions in ProclusÕ system are identical to each other ontologically in 
order to sustain the union of identity and difference through participation.  
In so far, then, as it has an element of identity with the producer, the 
product remains in it; in so far as it differs it proceeds from it. But being like 
it, it is at once identical with it in some respect and different from it: 
accordingly it both remains and proceeds, and the two relations are 
inseparable.47 
                                                             
46 Proclus, ET 35. 
47 Proclus, ET 35.  
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Without any one of the three elements, participation would break down. An effect 
that proceeded completely from the cause would lose its formal identity, and this 
principle of differentiation would fall into dualism. Without reversion, or return (in 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus this is connected with deification), the many would 
not find unity in the universal nor fulfil the principle of participation. Eric Perl 
summarizes this necessary triadic metaphysical movement: 
Thus participation, the ontological presence of cause in effect, of universal in 
particular, is at once procession and reversion, causing the effect to exist by 
imparting the form, which both differentiates and unifies particulars. All 
that the effect is, is the form which it has from the cause. Its coming into 
being, therefore, is its proceeding from its cause. But this is equally its 
reception or appropriation of the cause as its form, whereby it comes to be 
what it is, to participate, and so to exist. Reversion, the return of the effect to 
its cause, is this appropriation and is therefore the same as procession, now 
considered from the side of the effect.48 
Commentators such as Dodds and Gersh have noted how this Ôidentity of 
identity and differenceÕ through remaining, procession and return truncates the 
triadic motion into a single point. For if the ontological motions of remaining, 
procession and return are really identical, then we return to a monist position and 
only the One is real. There must be some kind of temporality in order to account for 
                                                             
48 Eric Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ pp. 45-46. 
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difference, but the Platonic commentators reject this.49 Despite trying to reconcile 
identity and difference through participation, the Neoplatonic system still falls into 
either monism or dualism from a logical point of view. Instead, the antinomy and 
paradox of participation as both one and many, identity and difference, and 
procession and return must be embraced as a metaphysical truth. Plotinus made to 
jump from the hypostases to the One through contemplative mysticism, but later 
Neoplatonism made the move towards theurgy as a participation in the divine, 
which then transcends the gulf of the divine and the material cosmos. The ascent to 
God and union with him in Plotinus50 and Proclus51 is described by both as being in a 
state of drunkenness and being in love.   
3.3 Participation in God According Maximus 
 
MaximusÕs understanding of metaphysical participation is most directly 
related to his embracing of Pseudo-DionysiusÕs thought, but as Gersh notes, he also 
moved away from the more emanative language of Pseudo-Dionysius (and the 
Neoplatonic cosmology of remaining, procession and return) and emphasized 
                                                             
49 E. R. Dodds, trans. and comm. Proclus, Elements of Theology (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 
217; Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 56-57. 
50 Plotinus, Enn. 6.7.20-28, 30. 
51 Proclus, Commentary on the Chaldaean Philosophy, Fr. 4, ed. and trans. by . des Places, (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 1971). 
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Aristotelian notions of movement, rest, power and act.52 As stated above, it is highly 
likely that Maximus did read the Platonic and Aristotelian commentators, but the 
differing accounts of his life do not provide clear information on this point. 
However, the depth of his comprehension of Neoplatonic and even Aristotelian 
principles would indicate a familiarity beyond what he could glean from just 
Pseudo-Pseudo-Dionysius and the Cappadocians.53 The use of the language of 
philosophical participation in Maximus is not just a casual adoption of common 
terminology within the philosophical parlance of the day, but one must still be 
cautious in applying the same content of such terms to his thought.  
There are three general senses of participation in Maximus: efficient 
causality, imitation, and supernatural grace. The first two senses of participation 
are related. In Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1329A-B), Maximus describes how the creature 
participates in God through his or her natural faculty in relation to their logoi that 
pre-existed in God: 
Of all the things that do exist or will exist substantiallyÉthe logoi, firmly 
fixed, pre-exist in God, in accordance with which all things and have become 
and abide, ever drawing near through natural motion to their purposed logoi. 
These things are rather constrained to being and receive, according to the 
kind and degree of their elective movement and motion, either well-being 
                                                             
52 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 204-227.  
53 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 134, 153-67. 
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because of virtue and direct progress in regards to the logos by which they 
are, or well-being according to the vice and motion out of harmony with the 
logos by which they exist. Or, to put it concisely: according to the having or 
the lack, in their natural participative faculty of him who exists by nature 
completely and unparticipated and who proffers himself entirely simply and 
graciously by reason of his limitless goodness to all.54  
Here, Maximus is describing participation in god according to oneÕs logoi. 
The logoi are like the medieval notion of divine ideas in the mind of God that 
Providentially orders everything that comes into existence. One can live virtuously 
in accordance with these pre-existing plans or Ôdivine willsÕ55 for their life or they 
can live in disharmony with them. Maximus is here speaking about what I would 
call Ôa natural principled participation.Õ Basically, as long as a person lives and 
moves, he or she is participating in God. Because Being-itself, which pre-exists as 
unified in God (as an attribute of God and a logoi for created Being with 
qualification), proceeds into creation, every being participates through existence in 
Being-itself. This is not substantive participation but principled participation due to 
efficient causality. Maximus clarifies in Amb. 7 that this is the basic scala naturae: 
Through this Logos there came to be both being and continuing to be, for 
from him the things that were made came to be in a certain way and for a 
certain reason, and by continuing to be and by moving, they participate in 
God. For all things, in that they came to be from God, participate 
                                                             
54 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1329A), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 60 n. 42. 
 
55 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1085A). 
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proportionally [analogia] in God, whether by intellect, by reason, by sense-
perception, by vital motion, or by some habitual fitness.56 
The second aspect of participation through imitation (often in the realm of morals 
and virtues) is directly connected with the first. According to Maximus, the virtues 
are natural for human beings.57 Practicing the virtues is direct participation in God 
because in Amb. 7, Maximus states that Jesus Christ is the substance of the virtues.58 
This context of the Amb. 7 indicates that Maximus makes moral participation also 
based on the metaphysical claim that the logoi of virtuesÑand Christ embraces all of 
the logoi in Himself as the LogosÑpre-exists in God as well as in the world. Moral 
imitation of God is also ontological participation in God because of the pre-existing 
logoi that one analogically orders their existence to. 
 The final type of participation in Maximus is that of supernatural grace, 
which is less defined and clear in his theology. Full ontological participation in God 
is not within human nature to induce; it must be initiated by the grace of God. Also, 
Maximus understands complete (I say complete because the creature can partially 
share now in the future benefit of deification) ontological participation to await the 
                                                             
56 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1080B), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 55. 
 
57 Maximus, Pyrrh. 88-95 (PG 91: 309B-11A). 
 
58 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1081D). 
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resurrection. This type of participation is still a full participation in God through the 
obtaining of divine attributes, but it must be understood to be by grace and fully 
realized in the future age of deification.59 We will come back to this type of 
participation in Chapter Four when we discuss GodÕs supra-temporal works grace.  
The importance of grace in MaximusÕs conception of participation, as 
opposed to participation in Neoplatonism, is that only a completely transcendent 
God who creates ex nihilo and by grace can radically participate without the need for 
causal intermediaries, such as the emanations and henads of Neoplatonism. This 
does not mean that Neoplatonists deny participation by grace (I will discuss this in 
Chapter Six), but Christianity teaches the doctrine of the full Incarnation of the 
Word in the flesh as the example of perfect participation between the divine and 
the created realms. 
Next, we will look at how Maximus incorporates the Dionysian tradition of 
procession (πρόοδος), energy (ἐνέργεια), power (δύναμις), grace (χάρισμα), 
exemplars (παραδείγματα), and logoi into his own cosmological vision. We will 
examine more closely the roots of participation and divine energy in Maximus as 
found in the theology of divine procession in Pseudo-Dionysius.  
 
                                                             
59 Maximus, Ad. Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 141). 
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3.4 The Nature of Divine Procession and Energy  
in Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus 
Pseudo-DionysiusÕs God is similar to the Neoplatonic One, but he takes ProclusÕs 
intermediate terms60 called henads (ἑνάδες)Ñwhich he variously names processions 
(πρόοδοι), powers (δυνάμεις), activities (ἐνέργειαι), graces (χαρίσματα), divine wills 
(θελήματα), or exemplars (παραδείγματα)Ñand he ascribes them to the whole one 
Godhead.61 Pseudo-Dionysius also uses the singular henad (ἑνάς) to describe the 
divine unity instead of the plural henads that Proclus uses as participations after the 
One.62 Often Pseudo-Dionysius uses henad or monad interchangeably to indicate the 
divine unity. The unified and undifferentiated names (τὰ ἡνωμένα) of God, such as 
Ôtranscendently goodÕ (ὑπεράγαθον), are known through denial, not in the sense of a 
lack or opposition but from what he calls Ôsuper-abundanceÕ (ὑπεροχιχῆς).63 The 
second type of unifying names in the Godhead has causal implications, such as good 
(τὸ ἀγαθόν), beautiful (τὸ καλόν), existent (τὸ ὄν), life-giving (τὸ ζωογόνον), and 
                                                             
60 For the linguistic and theological connections between Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus, see H. D. 
Saffrey, ÔNouveneaux Liens Objectifs entre le Pseudo-Denis et Proclus,Õ Recherches sur le noplatonisme 
aprs Plotin, 63 (1979); Carlos Steel, ÔDeny et Proclus: lÕexistence du mal,Õ in Denys lÕAropagite et sa 
postrite en Orient et en Occident, ed. Ysabel de Andia, (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1997), pp. 89-116; 
Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena; and Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London and New York: 
Continuum Press, 1989). 
61 See Pseudo-DionysiusÕs DN 5-8 for examples of all of these aspects of divine procession. 
 
62 Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 131. 
63 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.3 (PG 3: 640B). 
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wise (τὸ σοφόν).64 These causal names as applied to God indicate his name as a Ôgood 
gift.Õ65 
Divine Names that express distinction in Pseudo-DionysiusÕs system are: 
Being-itself (τὸ αὐτοεἶναι), Life-itself (ἠ αὐτοζωή), and Wisdom-itself (ἡ αὐτοσοφία). 
These divine unities are the causal activities of the Godhead proceeding into 
creation. Unlike Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius understands the divine processions as 
being directly accessible to all levels of the hierarchy, and they reach out to all of 
created reality, including matter. ÔPerfect goodness reaches out to all things and not 
simply to immediate good neighbours. It extends as far as the lowliest of things.Õ66 
God is Ôthe being immanent in and underlying the things which are, however they 
are,Õ and Ôhe is the essence of being for the things which have being.Õ67 This does not 
mean that the One is therefore a part of being. Pseudo-Dionysius makes this clear in 
the DN 5.8, ÔHe is not contained in being, but being is contained in him. He does not 
possess being, but being possesses him.Õ68 Pseudo-Dionysius is not affirming the 
                                                             
64 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.3 (PG 3: 640C). 
65 Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 100. 
66 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.20 (PG 3: 717D), trans. Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 
CWS (New York, NY: Paulinist Press, 1987), p. 86. 
67 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.4 (PG 3: 817D), trans. Luibheid, p. 98. 
68 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.8 (PG 3: 824A), trans. Luibheid, p. 101. 
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transcendence of the Godhead so that he may affirm an essence-energies 
distinction. Rather, he is establishing the transcendence of the Godhead to secure 
the participation of the One all the way down through the hierarchy of being. If the 
monad is on the same plane as the dyad, then participation becomes truly Ôa partÕ of 
the divine. Only as transcendent monad can the One proceed as a created unity into 
multiplicity. A possible source for this type of theologizing might be in the 
anonymous (Hadot ascribes it to Porphyry69) Commentary on the Parmenides 17.23-33: 
The One beyond essence and being is neither being nor essence nor act, but 
rather acts and is itself pure act, such that it is itself being (einai) before 
being (to on). By participating this being (the einai of the One), the One (scil. 
"who is," i.e., the second One) posses another being declined from it (the 
einai of the supreme One), which is to participate being (to on). Thus being 
(enai) is double: the first preexists (prouparchei) being (to on); the second is 
derived from the transcendent One who is absolute being (einai) and as it 
were the idea of being (to on).70 
The author of this commentary emphases that the Being who produces being must 
be absolutely transcendent and pure energeia in order to generate the being that can 
be participated. I believe this two-fold notion of Being in this passage is close to the 
meaning of Pseudo-DionysiusÕs metaphysics of procession. For Pseudo-Dionysius, 
                                                             
69 Pierre Hadot, ÔLa mtaphysique de Porphyre," Porphyre (Entretiens sur l'antiquit classique XII, 
Vandoeuvres-Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1960), pp. 127-157. 
 
70 Commentary on the Parmenides, trans. Richard T. Wallis , Neoplatonism and Gnosticism (New York, NY: 
SUNY Press, 1992), p. 435. 
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God is absolute Being-itself in His own divine unity and simplicity, but He produces 
a level of created being that is derivative and participle. This is still a full 
participation in the transcendent One, but the full transcendence of the One is what 
makes the One fully participle.  
Other names that indicate differentiation in the Godhead are the Trinitarian 
persons Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.71 Pseudo-Dionysius also includes the Incarnate 
Word among these differentiating names.72 Still, the Ôundifferentiated divine unityÕ 
proceeds generously (as simple and united) out into creation and differentiation.73 
Even though the divine unity above unityÑas the source and giver of unityÑis 
hidden from creaturely knowledge and comprehension, God nonetheless gives 
                                                             
71 ÔPseudo-Dionysius does not mention 'perichoresis,' but he uses vocabulary from neo-Platonic 
philosophy: the 'Permanence' and the ÔGround.Õ This vocabulary speaks well of a Permanence or a 
Ground of hypostasis into each other ... which well indicates the idea of perichoresis, even if the term 
is absent;Õ Ysabel de Andia, ÔLa theologie trinitaire de Denys lÕAreaopagite,Õ Studia Patristica 32 (1997), 
p. 295, English translation from the French is mine. The concept of perichoresis (interpenetration) is 
helpful here to understand that Pseudo-Dionysius is not talking about something that we can really 
separate. It is mostly a distinction parceled out in our minds (DN 2.7, PG 3: 645B). At the same time, 
Pseudo-Dionysius suggests that we would be Ôat loggerheadsÕ with Scripture if we did not also talk 
about distinctions in God (DN 2.2, PG 3: 640A). So distinction in the simple Godhead is not something 
we affirm metaphysically, it is a mental awareness on the part of the creature that is necessary in 
order to praise the Thearchy. Any distinction in the Godhead is purely what Theology requires (DN 
2.5, PG 3: 641D). However, Pseudo-Dionysius does affirm that we can talk about the Divine being qua 
or being through the divine processions (DN, 5.1, PG 3: 816B).  
72 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.3 (PG3: 640BC). 
73 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.5 (PG3: 644A). 
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completely to the creation. When discussing the image of a seal to its impression,74 
Pseudo-Dionysius states that the seal (i.e., God) Ôgives itself completely and 
identically to each [impression].Õ75 Nothing in the created realm is without a share in 
the whole of God; the ÔGodhead is granted as a gift to all things.Õ76 Even Ôsoulless and 
lifeless matterÕ partakes of the Good,77 and rational creatures can contemplate 
matter in order to reach the Ôimmaterial archetypesÕ of the cosmos.78 So, while 
Pseudo-Dionysius appears to affirm that there are real differentiations in God, he 
always relegates the naming of God as differentiation to what theology requires 
since metaphysics transcends Being and thus intelligibility and knowledge.79 This is 
the gift of grace beyond created nature. With the example of wax and seal in DN 2.5, 
critics of Pseudo-Dionysius raise the question whether the seal is not identical to all 
                                                             
74 Here Pseudo-Dionysius is talking about his general theory of causality. In discussing the idea of 
ÔprincipleÕ (ἀρχή), Pseudo-Dionysius argues that there is not an exact likeness between cause and 
what is caused. ÔThe effects only bear the images of the causes according to their capacity while the 
causes are above and beyond the effects. To say that life-itself lives or that light-itself is enlightened 
is not proper unless one intends by this that the qualities of effects [τὰ τῶν α ἰτιατῶν] pre-exist 
exceedingly and substantially [περισσῶς καὶ οὐσιωδῶς προένεστι] in their causes;Õ Boland, Ideas in 
God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 103. Maximus will add to the causal and formal dimensions of 
participation in Pseudo-DionysiusÕs theology with his doctrine of the Logos/logoi, which is a similar 
paradoxical response to the problem of metaphysical participation.  
75 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.6 (PG3: 644C), trans. Luibheid, p. 63. 
76 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 1.3 (PG3: 589C); DN 2.11 (PG: 649B). 
77 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.2 (PG3: 696D). 
78 Pseudo-Dionysius, CH 2.5 (PG3: 144C). 
79 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.5 (PG3: 641D). 
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of its imprints. Pseudo-Dionysius rejects this argument by affirming that the seal 
gives itself completely and individually to each imprint, but the nature of the 
imprints varies. This creates a plethora of different imprints.80 There is a difference 
in the receptive and participative faculties of creatures that manifests a plurality of 
processions, but the archetype and seal remain single and united. Additionally, in 
DN 2.7, Pseudo-Dionysius states that the observance of energies in the transcendent 
God is only apparent to the creature.  
What our minds lay hold of is in fact nothing other than certain activities 
[ἐνέργειαι] apparent to us, activities that deify, cause being, bear life, and 
give wisdom. For our part, as we consider that hiddenness and struggle to 
break free of all the working of our minds, we find ourselves witnessing no 
divinization, no life, no being which bears any real likeness to the absolutely 
transcendent Cause of all things.81  
Pseudo-Dionysius is not promoting a kind of proto-Nominalism here. In 
neoplatonism, Being and Intellect are convertible with one another. Thinking and 
Being are in a metaphysical relationship with one another. Though the human mind 
is aptly created to be able to notice the works of God in the world, this does not 
mean that God is working in the same manner as creatures. God manifests Himself 
in the world, but He remains in his own divine simplicity. 
                                                             
80 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.6 (PG3: 644B-644C). 
81 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.7 (PG3: 645B), trans. Luibheid, p. 63. 
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The manifested divine gifts that give being, life, wisdom and deification to 
creatures are also not in any way related to the unified names in the transcendent 
God. The creative and deifying gifts (note that all of the divine names are graces or 
gifts given) that the creature experiences are truly God as cause, but they cannot 
circumscribe or exhaust the being, life, wisdom and energy of the One God. Pseudo-
Dionysius presents us with a fecund paradox that the creature can fully participate 
in God through his creative gifts, but the wholeness of wholeness that God truly is 
cannot be participated.82 
Pseudo-Dionysius further compounds the paradox of participation in an 
imparticipable God through divine processions as he seems to describe the αὐτό-
realities in a few places (Being-itself, Life-itself, and Wisdom-itself) as being created 
by God. In DN 6.1, Pseudo-Dionysius praises ÔEternal lifeÕ because Life-itself and all 
life flow from it. He qualifies this hymn of praise by referencing what he said 
concerning Being in DN 5.5: ÔJust as when talking of Being I said it is an eternity of 
                                                             
82 Gersh distinguishes this tension as assumptions 1, 2 and 3: In the first assumption, God is above 
Being, Life and Wisdom; in assumption two, God is equated to Being, Life and Wisdom; and in 
assumption 3, God is equated to Being, Life and Wisdom, but there are no real ontological realities in 
God. See, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 156-65. 
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absolute being, so now I say that the divine Life beyond life is the giver and creator 
of life itself.Õ83  
This quote describes how a primary creative procession, such as Being or 
Life, can be both God as cause and also as a part of creation through procession. The 
procession is also the substantial power to allow beings to participate in the 
primordial gift. Even though Being is a created gift, it still participates in the divine 
economy of God. More importantly, Being is an Ôeternal abodeÕ because with the gift 
of deification at the resurrection, the creature moves from corruptible being to the 
eternally sustained Being proceeding from the absolute Being of God. The gift of 
Eternal Being is by the grace of God.  
Stephen Gersh argues that Christian Neoplatonists, such as Pseudo-Dionysius 
and Maximus, holds these two tensions together because of their commitment to 
intermediaries or gods between God and the world.84 I agree with Gersh completely 
on the schema of the two tensions in Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus, but he fails to 
press the paradox to its conclusion. By predicating the divine processions of the 
Transcendent God and also of created effect, Pseudo-Dionysius reveals an 
                                                             
83 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG3: 856B): Ôὅτι καὶ τῆς αὐτοζωῆς ἐστιν ἠ ὑπὲρ ζωὴν ἡ θεία ζωἡ.Õ One 
could translate θεία as father as well, Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 617.  
84 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 156ff. 
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extraordinary mystery. The divine processions are both on the side of creation and 
on the side of God at the same time. The procession is uncreated because it has God 
as the direct source of it through his unified divine wills (logoi),85 but the processions 
are also on the side of creation because participants participate in them as a 
participation. As we will see, such a paradox in Pseudo-Dionysius yields some 
explanation of MaximusÕs theology of divine energy.  
Moving on in the DN, if we take the patterns of divine unity and 
differentiation as presented in DN chapter two, the following matrix emerges: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
85 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.8. 
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Table 3.1: Divine Unions and Distinctions 
 Divine Unity 
 (μονή) 
Divine Differentiation  
(πρόοδος) 
Names indicating 
unity 
(ἑνώσεις) 
 
Transcending names of the 
One 
(ὑπερ-) 
Transcendently Good 
Transcendently Divine 
Transcendently Existing 
Transcendently Living 
Transcendently Wise 
 
Causal names 
(τὰ αἰτιολογικὰ πάντα) 
Good 
Beautiful 
Existent 
Life-giving 
Wise 
(Gifts) 
Being-Itself 
Life-Itself 
Wisdom-Itself 
other gifts 
Names indicating 
differentiation 
(διακρίσεις) 
 
(Trinitarian names) 
Father 
Son 
Holy Spirit 
 
 
(Incarnation) 
Jesus 
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The logical order of the divine processions (i.e., αὐτό-realities) according to 
Pseudo-Dionysius is as follows: Goodness, Being, Life and Wisdom (though also 
simple in God and equated to his being).86 Life and Wisdom must follow after Being 
because ÔBeing in itself is more revered than the being of Life and Wisdom itself and 
Likeness to divinity itself.Õ87 Pseudo-Dionysius affirms this due to the fact that one 
cannot have life or wisdom if they do not first exist in being. Therefore, Pseudo-
Dionysius ascribes Being as the first gift of God, which is the condition for the 
creation to be able to praise God as ÔHe who isÕ (ὃ ὢν).88 All of the divine gifts are 
                                                             
86 Pseudo-Dionysius places the processions as simple within God (CH 4.1, PG 3: 177; DN 1.2, PG 3: 
589BC) and also in succession to one another from God as created gifts, and they are the shapers of 
all creaturely existence according to capacity (DN 11.6, PG 3: 956A). I think this is to affirm the 
paradoxical nature of the processions as created from God and also being from the essence of God. 
The Christian move of equating the processions to the Thearchy in Pseudo-Dionysius, and thus 
making them attributes and names, is shifted in Maximus to the divine Logos himself: Ôthe being of 
each thingÕs virtue is the divine LogosÕ (Amb. 7, PG 91: 1089C). This allows for the reading of Maximus 
whereby God is both immanent and transcendent in the creature at the same time. The interpretive 
challenge will be to understand how the simple God can communicate divine gifts. For all 
providence, judgment, grace, energy, and logoi (essentially synonyms of the same reality in Maximus 
but functioning differently) are single and simple in God, but multiple from the perspective of the 
creature. Maximus can affirm this since procession and return in the Neoplatonic schema are the 
same and they come from Christ (Ad Thal. 60, CCG 22, 75; Amb. 7, PG 91: 1081D-1084A). Finally, this 
perspectival complex is also connected with MaximusÕs five-fold division of being as the uncreated is 
discoverable in the created sensible and intelligible realms (Amb. 41, PG 91: 1304D).   
87 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG 3: 820A). It should also be noted that the logical order does not 
presuppose that each of the terms are not mirrored in each other. In proposition 103 of ProclusÕs ET, 
he mentions that it is true to say of Being, Life and Wisdom that they are both successive stages of 
unfolding from the One and also three aspects of the same reality. See DoddÕs commentary on this 
topic in proposition 103, p. 254. 
88 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.6 (PG 3: 820D). 
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also rooted in the prior cause of Goodness itself (ἁγαθὸν αὐτό),89 which Ôby the very 
fact of its existence, extends goodness into all things.Õ90 The Good preceding the 
divine processions is crucial for Pseudo-DionysiusÕs system because it is the creator 
of all form, and it is the source and telos of all things.91 For Pseudo-Dionysius, the 
Good Ôpre-eminently gives form to the formless.Õ92 God is Ônothing less than the 
archetypal God, the supra-divine transcendent one God who dwells indivisibly in 
every individual and who is in himself undifferentiated unity with no commixture 
and no multiplication arising out of his presence among the many.Õ93 Pseudo-
Dionysius further says that the Good is that Ôwhich truly isÕ (ὠς ὄντως ὃν), and it is 
the substantive cause (οὐσιοποίος) of all thingsÑincluding the being, power, and 
activity of intelligible and intelligent beings (αἱ νοηταὶ καὶ νοεραὶ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι καὶ 
δυνάμις καὶ ἐνέργειαι).94 This is how Pseudo-Dionysius can radically affirm that Ôall 
                                                             
89 Following Neoplatonic commentators, Pseudo-Dionysius also equates the Good with God himself, 
not merely a procession (DN 1.5, PG3: 593B, DN 1.6, PG3: 596A, DN 4.12, PG3: 709BC). In Neoplatonism 
the Good was generally equated with the first principle, and derivative principles were beneath the 
One; see Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 159, n. 151. 
90 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.1 (PG 3: 693B). 
91 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.35 (PG 3: 736B). 
92 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.3 (PG 3: 697A). 
93 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.11 (PG 3: 649C), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 67. 
94 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.4 (PG 3: 817C). 
  83 
beings are in him and around himÕ (ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν).95 The Beautiful is also 
equivalent to the Good. For the ÔBeautiful is the origin (ἀρχή) of all things as their 
productive cause (ὡς ποιητικὸν)Éit is the goal of all things and is loved as final 
cause (τελικὸν) since all things come to be for the sake of the Beautiful; and it is the 
exemplary cause (παραδειγματικόν) according to which all things are determined.Õ 
In the cosmic hierarchy, all being finds its causal origin and subsistence in the Good 
and the Beautiful. Finally, Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the Good as love (ἔρως). 
Vivian Boland, quoting Pseudo-Dionysius, describes this love as: Ôthe love of the 
incomprehensible cause of all loves (ἡ...ἐπέκεινα παντὸς ἔρωτος ἄσχετος αἰτία). 
Through excess of goodness (δι' ἀγαθότητος ὑπερβολὴν) God yearns for (ἐρᾷ), 
creates (ποιεῖ), perfects (τελειοῖ), conserves (συνέχει), and attracts (ἐπιστρέφει) all 
things.Õ96 Pseudo-Dionysius summarizes the extent of the causality of God in all of its 
facets in DN 4.10: 
To put the matter briefly, all being drives from, exists in, and is returned 
toward the Beautiful and the Good. Whatever there is, whatever comes to be, 
is there and has being on account of the Beautiful and the Good. All things 
look to it. All things are moved by it. All things are preserved by it. Every 
source exists for the sake of it, because of it, and in it and this is so whether 
such source be exemplary, final, efficient, formal, or elemental. In short, 
                                                             
95 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.4 (PG 3: 817D). 
96 Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 103. Maximus also connects divine love 
with grace and deification (i.e., the movements of both procession and return) in his metaphysical 
system; see Epistle 2 (PG 91: 392D-408B). 
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every source, all preservation and ending, everything in fact, derives from 
the Beautiful and the Good.97 
Are these divine processions as cause (αἰτία) and principle (ἀρχή) of all 
created reality divine intermediaries between God and creation? As mentioned 
earlier, Pseudo-Dionysius rejects, though he does not mention Proclus by name, the 
doctrine of the henads as being divine ontological intermediaries98 between the One 
and the many:  
The absolute being underlying individual manifestations of being as their 
cause is not a divine or an angelic being, for only transcendent being itself 
can be the source, the being, and the cause of the being of beingsÉBeing 
itself, life itself, divinity itself, are names signifying source, divinity, and 
cause, and these are applied to the one transcendent cause and source 
beyond source beyond source of all things. But we use the same terms in a 
derivative fashion and we apply them to the provident acts of power which 
come forth from that God in whom nothing at all participates.99   
Instead of ProclusÕs henads performing the function of intermediaries between the 
One and the many, which raises the question about an infinite number of third 
terms for Christian theologyÑand the issue for an ontological sphere between God 
                                                             
97 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.10 (PG 3: 705D), trans. Luibheid, p. 79. 
98 Pseudo-Dionysius also clarifies that angels are not real intermediaries of divinity between God and 
creatures. See Andrew LouthÕs excellent discussion on this move by Pseudo-Dionysius, Denys the 
Areopagite. 
99 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.6 (PG 3: 953C-D), trans. Luibheid, pp. 124-25. 
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and creaturesÑPseudo-Dionysius emphasizes GodÕs direct processions,100 and 
theophanies into creation.101 They are both prior to creation and dependent on 
                                                             
100 There is a variance in the way the processions occur in latter Neoplatonic and Christian thought. 
Pseudo-Dionysius does use procession as from God and also as action towards creatures. In DN 11.6, 
Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of providence and participated goodness as Ôproceeding from the 
unparticpable GodÕ (Ôἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀμεθεκτου προῖοῦσαι,Õ PG 3: 956B). The other dynamic of a cause 
proceeding to its effects can be found in DN 5.1, ÔWhat I wish to do is to sing a hymn of praise for the 
being-making procession of the absolute divine Source of being into the total domain of being (Ôἀλλἀ 
τὴν ο ὗσιοποιον ε ἰς τ ἀ ὀ=ντα π άντα τ ῆς θεαρχιχῆς ο ὖσιαρχίας πρ όοδον ὐμνῆσαι,Õ PG 3: 816B). The 
Plotinian model would affirm the first form of procession since it retains the complete 
transcendence of the One from the second and derivative hypostasis. Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus 
both hold this primary position in talking about the nature of the Godhead above unity and 
distinction. The second form arose because this left the causal work of creation up to ontological 
intermediaries. Here, the divine causal gifts of Being, Life and Wisdom are understood as within the 
Godhead itself. Thus in order to hold the two together, where transcendence and causal powers are 
in the divine unity, Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus will affirm that the divine processions of Being, 
Life and Wisdom are predicated completely of the whole God and also that God is transcendently 
beyond any categories of unity and distinction. The troubling consequence for this whole dynamic is 
that it appears that Pseudo-Dionysius suggests something like a God beyond God, which is the 
direction that Gregory of Palamas goes with the ο ὐσία of the One beyond energy. Andrew Louth 
describes the situation in Pseudo-Dionysius this way: ÔThe use of the language of procession (if it is 
not just fashionable late fifth-century language, and confusing as fashions often are) raises problems 
that Denys does not answer. Procession is logically inferior to the unity from which it proceeds: 
Denys himself says that Ôin divine matters unions are more important than differentiationsÕ (DN 2.11, 
PG 3:652A). Does this mean that the Unity within the Godhead is in some sense prior to, more 
ultimate than, the Trinity of Persons? Sometimes Pseudo-Dionysius seems to indicate that this is far 
from what he means, and it would certainly be far from the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocian 
FathersÉGod is not Unity beyond Trinity, but beyond both Unity and Trinity in any way that we can 
understand these terms. Unity and Trinity, it would seem, are equally ultimate, and equally 
transcended. But the idea of a Godhead beyond the Trinity is at least suggested by Pseudo-
DionysiusÕs language, even though it is a suggestion he seems not to take up himself;Õ Andrew Louth, 
Denys the Areopagite, p.91. John D. Jones takes the view of the One beyond Trinity; see John D. Jones, 
ÔAn Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks fur Reading Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite,Õ Thomist 69 
(2005), pp. 371-406. Vladimir Lossky argues for the opposite view that Pseudo-Dionysius presents a 
Trinity above Unity; see Lossky, Vision of God (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1983 [1948]), p. 101. See also, 
John N. Jones, ÔThe Status of the Trinity in Dionysian Thought,Õ Journal of Religion 80 (2000), pp. 645-57. 
For the view of simultaneous unity and differentiation (this would be my reading of Pseudo-
Dionysius), see Beierwaltes, ÔUnity and Trinity in East and West,Õ in Eriugena East and West, ed. Bernard 
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creation at the same time. According to Eric Perl, Ôas causes, they [πρόοδοι] must be 
prior to their effects. But since they have no separate subsistence but exist only qua 
causes, they exist only relative to their effects and are thus dependent on them.Õ102 
Creation is the self-multiplication of God,103 but it is not a pantheistic unity of God 
with the world (there is not a substantive relation in the processions but a causal 
one), nor a divine necessity as it is later in Hegel. For Pseudo-Dionysius, ÔGod must 
differentiate himself in order to create, but there must be creatures in order that he 
                                                                                                                                                                              
McGinn and Wiernien Otten (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) pp, 209-
31; see also GershÕs commentary on this problem with the conclusion of simultaneous unity and 
differentiation (though his language is more that we should hold to a mixture of conflicting elements 
instead of the embracing of a paradox), From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 165-67. This Trinitarian 
ambiguity is related to the nature of the processions (i.e., are the uncreated energies of God or are 
they created perfections?), which as we will see, is the pivot around which Eastern and Western 
commentators on Pseudo-Dionysius will see either uncreated grace (Palamas) or created grace 
(Aquinas) in his metaphysical system.  
101 Eric Perl describes Pseudo-DionysiusÕs metaphysics as ÔtheophanismÕ because no other description 
can contain the unity in appearance that avoids monism or dualism. He says, Ôthe relation between 
appearance and that which appears is irreducible to either unity or duality and cannot be expressed 
in any terms other than those of appearance, manifestation, image, expression;Õ see Eric Perl, 
Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), p. 34. 
For Maximus, the theophany of God into the creation is connected with Christology in the 
Logos/logoi. Thus theophanism becomes ÔChristophanismÕ in his metaphysics. For the Ômystery of the 
incarnation of the Word contains in itself all the hidden meanings and figures of Scripture as well as 
the knowledge of visible and intelligible creaturesÕ (Cap. Gnost., 1.66, PG 91: 1108). This new emphasis 
is supported by the fact that Maximus believed that the Incarnation would have happened even if sin 
did not come into the world; see Eric Perl, ÔMetaphysics and Christology in Maximus Confessor and 
Eriugena,Õ in Eriugena: East and West, ed. Bernard McGinn (Chicago and Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 253-79; see also Hilary Anne-Marie Mooney, Theophany: The Appearing of 
God According to the Writings of Johannes Scottus Eriugena (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), pp. 193-94. 
102 Eric Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ p. 62. 
103 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.11 (PG 3: 649BC). 
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be differentiated.Õ104 Creation only exists as it participates in the divine, and it 
ultimately returns to the divine in rest.105 This circular dynamic reflects the 
paradoxical and antinomic nature of the simple God who yet creates the 
multiplicity found in the world.  
The ontology of participation through the divine processions in Pseudo-
Dionysius is also based on the free and providential gift of the Creator; it is the gift 
of grace itself. This moves Neoplatonic philosophy towards a Christian theology of 
grace.106 Even though there is a logical connection between procession, remaining, 
                                                             
104 Eric Perl, ÔMethexis,Õ p. 65. 
105 ÔHe is the Cause of the rest and of the stability of everything and is himself beyond all stability and 
all rest;Õ Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 9.7 (PG 3: 916A). This is the Neoplatonic return to God through 
deification. Maximus will take up this metaphysical principle in Pseudo-Dionysius and combine it 
with Gregory of NyssaÕs idea of perpetual ascent (ἐπέχτασις) to say that the Christian will be an ever-
moving rest; see Paul Blowers, ÔMaximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of 
ÔPerpetual Progress,Õ Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992), pp. 151-171. This point will also be very important 
for Maximus in his extensive corrections of the Origenist conception of motion. The important point 
here in terms of metaphysics is that Maximus combines the beginning of creatures in God (logoi) and 
ends with their return to him through grace and deification. This free act on the part of the Creator 
that also returns to Him (so that beginning and end are the same) allows for a Christo-centric 
reconfiguration of motion that reveals to the human person the limits of their nature to achieve the 
object of their natural desire (i.e., God). 
106Pseudo-Dionysius explains (CH 1.2, PG3: 121BC, trans. Luibheid, p. 146): ÔOf course this ray never 
abandons its own proper nature, or its own interior unity. Even though it works itself outward to 
multiplicity and proceeds outside of itself as befits its generosity, doing so to lift upward and to unify 
those beings for which it has a providential responsibility, nevertheless it remains inherently stable 
and it is forever one with its own unchanging identity. And it grants to creatures the power to rise 
up, so far as they may, toward itself and it unifies them by way of its own simplified unity. However, 
this divine ray can enlighten us only by being upliftingly concealed in a variety of sacred veils which 
the Providence of the Father adapts to our nature as human beings.Õ This is also why Maximus can 
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and return in Pseudo-DionysiusÕs theology of the divine proodoi, this does not mean 
that he considers creation a necessary ontological effect of the OneÕs procession. 
This is the monist trap that Plotinus and Proclus incurred in their metaphysics. 
Pseudo-Dionysius retains the fully Christian notion of creation and the grace of all 
three movements of procession, remaining, and returnÑa theme that Maximus 
picks up and revises into a more Aristotelian philosophy of movement. Pseudo-
Dionysius supports this view of grace when he says, ÔFor there is nothing at all 
lacking a share in that One which in its utterly comprehensive unity uniquely 
contains all and everything beforehand, even opposites. Without the One there is no 
multiplicity, but there can still be the One when there is no multiplicity, just as one 
precedes all multiplied number.Õ107 In an illuminating passage in DN, Pseudo-
                                                                                                                                                                              
describe the ascent to God through the WordÕs descending Ôdivine playÕ in the world, which makes 
sense of Pseudo-DionysiusÕs usage of ekstasis in God: ÔGod who is above all leads us through the 
historical nature, so to speak, of the appearance of created things to amazement and a kind of ascent 
through contemplation and knowledge of them, rather in the way in which we care for children, and 
then introduces the contemplation of the more spiritual meaning [λόγος] within these things, and 
finally leads us by way of theology up to the most hidden knowledge of himself, so far as possible, in 
the early stages of purifying us from everything that has form or quality or shape or quantity, 
whether of multitude or size, and from variety or composition, so that we may reach the goal of 
contemplationÑand this is called ÔplayingÕ by the God-bearing Gregory, and ÔenchantingÕ or Ôbeing 
carried outside himselfÕ by the God-bearing Denys,Õ Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1413C-D), trans. Louth, p. 167. 
Divine play bridges the gulf between AbrahamÕs bosom and Lazarus according to Maximus in this 
passage, but the bridge is not understood as ontological hinterland, but the direct sharing or 
participation of the creature in God as God wills through his Word. God grants a likeness that is a 
participation, which makes Ôdivine playÕ at once uncreated and created grace. 
 
107 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 13.2 (PG 3: 980A), trans. Luibheid, p. 129. 
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Dionysius describes how God is both fully participle and fully imparticiple by 
theologizing about the divine creative processions into creation: 
On the other hand, if differentiation can be said to apply to the generous 
procession of the undifferentiated divine unity itself overflowing with 
goodness and dispensing itself outward toward multiplicity, then the things 
united even within this divine differentiation are the acts by which it 
irrepressibly imparts being, life, wisdom and the other gifts of its all-creative 
goodness.108 It is according to these gifts that the supreme things which are 
participated in, but which do not themselves participate in anything higher, 
are praised through the participations and those who participate. Now this is 
unified and one and common to the whole divinity, that the entire 
wholeness is participated in by each of those who participate in it; none 
participates in only a part.109  
According to Pseudo-Dionysius, the divine gifts paradoxically pour out from 
the unity of God into the plurality of creation in a unified manner. This outpouring 
                                                             
108 Luibheid seems to be using a little artistic license in trying to communicate into English the 
awkward Greek here. A better reading of this line would be, 'The irrepressible things that are 
imparted according to the divine differentiation are united; [they are] substantifications, the things 
that give life and those that make [things] wise [and] the other gifts that cause the goodness of all 
thingsÕ (ἡνωμέναι μέν εἱσι κατἀ τἡν θείαν διάκρισιν αἱ ἄσχετοι μεταδόσεις, αἱ ούσιώσεις, αἱ ζωώσεις, 
αἱ σοφοποιήσεις, αἱ ἄλλαι δωρεαὶ τῆς πάντοων αἰτιάς ἀγαθότητος). The phrase Ôthe acts by whichÕ is 
not really in the Greek, but Luibheid is probably trying to indicate that Pseudo-Dionysius sees these 
processions (as multiple and other) as on the side of creation. This may be justified from what 
Pseudo-Dionysius says later in 6.1, and similarly in other places, ÔJust as when talking of Being, I said 
it was an eternity of absolute being, so now I say that the divine Life beyond life is the giver and 
creator (or father) of life itselfÕ (ὄτι καὶ τῆς αὐτοζωῆς ἐστιν ἠ ὑπὲρ ζωήν ἡ θεία ζωἡ), PG 3: 856B. 
Maximus affirms the same attribution of the united energies or ÔparticipationsÕ as being creations of 
God in Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50. 
109 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.5 (PG 3: 644A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 62. 
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brings about substantification, vivification, wisdom and deification in human 
beings.110 Pseudo-Dionysius retains the full paradox of participation. 
Pseudo-Dionysius creatively reconfigures the metaphysics of participation in 
Neoplatonism towards an emanative all-creative procession of the Godhead into 
creation through His creative gifts. Even though Pseudo-Dionysius uses the 
language of power and activity in the divine processions, he does not intend for the 
reader to think that he is promoting change or motion in a God of simplicity.111 
When speaking about Being-itself having its power from GodÕs power, Pseudo-
Dionysius qualifies the language used by adding Ôif it is proper to speak thusÕ (εὶ 
θέμις ε ἱπειν).112 However, within Dionysian scholarship there is still a debate over 
the nature of the creative processions from God. Both Eastern and Western 
Christian theology affirm a separation between the essence of God and the divine 
                                                             
110 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.8 (PG 3: 645BC); see also Vivian Boland, Ideas in God According to Saint 
Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, volume 69, (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1996), p. 103. 
111 In Maximus, Panayiotas Christou (ÔMaximus Confessor on the Infinity of Man,Õ in Maximus 
Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseru, ed. Felix Heinzer and Christoph Schonborn, 
(Fribourg: 1980), pp. 261-72.) believes that movement and energy are separated in Maximus. ÔThus, in 
general, Maximos does not consider movement and energy as identical; in his mind, the second is a 
personal elaboration of the first and every created nature is defined by its energy.Õ This might be the 
case if one were to equate will with energy, but to my knowledge Maximus never actually does this. 
Contemporary Eastern Orthodox personalism appears to be the overriding hermeneutic in this case. 
112 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 8.3 (PG 3: 892B). 
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processions, but the nature of the processions themselves is where the two great 
traditions part ways. Are the divine processions irreducible uncreated energies 
separate from the divine essence or are they created processions as hinted at 
earlier?  
3.5 Aquinas and Palamas on the Divine Processions 
Thomas AquinasÕs commentary on the DN of Pseudo-Dionysius in the 
thirteenth century adds the distinctively Western approach to the problem of the 
nature of the divine processions. In his commentary, Aquinas affirms that there are 
two processions of the Godhead: one from within the divine unity, and the other 
from within the differentiation. ÔSo in the aforesaid common union there are some 
things of their own union and differentiation, and even a common differentiation in 
the aforesaid.Õ 113 Thomas is basically indicating that with God there is a 
differentiation in the unity and in the differentiation. He adds, ÔThere are two kinds 
of procession: one according to which one Person proceeds from another 
[Trinitarian persons], and by this the divine persons are multiplied and 
distinguished. And by this differentiation, properly so called, is the common mode 
of differentiation; the other procession is according to which the creature proceeds 
                                                             
113 Ôtam in praedicta unitione communi sunt quaedam propriae unitiones et discretiones, quam etiam 
in praedicta communi discretion;Õ Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, 2.2, 
in In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus exposition (Rome: Marietti, 1950). 
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from God.Õ114 In the second mode of the double procession, Aquinas reads Pseudo-
Dionysius as saying that differentiation of the union applies solely to creatures.115 
Aquinas bases the distinction between the two processions on what is shared. 
Within the Trinity the divine persons share the essence, whereas in divine 
differentiation in creation the creature does not share the divine essence.116 There 
are only two realities in AquinasÕs system, the divine essence and everything else, 
which is created. Aquinas explains Pseudo-DionysiusÕs unusual phraseology in a 
Proclean manner: 
Then when he says ÔBut differentiations etcÉ,Õ he explains the common 
mode of differentiation through its opposite. And he says that the previously 
mentioned teachers call the differentiations processions and manifestations 
of divinity, which befit it in so far as it is the Good itself, since it is of the 
notion of the Good that effects proceed from it through its communication. 
And it must be considered that counter to what he had said above 'hidden 
and ineffable' he posited adequately and compatibly processions and 
manifestations, since it is manifested through effects proceeding from it and 
                                                             
114 ÔEst autem duplex processio: una quidem secundum quod una persona procedit ab alia et per hanc 
multiplicantur et distinguuntur divinae Personae et quantum ad hoc attenditur discretio propria in 
communi modo discretionis; alia est processio secundum quam creatura procedit a Deo,Õ Thomas 
Aquinas, Commentarium in Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, 2.3, in In librum beati Dionysii De divinis 
nominibus exposition (Rome: Marietti, 1950). 
115 Ôquod sequitur de unitione et discretione pertinet ad creaturas,Õ Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in 
Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, 2.3, in In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus exposition (Rome: 
Marietti, 1950). For a discussion on how Thomas interprets Pseudo-Dionysius and John Damascene on 
this point, see David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom 
(Cambridge; CUP, 2004), pp. 245-47. 
116 Bogdan G. Bucur, ÔDionysius East and West: Unities, Differentiations, and the Exegesis of Biblical 
Theophanies,Õ Dionysius 26 (2008), p. 126. 
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in some way deity itself proceeds in effects, while it hands down its 
similitude to things according to their proportion, nevertheless such that its 
own excellence and singularity remains in itself, not communicated to 
things and hidden to us. Therefore these processions are called 
differentiations, since, unless other things flow out from a first principle, the 
first principle would not have that from which it could be discerned.117 
At the core of the mystery and antinomy that Pseudo-Dionysius is trying to 
communicate in this difficult passage in the DN is the gift of the divine presence in 
the single act of creation.118 Thomas uses language to describe the seemingly 
impossible truth that the simple and unified God has made himself divisible in the 
multitude. Aquinas does not denigrate this participative mystery by emphasizing 
that despite the differentiation into multitude, the impartible essence is retained, 
and the singular God multiplies in a singular way in the process. Aquinas reiterates 
the Dionysian oscillation mentioned above concerning the need for procession from 
the first principle in order that the first principle be discerned from the multitude.  
                                                             
117 ÔDeinde, cum dicit: discretiones et cetera, exponit, per oppositum, communem modum 
discretionum; et dicit quod praedicti magistri vocant discretiones, processiones et manifestationes 
deitatis, quae conveniunt ei inquantum ipsum bonum, quia de ratione boni est quod ab eo procedant 
effectus per eius communicationem. Et considerandum quod contra id quod supra dixerat: occultas 
et inegressibiles, satis congrue posuit processiones et manifestationes, quia per effectus 
progredientes ab ipso manifestatur, et quodammodo ipsa deitas in effectus procedit, dum sui 
similitudinem rebus tradit, secundum earum proportionem, ita tamen, quod sua excellentia et 
singularitas sibi remanet, incommunicata rebus et occulta nobis. Hae igitur processiones vocantur 
discretiones, quia nisi a primo principio alia effluerent, non haberet primum principium a quo 
discernereturÕ (Rome: Marietti, 1950), p. 159 col. 52a. 
118 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.10 (PG 3: 825B). 
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Aquinas and Pseudo-Dionysius also follow the Proclean precept that 
everything that participates of the One is both one and not one.119 In the 
commentary on the DN, Aquinas illustrates Pseudo-DionyiusÕs meaning concerning 
the differentiations using Neoplatonic metaphysics. Creatures are given a similitude 
or likeness to God that is also a participation in the Godhead. This is different from 
being given a similitude that participates in a participation. Many Palamite 
theologians miss this Neoplatonic understanding of participation in Pseudo-
Dionysius and Aquinas.  
The Latin Doctor also retains the notion that the power of the cause remains 
in their effects, and this is why everything to the very edge of existence participates 
in the one God in his system; God resides in the core of his creatures. Aquinas 
understands being to be predicated of creatures through participation in GodÕs 
Being.120 The essential predication of Being in God is due to God being ipsum esse per 
se subsistens.121 Aquinas interprets Pseudo-DionysiusÕs predication of Being in God in 
                                                             
119 Proclus, ET 2. 
120 Aquinas, Quodlibet, II 2.1. See also my article, ÔThe Metaphysics of Christian Ethics: Radical 
Orthodoxy and Theosis,Õ Heythrop Journal of Philosophy and Religion, 52:3 (July 2011); John F. Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: CUA, 
2000), pp. 103-10; Rudi Te Velde, Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), pp. 129-31. 
121 Aquinas, ST I.3-11. 
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a more literal manner, but he also retains transcendence in God through the 
analogy of Being: 'Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of 
God and creatures.'122 God is not merely an infinite being on the same scale of being 
with creatures, this would be a Scotist interpretation of the Being-of-God, but he is 
transcendent being. This is why Aquinas can emphatically assert that Ôit is not 
possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a 
material principle.Õ123 God and creatures do not share the same formality, as within a 
species, because God cannot be contained within any genus; he is the Ôprinciple of 
all genera.Õ124 Instead, creatures participate in God Ôaccording to some sort of 
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they 
are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.Õ125 God is 
interior intimo meo, closer to me than I am to myself.126 Because God is the supreme 
cause of all things, the creature participates in God: 
God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an 
accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For 
an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and 
                                                             
122 Aquinas ST I.13.5. 
123 Aquinas, ST I.3.8. 
124 Aquinas, ST I.4.3; ST I.4.3, rep. 2. 
125 Aquinas, ST I.4.3. 
126 Augustine, Confessions, 3.6. 
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touch it by its power...Now since God is very being by His own 
essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the 
proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only 
when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in 
being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air 
remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must 
be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is 
innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all 
things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as 
was shown above [Question 7, Article 1]. Hence it must be that God is 
in all things, and innermostly.127 
For Aquinas, likeness (similitudo) to GodÑwhich has been equated with the 
participated term in the Neoplatonic triad of imparticipable, participated, 
participant128Ñmoves in a one-way direction. A creature can be said to be like God, 
but God in no way can be said to be like creatures.129 Aquinas holds that all 
perfections in the created order are one in the divine essence (i.e., GodÕs perfections 
as perfection itself). ÔAll created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as 
universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator [Aristotle], 
Metaphysics v) any excellence which may be found in any genus.Õ130 So, for Aquinas 
the divine perfections are one with his essence, and all perfections that we find in 
                                                             
127 Aquinas, ST I.8.1. 
128 Harry C. Marsh, ÔCosmic Structure and Knowledge of God: Thomas AquinasÕs In librum beati Dionysii 
de divinis nominibus expositioÕ (PhD dissertation at Vanderbilt University, 1994), pp. 105-06; Bogdan G. 
Bucur, ÔDionysius East and West,Õ p. 127. 
129 Aquinas, ST I.4.3, rep. 4. 
130 Aquinas, ST I.4.2. 
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the created order are created perfections and created likenesses131 to the divine 
essence.132 The power and activity of God in creation (grace) are of formal and 
efficient causality.133  
 Gregory of Palamas read the same texts of Pseudo-Dionysius and saw a 
different trajectory than the Ôcreated effectsÕ (i.e., created graces) of Aquinas. He 
begins by discussing the unity and differentiation in the Godhead according to 
several passages from the DN. Gregory affirms the differentiation of the hypostases 
of the Holy Trinity, but he adds: 
Thus he [Pseudo-Dionysius] clearly shows that there is another distinction 
alongside that of the hypostases and a distinction belonging to the Godhead. 
And he says that according to the divine processions and energies God is 
multiplied and enters multiplicity and at this point he says that the same 
procession is also processions; but at another point, the Divinity does not 
enter multiplicityÑcertainly not!Ñnor as God is he subject to distinction. For 
us God is a Trinity but he is not threefold.134 
                                                             
131 Aquinas, SCG, 1.26.10. 
132 Aquinas, SCG, 1.75.3. 
133 ÔGod is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body 
after the manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the 
form, of itself, 'informs' the matter or subject; whereas the agent 'informs' the subject, not by its 
substance, but by the form, which it causes in the matter,Õ ST I-II, 109.2. 
134 Gregory of Palamas, 150 Chapters, chapter 85, trans. and ed. Robert E. Sinkewickz, (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988), p. 185. 
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One can see the classic Neoplatonic triad of imparticipable, participated, and 
participant in GregoryÕs reading of the divine unities and differentiations. He also 
equates the energies of God with the ÔparticipatedÕ terms of the triad, ÔIf you take 
away that which is between the unparticipated and the participatingÑO, 
emptiness!Ñthen you separate us from God.Õ135 Palamas strongly affirms that the 
processions are realities that are participated in but are not things that participate 
in anything higher, which would make them not creatures.136 The logic of Gregory 
here is very acute, but I do not think that understanding the processions as created 
realities makes them ÔparticipantsÕ rather than participations. A created perfection 
that does not participate in anything higher would work in Pseudo-DionysiusÕs 
argument.137 Really, the strongest argument that Gregory makes, though not 
generally pointed out by Orthodox scholars, is in Capita chapter eighty-six, where he 
comments on DN 2.3-5: 
The same divine revealer [Pseudo-Dionysius] who said above that the 
beneficent procession is a divine distinction adds, Ôthe incomprehensible 
                                                             
135 Palamas, Triads 3.2.24. trans. Bogdan G. Bucur, ÔDionysius East and West,Õ p. 127. 
136 Gregory of Palamas, 150 Chapters, chapter 89, trans. and ed. Robert E. Sinkewickz, p. 187-89; Bogdan 
G. Bucur, ÔDionysius East and West,Õ p. 159. 
137 Bucer (ÔDionysius East and WestÕ) raises an important point in this regard. How would Aquinas 
account for Pseudo-DionysiusÕs affirmation that God is the Being of beings as they have being? 
Aquinas would have to answer using causality of Being instead of being the actual Being of beings, 
but it is also unclear how Pseudo-Dionysius would avoid the issue of panentheism here. 
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communications are united according to the divine distinction.Õ Thus he 
took here all the processions and energies together and called them 
communications and he added that they are incomprehensible lest anyone 
think them to be created effects, such as the substance of each being or the 
sensible life of animals or the reason and intellect inhering in rational or 
intellectual beings. For how could these realities be incomprehensible in God 
while being created?138  
Pseudo-DionysiusÕs language of the ineffability of the divine unity is related 
more to the Proclean requirement of an imparticiple One above everything, which 
provides the basis for differentiation, than to the creation of a new ontological 
category between GodÕs essence and creatures, but Pseudo-DionysiusÕs language 
could lean towards such a reading despite the philosophical problems involved. 
Instead of a mediated principle of participation in between God and the world, it 
would be better to affirm the paradox of participation on both sides of the 
ontological divide. This model would provide a direct participation in the full life of 
God while at the same time maintaining each of the natures intact. The 
Irreducibility of a paradoxical participation prevents one from conflating either side 
of the ontological divide as well as identifying our energy with divine energy so that 
creation may be seen as one creation.139 Hyperbolic and symbolic language is often 
difficult to decipher with certainty, and Pseudo-Dionysius is likely retaining a 
Christian understanding of language about God that is kataphatic but only with an 
                                                             
138 Gregory of Palamas, 150 Chapters, chapter 86, trans. and ed. Robert E. Sinkewickz, p. 185. 
139 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1308A). 
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apophatic reserve. Pseudo-Dionysius is simply not clear enough as to the nature of 
the processions for one to assert that he is implying here a separation of energies 
from the essence.  
3.6 Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus Confessor and the Essence-Energy 
Distinction 
The Eastern Fathers never definitively proclaim that GodÕs essence and 
energies are metaphysically distinct. As we saw in the previous chapter, the essence 
and energies distinction is cast within the realm of epistemology and the economy 
of salvation. Pseudo-Dionysius paradoxically states in the DN that the Thearchy not 
only shares its essence but also its transcendent unity. God is the power who lifts all 
things up to himself by the Ôrevelation of himself by himself [ἔκφανσις ἑαυτοῦ δι' 
ἑαυτοῦ], the good procession of his own transcendent unity.Õ140 This declaration of 
Pseudo-Dionysius would certainly lend itself to more of a paradoxical full notion of 
participation rather than a partial one in the divine energies. Further, the Eastern 
Fathers predominantly use the singular ÔenergyÕ to denote GodÕs activity.141 In the 
West, John Scotus Eriugena even reads Pseudo-DionysiusÕss language concerning 
                                                             
140 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.4.14 (PG 3: 712 C). 
141 John Milbank, ÔChristianity and Platonism East and WestÕ (forthcoming). 
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procession as part of the second division of nature, which is created. The divine 
exemplars and processions are considered by Eriugena as Ôet creatur et creat.Õ142 Both 
Aquinas and Eriugena are more than likely relying on a statement of Augustine that 
theophanies of the divine are created realities.143 Even Pseudo-Dionysius himself 
tends towards presenting theophanies as created realities.144 Divine manifestation in 
Pseudo-DionysiusÕs system is mediated through created reality.  
The same argument applies to Maximus in his commentary on the glory of 
the Transfiguration in Amb. 10. With the appearance of Christ in the flesh, the unity 
of the sensible and intelligible orders becomes more apparent. GodÕs providence and 
will also appears in the light of the Transfiguration. Maximus sees every aspect of 
the experience, from light to the radiant garments of Christ, as being a revelation of 
the divine. ÔOr everything that is after God and has come into being from God, that 
is the nature of beings and time, these appear together, so far as is possible, with 
God who appears as cause and maker.Õ145 We can see that Christ is God as cause and 
                                                             
142 Eriugena, Periphyseon 2 (CC 162:41); Lossky notes how the Ideas in Eruigena become the first 
created essences, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1976), p. 96. 
143 C.f., Augsutine, De Trinitate II.5.10-16.28, III.II.21-27; De Genesi ad Litteram XI.33-43. 
 
144 See again BulcerÕs commentary on the theophany tradition in East and West, ÔDionysius East and 
West.Õ For created theophanies in Pseudo-Dionysius, see Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite, (London 
and New York: Continuum Press, 1989), pp. 37, 51. 
145 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1164A), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 130. 
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creator, but we cannot know him in his essence. Only God knows his own sacred 
essence.146 In this reflection on the Transfiguration, Maximus begins with the 
apophatic denial and ends with the kataphatic affirmation: Ôout of his love for 
humankind he grants to human beings intimations of Himself in the manifest divine 
works [θεουργίας] performed in the flesh.Õ147  
The ultimate divine work in time is that of the Incarnation itself, but 
Maximus would also include other miracles. These works in the flesh are only 
ÔintimationsÕ of the eternal transcendent Godhead, and at the same time they are 
mediated manifestations Ôin the flesh.Õ Both uncreated and created are made 
manifest together in the Incarnate Christ. The Incarnation is the demonstration of 
grace as both uncreated (on the non-ontic side of the divine) and created (on the 
ontic side of creation). There is not an Ôin-betweenÕ the divine and human natures of 
Christ, only a paradoxical bi-ontological reality of grace-energy that it at once both 
divine and created.  
Maximus further illustrates this point in Amb. 42. He describes the nature of 
miracles in the Bible and in the ministry of Jesus as only altering the mode of 
                                                             
146 Maximus, De Char. 3.24. 
147 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168A), trans. Louth, p. 132, Greek inserted by me. 
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existence and not the underlying nature. For example, Enoch and Elijah were 
translated Ôfrom life in the flesh, subject to corruption, to a different form of life, 
not by altering their human nature, but by changing the mode and domain of action 
proper to their nature.Õ148 In this miraculous event, Maximus argues for an 
understanding of grace and nature that is in harmony. Grace does not override or 
change human nature, but grace transforms it into a new mode of existence. God 
acts directly on the human person, but it is a mediated action that results in actual 
miracles!    
Since the Tridentine idea of Ôpure natureÕ is not a part of patristic theology, 
it would be anachronistic to apply the sharp divide between Creator and creation to 
the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus. On the other hand, even though 
there is a more organic connection between Creator and creation in their theology, 
this does not mean that they would understand the processions as uncreated 
realities distinct from GodÕs essence. The paradox is that these are real created 
activities from an uncreated source.  
Stephen Gersh presents a strong counter assertion to the essence-energies 
distinction in Pseudo-Dionysius by Palamites: 
                                                             
148 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1344A), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 90. 
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There is no evidence for the existence of an ontology in which this 
distinction is made between GodÕs essence and energies in Neoplatonism, 
with the exception of a doctrine mentioned at Procl. In Parm. 1105. 32ff. and 
perhaps to be associated with the school of Porphyry. However, this doctrine 
is explicitly rejected by the Athenian School of Neoplatonism which is Ps.-
DionysiusÕs source. 149 
                                                             
149 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 167 n84. There is also a newer theory, not widely accepted, 
presented by Sarah Klitenic, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition (Surrey, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2007), pp. 44-48, that Pseudo-DionysiusÕs source for the αὐτό-realities being both in God 
and beneath God, as it were, can be found in a little known teaching of Porphyry, where he moves 
the second hypothesis to the first principle. Thus, the ÔFatherÕ of the intelligible triad becomes the 
One. Transcendence though is still retained. This is an interesting theory because it shows a 
movement in Neoplatonic metaphysics very close to that of the Christian development in Pseudo-
Dionysius and Maximus. Porphyry does not seem, however, to be a significant source in Pseudo-
DionysiusÕs works. Maximus will later organize his created ontology along the lines of the Porphyrian 
tree, which is drawn from the widely circulated Isagogue of Porphyry. The textual evidence of 
Porphyry being a source does not really exist in the CA. The preponderance of evidence shows a very 
close connection to the Athenian school as Gersh notes. Iamblichus is quite clear that energies are 
the essence and expressive of it. In the De Mysteriis 1.4 (11-12), Iamblichus brings into his argument 
the triad ο ὐσία-δύναμις-ἐνέργεια. Porphyry (the recipient of this work of Iamblichus) only 
distinguishes the gods according to energies and not essence (Iamblichus is demonstrating that you 
cannot logically subsume human souls and gods under the same genius). With the gods, argues 
Iamblichus, there is not a Ôcontrast between action and passivity, but their activities are considered 
to be absolute and unalterable and free of any relation to an opposite,Õ trans. Emma Clarke, John 
Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), p. 17. Iamblician theology 
and philosophy holds that ἐνέργεια reveals ο ὐσία in the gods, and that they should not be 
distinguished from each other. This is blazingly clear in De Mysteriis 2.3 (70): ÔSo, then, in brief, I 
declare that their [the gods] manifestations are in accordance with their true natures, their 
potentialities (δυνάμεσι) and activities (ἐνεργείαις). For as they are, so they appear to those invoking 
them; they display their activities and manifest forms in agreement with themselves and their own 
characteristic signs,Õ trans. Emma Clarke, John Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell, p. 87. Iamblichus also 
holds to a sliding scale of simplicity from the gods down through demons and angels to human souls. 
A god is completely simple (i.e., no accidental qualities) but human souls are composite; see Gregory 
Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblicus (University Park, PN: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1995), pp. 78-79, 219-20; also Carlos Steel, The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in 
Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus (Brussels: Paleis der Academien, 1978), pp. 54-
59. Athenian (and also theurgic) Neoplatonism after Iamblichus does not distinguish the essence of 
the gods from their manifestation or energies. For Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus, Eric Perl is closer 
to truth of the matter by deeming the αὐτό-realities as being the gift of participation itself, which 
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I agree with Gersh in this regard, as I have not been to locate this teaching in the 
Athenian school of Neoplatonism. There are also philosophical issues that Gersh 
does not really go into in his footnote on Palamism. Gersh cites the work of Corsini 
but does not present his argument. Corsini points out the philosophical flaws in 
embracing an essence-energies distinction in his study on Pseudo-Dionysius. He 
rejects a distinction between GodÕs essence and the divine attributes and logoi 
because GodÕs manifestation never exceeds the limits of Being.150 Corsini concludes 
that the creature can only participate in created grace. He further adds concerning 
the divine nature: ÔWe therefore believe that a real distinction between attributes 
and divine archetypes is not possible except in the sense of being two aspects of one 
and the same reality, which is mono-intelligible.Õ151 God is not divided against 
Himself.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
straddles an infinite rift between uncreated and created, ÔMethexis,Õ pp. 141-43. A participation is not 
an ontological Ôin betweenÕ God and creatures, but it is more like two sides of the same coin. A 
created likeness (or similitude) that is also a divine participation, which is how Aquinas defines it (In 
librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus exposition 4.6, 9.1, and 9.3), allows for an αὐτό-realities to be 
both created and uncreated, which makes grace both uncreated and created depending on which 
side of the ontic divide one is speaking about. 
150 E. Corsini, Il trattato ÔDe Divinis nominibusÕ dello Pseudo-Dionigi e I commenti neoplatonici al Parmenide 
(Torino, 1962), p. 137 
 
151 E. Corsini, Il trattato ÔDe Divinis nominibusÕ dello Pseudo-Dionigi, p. 137: ÔPensiamo quindi che una vera e 
propria distinzione tra attribute divini e archetipi non sia possibile se non nel senso di due aspetti di un'unica e 
identica realta, che costituisce il moneio intelligibile.Õ 
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Hans Urs von Balthasar also assesses this issue in Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Maximus, and he emphasizes the dual movements of procession and return as the 
explanatory centre of Pseudo-DionysiusÕs seemingly contradictory ontology. There 
is an irreducibility between the participant and that which is participated in, and 
there is an irreducibility between what is comprehensible and incomprehensible: 
The imparting of God is not a realm on its own between God and the world, 
but that movement of God in creation and grace, which on the one hand 
with regard to what is imparted coincides with God himself, and on the other 
(as its goal) with the worldÉthe mystery of creation because of its intimacy 
cannot dispense with the category of participationÉthat in which [creatures] 
participate is itself precisely that in which they cannot participate, for were 
it not that they would not be participating in GodÉit is not that some aspects 
of God are comprehensible while others are notÉIt is not that one can ÔonlyÕ 
know the powers of God ad extra, but not the underlying essence; rather, for 
Denys what is Incomprehensible is to be found in what is really 
comprehensible, for it is in every case the incomprehensible God in his 
totality who makes himself comprehensible in his communications.152 
3.7 Conclusion 
In our study of Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus on participation and the 
divine processions, we have learned that they describe the unity of the divine 
distinctions using kataphatic theology and the distinction of the divine distinctions 
using apophatic theology. The existence of an essence-energies epistemology in the 
Church fathers does not therefore force the theologian to insert a real distinction in 
                                                             
152 Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 2: Studies in Theological Style: 
Clerical Styles, (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1984), pp. 163, 170, 179, 185, 188. 
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God. Pseudo-Dionysius moves along a more radical trajectory, where the divine gifts 
in creation are participations in the fullness of God. Only because God is absolutely 
imparticipable can He be participated in.  
Pseudo-Dionysius also points to a possible solution in understanding the 
processions as divine archetypes or logoi in DN 5.8. Maximus will pick up on this 
point in Pseudo-DionysiusÕs theology and make it the centre of his metaphysics. 
Divine procession is understood by Maximus in terms of logoi and energeia. In the 
next chapter, I will show how Maximus uses the doctrine of the logoi and its 
eschatological communication to creatures as the essence of divine energies. 
Though this is a supernatural gift, it is still mediated through human nature. We 
also began to look at MaximusÕs doctrine of the Incarnation and theophany. I will 
also show that MaximusÕs Christological grounding of divine grace rejects an 
essence-energies distinction.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
4.1 Divine Energy and Grace 
In the previous chapter, I examined Pseudo-Dionysius and MaximusÕs 
doctrine of participation and divine procession as one of the sources for the Eastern 
Orthodox distinction between GodÕs essence and energies. I interpreted the divine 
processions as being on both sides of the ontological divide between God and His 
creation. This paradox also applies to divine grace in that the creaturely effects of 
GodÕs action are directly connected to the utterly transcendent God. The Thearchy 
is wholly imparticiple but directly acts in the world without remainder. There is not 
a hinterland between the two sides of the ontological divide, nor is there an 
ontological level of energy between God and his creation. It is the radical notion of 
participation that does not conflate God and the world nor separate them into 
unrelated spheres. In the present chapter, I wish to unpack this paradox a little 
more by examining how Maximus understands essence and energy in relation to 
God. It will be demonstrated that Maximus does not separate GodÕs essence from His 
energies due to his doctrine of the logoi, and that Christological grace is the best way 
to understand the paradox of participation in God. 
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5.1 Divine Procession as Energy and Grace in Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus 
Pseudo-Dionysius establishes a rule when speaking about divine unity and 
differentiation: Ôwe are not entitled to make distinctions where there are none or to 
jumble together what has been distinguished. Rather, we must follow in whatever 
way we can and we must lift up our eyes to the divine rays [of the revelation of 
scripture].Õ1 The concern here is to maintain the priority of principle in the 
procession of the Godhead. If God is not transcending principle, then multiplicity is 
not grounded in unity. Unity, as it were, would disintegrate if the One, as self-
subsistent being, were not the transcending principle of multiplicity.2 The divine 
ousia is beyond the differentiations and the ground of all differentiation at the same 
time. This does not mean that the divine ousia is really distinct from its knowable 
activity, but that it is not Ôbound by Ôform,Õ ÔessenceÕ or definition of any kind.Õ3  
The paradox of absolute Unity and differentiation within God must be 
affirmed according to Pseudo-Dionysius. Throughout the DN, Pseudo-Dionysius 
boldly asserts or predicates a divine name of God based upon remonstration and 
derivation from multitude (i.e., makes them into real divine titles). Divine revelation 
                                                             
1 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 2.2 (PG 3: 640A).  
2 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.3 (PG 3: 980B). 
3 Rowan Williams, ÔThe Philosophical Structures of Palamism,Õ Eastern Churches Review, Vol. 9 (1977), p. 
39. 
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through the Holy Scriptures also places a theological requirement on ascribing such 
terms to the Thearchy. Kataphatic predication is then guarded by an apophatic 
reserve that guarantees the totality of participation in God as a super-substantial 
totality. Distinction in God can only be asserted because of the participation of the 
multitude in the One. Pseudo-Dionysius emphasizes the simultaneous 
transcendence and immanence of the Trinity in DN: 
We must go on now to the name of ÔbeingÕ which is rightly applied by 
theology to him who truly is. But I must point out that the purpose of what I 
have to say is not to reveal that being in its transcendence, for this is 
something beyond words, something unknown and wholly unrevealed, 
something above unity itself. What I wish to do is to sing a hymn of praise 
for the being-making procession of the absolute divine Source of being into 
the total domain of being.4 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius wishes to sing a hymn to One beyond being because this is a 
knowledge that transcends what can be known (only that which has creaturely 
being can be known). On the other hand, theology can rightly apply the name 
ÔbeingÕ to the Godhead because it is the Ôbeing-making Source of being.Õ In a later 
chapter, Pseudo-Dionysius adds this reflection to the limits of what is knowable 
concerning the Trinity: 
You will find nothing in the world, which is not in the One, by which the 
transcendent Godhead is named. Everything owes to the One its individual 
                                                             
4 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.1 (PG 3: 816B), trans. Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works 
(New York, NY: Paulinist Press, 1987), p. 96. 
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existence and the process whereby it is perfected and preserved. Given this 
power of the GodÕs unity, we must be returned from the many to the One and 
our unique song of praise must be for the single complete deity which is the 
one cause of all things and which is there before every oneness amid 
multiplicity, before every part and whole, before the definite and indefinite, 
before the limited and the unlimited. It is there defining all things that have 
being, defining being itself. It is the cause of things and of the sum total of 
things. It is simultaneously there with them and before them and beyond 
them. It is there beyond the one itself, defining this one. Unity among 
creatures is a unity of number, and number has its own share of 
beingÉThere is the transcendent unity of God and the fruitfulness of God, 
and as we prepare to sing this truth we use the names Trinity and Unity for 
that which is in fact beyond every nameÉBut no unity or trinity, no number 
or ones, no fruitfulness, indeed, nothing that is or is known can proclaim 
that hiddenness beyond every mind and reason of the transcendent Godhead 
which transcends every being.5 
Pseudo-Dionysius describes the existence of the Godhead as being prior to 
oneness amid multiplicity. Oneness is a reference to the primary beings of Being, 
Life, and Wisdom that he describes in DN 2.6 and 11.6. The simple and united God 
transcends all participations and those that participate in them. For Pseudo-
Dionysius, and Maximus following him, numbers (even the number one) are a part 
of Being. Maximus states that a number Ôdoes not express a reality but points in a 
direction.Õ6 This is because a number is essentially a sign that indicates quantity and 
not substance or accident.7 Maximus calls number Ôa kind of sound and, at the same 
                                                             
5 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.3 (PG 3: 980C-981A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 129. 
6 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1185B). 
7 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to St. Maximus Confessor (San Francisco, 
CA: Ignatius Press, 2003) p. 109 ff. 
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time, a predicate associated with quantity.Õ8 In reality, everything created, whether 
unified or multiple, has the essential relationship of being both an individual 
separated from other beings and an individual in relation9 to other beings.10 Further, 
Maximus applies his critique of Origenist motion, with the understanding of unity 
and diversity in the One: 
The Myriad is the monad in movement, and the myriad without movement 
is the monadÉfor the beginning of all nonidentity is the monad, and if the 
monad is not without origin, it also cannot be without movement. It moves, 
in fact, by means of number; it starts from atomic units and moves towards a 
synthetic unity, and thenÑby dissolutionÑinto atomic individuals. That is its 
being.11 
The unity in the multiplicity of created being in the system of Maximus is 
only found beyond the realm of the created order (which oscillates between 
beginning and end through becoming12). Maximus clarifies the nature of the monad 
of the transcendent Godhead by saying, ÔOnly the monad is genuinely without 
                                                             
8 Maximus, Ep. 15 (PG 91: 564D), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p. 109. 
9 Gersh discusses this in relation to Leontius of Byzantium, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation 
of the Pre-history and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, 1978), p. 241 n. 173. 
10 von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p. 109. 
11 Maximus, Ad Thal. 55 (CCG 7, 489, p. 150ff); Amb. (10 PG 91: 1185B), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmic 
Liturgy, p. 112.  
12 Maximus, Ad Thal. 55 (CCG 7, 489, 153ff): ÔEvery created thing has the divine and ineffable monad, 
which is God himself, as its origin and its end, because it comes forth from him and ultimately 
returns to him.Õ Becoming for Maximus will be the distention (διάστασις) whereby through free-will 
one can live according to their logoi and towards their end in God.  
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movement, because it is neither number nor numerable.Õ13 So, even the number one 
still indicates a synthetic unity of the individual and otherness.14 This synthesis is in 
reality one but is perceived in the mind as two. ÔBeing-in-itself and being-related, 
always remains an abstractionÑor better, a ÔprescindingÕ (praecisio rationis).Õ15 This is 
why, in the dominion of essences, numbers can never fully define anything.16 
However, Maximus also says in his scholia17 on the DN of Pseudo-Dionysius, that 
Ôunity, as the cause of numbers, includes all numbers in itself in a unitary way, just 
as the center or point contains the straight lines of the circle.Õ18 The necessity of a 
transcendent God who, as origin and cause, establishes unity and diversity in 
creation does not mean that God is not also immanent in creatures. His immanence 
is to be found in divine eros and agape towards the creature as the object of eros and 
agape created in the creature, as it is able. As Maximus clearly affirms in Amb. 23, 
God is only moved to the extent that he creates eros and agape in those capable or 
                                                             
13 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1185B). 
14 Maximus, Ep. 13 (PG 91: 480B): ÔDistinction and unity are in fact not the same thing, although they 
hold good for and are predicated of the same subject and are even qualities of the same subject.Õ 
15 Maximus, Ep. 13 (PG 91: 477B), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p. 110. 
16 Maximus, Ep. 15 (PG 91: 564C). 
17 Many of these scholia, which that were originally attributed to Maximus, were in fact the works of 
John of Scythopolis. See Von BalthasarÕs study on this textual issue, Cosmic Liturgy, pp. 359-87. 
18 Maximus, Scholia on DN 13 (PG 4: 321C), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p. 114. 
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worthy to receive it. 19    Movement and divine energy and power are manifested as 
works in creatures. God Himself is not in movement and does not ÔhaveÕ energy and 
power. Towards the end of the DN, Pseudo-Dionysius discusses the paradox of God 
being both simple and active in creation. His conclusion is to accept that there is a 
proper mode in which God proceeds, creates, and sustains. 
And yet what do the theologians mean when they assert that the unstirring 
God moves and goes out into everything? This is surely something which has 
to be understood in a way befitting God, and out of our reverence for him we 
must assume that this motion of his does not in ay way signify a change of 
place, a variation, an alteration, a turning, a movement in space either 
straight or in a circular fashion or in a way compounded of both. Nor is this 
motion to be imagined as occurring in the mind, in the soul, or in respect of 
the nature of God. What is signified, rather, is that God brings everything 
into being, that he sustains them, that he exercises all manner of providence 
over them, that he is present to all of them, that he embraces all of them in a 
way which no mind can grasp, and that from him, providing for everything, 
arise countless processions [πρόοδοι] and activities [ἐνέργειαι]. And yet, in 
some mode conforming to what befits both God and reason, one has to 
predicate movement of the immutable God.20  
What is interesting in this passage of Pseudo-Dionysius is that he speaks about the 
motion that must be predicated of God, which also does not reside in the human 
                                                             
19 Maximus, Amb. 23 (PG 91: 1280B). 
20 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 9.9 (PG 3: 916C), Greek inserted by me. Luibheid inserts the phrase Ôsome 
modeÕ in the Greek sentence ÔΑλλἀ καὶ κινήσεις θεοῦ τοῦἀκινητου, θεοπρεπῶς τφ λόγῳ συγχωρητέον 
ὑμνῆσαι.Õ Quite literally, this sentence would read ÔAnd yet, befitting god and reason, one must hymn 
movement of the immovable God.Õ I think that Luibheid added the word mode to indicate the 
manner in which something is fit for God. The idea here is that there is some way that God can act 
(i.e., create) to bring about his creative processions and energies. Also, using the word ÔhymnÕ instead 
of ÔpredicateÕ is much more in tune with Pseudo-DionysiusÕ theology about transcendence, even 
though the intent of meaning is the same.  
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mind and soul, or in the nature (οὐσία) of God.  At the same time, this providential 
activity of God is such that Ôno mind can grasp.Õ The paradox of the movement of an 
unmovable God gets at the core of the paradox of creation: Why is there something 
other than God? Pseudo-Dionysius appeals to divine economy as the only 
explanation for why there is the presence of his creative grace giving processions 
and energies in the world. There must be some sort of way that the simple God can 
create and sustain his creation. Affirming a mode befitting God and reason in which 
God acts to create is very far from a real metaphysical distinction in God between 
his essence and operations. Also, the apophatic reserve must guide the energetic 
ascriptions to God in Pseudo-DionysiusÕs writings. Motion in God can only be 
predicated through remonstration from beings. This is how God can be both 
movable and immovable. 
Earlier in the same chapter, Pseudo-Dionysius discusses how ÔdifferenceÕ can 
be predicated of God. The divine can be described as having difference only by the 
power exercised in divine economy for the salvation of all creation. According to 
Christian patristic thought rooted in Neoplatonism, deification and the return to 
God is always the basis for describing God as multiple in operations. However, 
Pseudo-Dionysius next qualifies the name of ÔdifferenceÕ by saying, Ôyet at the same 
time he remains within himself and in his one unceasing activity he never abandons 
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his own true identity [τῆς οἰκείας ταὐτότητος ἀνεκφοιτήτως κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν μίαν].Õ21 
Paradoxically, the difference that is manifested to the creature is really pointing to 
a direction and meaning above what is manifested as diverse. Pseudo-DionysiusÑas 
well as Maximus22Ñuses the example of the soul to the body. If the incorporeal, 
simple and indivisible soul were manifested in corporeal form as having parts, the 
observer would see multiple things even though the truth is that there is an 
underlying simplicity and unity.23 With quite the reversal from the common 
understanding of difference thus far in the DN, Pseudo-Dionysius enigmatically 
asserts that creative manifestations of God as multiple really indicate a Ôunity amid 
many forms and the uniform processions of his fecundity to all.Õ24 So, despite the 
manifestation of activities in God, the transcendent God remains in his own identity 
and Ôunceasing energy.Õ  
Maximus to denies movement in God, but he understands motion from the 
effects of GodÕs creating and sustaining the world.25 In the background of Pseudo-
                                                             
21 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 9.5 (PG 3: 912D), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 116. 
22 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1100A-B). 
23 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 9.5 (PG 3: 913A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 117. 
24 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 9.5 (PG 3: 913B), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 117. 
25 Thomas Aquinas will later make a similar distinction in reference to the act of creation by God. In 
SG 2.17, Aquinas says that ÔGodÕs action, which is without pre-existing matter and is called creation, is 
neither a motion nor a change, properly speaking.Õ Motion or movement in God can only be 
predicated through remonstration from the created order, and it cannot be applied to God in the 
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Dionysius and MaximusÕs concept of motion is the Neoplatonic triad of proceeding, 
remaining and return. Since the power and activity of the cause remains in and 
proceeds to the effect, Neoplatonists were able to affirm motion and rest in the 
divine and temporal realms. Gersh notes that this also allows the Neoplatonists to 
speak of motion in terms of spiritual movement.26 However, in general motion was 
the principle of otherness for Neoplatonists.27 When carried over into Christian 
theology, motion was also understood to distinguish the uncreated from the 
created. Maximus uses the Trinity as an example of this interplay of metaphysical 
terms in his Or Dom., ÔThis teaches us [speaking about the unity in plurality of the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
same manner that it is predicated of creatures who exist in time. Neoplatonic discussion on motion 
in the divine realm centered around the controversial statement by Plato in the Sophist 249C 10-D4 
that the philosopher should reject the notion that rest applies to the whole. Neoplatonists embraced 
the assumption that both motion and rest are located in material and intelligible worlds. The reason 
for this is that in the three movements of remaining, procession and return, there is a dual aspect of 
stability and motion in each of the causal links going down the scale of being. Gersh (Iamblichus to 
Eriugena, pp. 69-70) describes this dual aspect well: ÔIn brief, the argument seems to be that rest and 
motion are in a reciprocal relation since each must follow the other in temporal sequence and that, 
since motion is a kind of rest (for it remains in a state of mobility) and rest is a kind of motion (for it 
requires that something continues to rest), the reciprocity applies even to the atemporal sphere.Õ  
 
26 Gersh, Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 68. 
 
27 ÔThe reduction of motion to otherness naturally emphasizes the plurality implicit in the causal 
process while the acceptance of motion for itself tends rather to emphasize the unity. Thus a given 
term may be interpreted both as multiple and as single depending upon the dimension (space or 
time) in regard to which it is primarily interpreted,Õ Gersh, Iamblichus to Eruigena, p. 72. 
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Trinity], who have been introduced to the perfect knowledge of truth by a calling of 
grace and faith, to recognize that the nature and the power of the divinity are one.Õ28  
This passage reflects MaximusÕs Trinitarian theology, where God is both a 
unity in Trinity and a Trinity in unity. He holds the two terms together and 
emphatically affirms that the Trinity is ÔUnity according to the principle of essence 
and Trinity according to the mode of existence.Õ29 Trinitarian activity in its mode of 
operation (which the creature cannot fully apprehend) shows that Maximus 
conceives the divine nature to be active, but elsewhere he also states that the 
sharing of Trinitarian life through the gift/grace of goodness reflects the Ôsimplicity 
and indivisibility of the divine activity [καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν κα ὶ ἀμερές τ ῆς θείας 
ἐνεργείας].Õ30 MaximusÕs meaning in this passage from the Or. Dom. is clarified in an 
important passage in Amb. 1, where he analyzes how the creature can have 
knowledge of the Trinity:  
If the Godhead is monad, but not dyad, and triad, but not multitude, as being 
without beginning, bodiless and undisturbedÉFor it is not the beginning of 
everything that comes after it, according to the contraction of expansion, as 
if it were poured out naturally and led to multitude, but is the existent 
reality of the consubstantial triadÉThus there is one Godhead that is as 
monad, and subsists as triad. If, hearing of movement, you wonder how the 
                                                             
28 Maximus, Or. Dom., (PG 90: 892C). 
29 Maximus, Or. Dom., (PG 90: 893A). 
30 Maximus, Myst. 5 (PG 91: 680A). 
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Godhead that is beyond infinity is moved, understand that what happens is 
happening to us and not to the Godhead. For first we are illuminated with the 
reason for its being, then we are enlightened about the mode in which it 
subsists, for we always understand that something is before we understand 
how it is. Therefore movement of the Godhead is constituted by the 
knowledge about the fact that it is and how it subsists that comes about 
through revelation that to those who receive it.31  
MaximusÕs emphasis in this passage is the non-ascription of movement to God, and 
that knowledge of God through activity is restricted to how it affects the creature. 
Further, knowledge of how God subsists must be revealed to the creation through 
economy (i.e., created effects). GodÕs subsistence or movement is not predicable of 
Him in essence. The ontological difference between God and creatures requires that 
motion be predicated of God through remonstration from creatures.32 Maximus also 
understands the revelation of Scripture to be the Ôdivine powers.Õ In Cap Gnos. 2.11, 
Maximus says that the Ôlogoi and forms of the commandments, which are the divine 
powers, will come as birds from heaven to rest in [the gnostic].Õ33  
                                                             
31 Maximus, Amb. 1 (PG 91: 1036B-C), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 170, italics mine. 
32 Proclus (PT 283) offers an insight concerning motion and activity in Neoplatonism that might 
explain what Maximus means by not predicating movement in God: ÔFor the Philosopher described 
its intellectual monad as remaining in the same state because of its eternal nature, but he showed its 
activity outward moving and participated in by the soul and the whole Cosmos because of its 
mobility,Õ trans. Gersh, Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 131. Here Proclus points out that when activity is 
external to a monad, it is in motion, which means it is manifesting in the sensible world. Motion 
cannot be predicated of GodÕs essential nature, but He produces effects that are in motion. 
33 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.11 (PG 91: 1129B-C): Ôτούς δέ λόγους ἑαυτῶ τῶν ἐντολῶν καί τούς τρόπους, ἤ 
καί τάς θείας δυνάμεις, ὥσπερ πετεινά οὐρανοῦ ἐπαναπαύει.Õ 
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Therefore, PalamasÕs claim about the ineffability of GodÕs energies must be 
rejected in Maximus because knowledge and experience of God occurs through his 
created effects. What is ineffable in GodÕs activity is the fact that He somehow goes 
outside Himself to create.  
Connected with movement or motion in God is the issue of divine energy. It 
is not the case in MaximusÕs theology that God has energy, but it is the case that He 
is energetic or pure act. Divine energy is not separated from GodÕs essence, and it is 
also not separated from its created effects in creatures. We will examine how 
Maximus understands divine energy to be communicated to creatures through 
created grace at the end of this chapter, but there are several points concerning 
energy that need to be made at this point in our discussion.  
In the article introduced in the previous chapter, Juan-Miguel Garrigues 
shows how this Byzantine theologian conceives of energy and power as being 
associated with and in the divine essence. Garrigues quotes a passage from the Th. 
Pol. discussing power and energy in the hypostatic union of the Incarnation: 
Anything that exists shares in essential and natural existence; and so also, 
that which is energized or that which energizes properly signifies that which 
is endowed with power. That which is endowed with power is that which has 
both essential and natural power. Therefore, the act of confessing that the 
two34 natures in Christ are not without existence and without energy, does 
                                                             
34 Maximus does not use ÔtwoÕ natures in the Greek, but it is implied. 
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not imply that they are not two hypostases or two agents, but this is to 
confess both their essential and natural existences and energies in an 
orthodox manner.35  
Earlier in Th. Pol. 1, Maximus describes the location of the divine power and activity 
in Christ: Ôthe action is from the power and power from the essence and is the 
essence. It is said therefore that these three things have things from one another: 
that which is powerful, power, and the empowered. And that which is powerful, one 
says that is the essence.Õ36 Natural energy in Maximus is merely the energy inherent 
in a nature or essence.37 Maximus generally relates natural energy to the energy of 
GodÕs Providential care of His creation through continual grace.38 It does not entail a 
separation of essence from energies. The divine energies (as attributes) are also 
identified with GodÕs essence quite clearly in Ambiguum 7.  
In MaximusÕs grand critique of the Origenist fall of a primitive henad of 
souls, he explains a saying of Gregory Nazianzen that creatures are a Ôportion of 
GodÕ that have Ôslipped downÕ from above by using the model of the Logos-logoi. 
                                                             
35 Maximus, Th Pol 16 (PG 91: 205B). 
36 Maximus, Th Pol 1 (PG 91: 33B). 
37 Juan-Miguel Garrigues, ÔLÕEnergie Divine et Grace chez Maxime le Confesseur,Õ Istina, vol. 19, no. 3 
(1974): pp. 273ff. 
38 C.f., Cap. Gnost. 1.47. 
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Maximus describes what the Logos-logoi relationship means in different ways.39 One 
way is through a meditation on the ÔWord of God is the substance of virtue.Õ 
Maximus first identifies Christ with the virtues and then describes how one then 
participates in Christ: 
For our Lord Jesus Christ himself is the substance of all the virtues, as it is 
written: This one God made our wisdom, our justice, our sanctification and 
redemption (1 Cor 1:30). These things of course are said about him absolutely, 
since he is wisdom and righteousness and sanctification itself. They are not, 
as in our case, simply attributed to him, as for example in the expression, a 
Ôwise manÕ or a Ôjust man.Õ It is evident that every person who participates in 
virtue as a matter of habit unquestionably participates in God, the substance 
of the virtues. Whoever by his choices cultivates the good natural seed [i.e., 
the logoi as immanent and substantive or perhaps also the natural 
participative faculty of the creature] shows the end to be the same as the 
beginning and the beginning to be the same as the end [i.e., the gift of being 
and eternal well being].Õ40     
In the commentaries on Ambiguum 7, most Eastern Orthodox scholars neglect this 
retelling of the Ôportion of GodÕ ascription of St. Gregory in relation to what 
Maximus discusses earlier in his commentary. Kataphatically, Maximus is affirming 
virtue and other attributes to the Logos Christ simpliciter. The Incarnate one does 
not possess or have virtue and wisdom, but he is virtue and wisdom in his essence.41 
                                                             
39 He actually retells what he means using four forms of explanation; see Sherwood Polycarp, The 
Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, (Rome: 1955). 
40 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1081D-1084A), trans. Paul Blowers, On The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ 
(Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 2003), p. 58-59. 
41 Maximus makes an interesting comment in Myst. 5. He describes how God is revealed through both 
truth and goodness: ÔTruth does this when the divine seems to be revealed in its essence, for truth is
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Maximus makes a similar affirmation in an important theological passage on holy 
baptism and deification in Ad Thal. 6: 
With those undergoing the (second mode of) birth, the Holy Spirit takes the 
whole of their free choice and translates it completely from earth to heaven, 
and, through the true knowledge acquired by exertion, transfigures the 
mind with the blessed light-rays of our God and Father, such that the mind is 
deemed another Ôgod,Õ insofar as in its habitude it experiences, by grace, that 
which God himself does not experience but ÔisÕ in his very essence [χάριτος 
ὄπερ οὐ πάσχων ἀλλ' ὑπάρχων κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ὁ θεός].42 
Maximus orientates the philosophy of participation around the theological notions 
of adoption grace and deification in God through holy baptism. Through true 
knowledge and moral striving to live according the divine will, the creature can 
experience in its habitude (or tropos of free-will in accord with divine virtue) the 
essence of God by grace.43 By a habitus of unwavering virtuous disposition and action 
                                                                                                                                                                              
something simple, unique, one, identical, indivisible, immutable, impassible, all-seeing, and wholly 
eternal. Goodness on the other hand, reveals God when it manifests him in its activities: for the good 
is beneficent and provident and protective of everything that comes from it,Õ trans. Berthold, p. 191. 
This passage seems to clearly indicate that for Maximus, activity is through economy and 
Providence. 
 
42 Maximus, Ad Thal. 6 (CCSG 7:70-71), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 104, Greek inserted by me.  
43 In the Cap. Gnost. 1.82-83, Maximus makes another intriguing claim about the essence of God in 
relation to our mind and contemplation of Him: ÔFor there is no being at all which is by itself a simple 
essence or thought to the extent of also being an undivided monad. As far as God is concerned, if we 
say that he is an essence, he has not naturally inherent in him the possibility of being thought 
because he is not composed; if we say that he is thought he has no essence which by nature is capable 
of being a subject of thought. But God is himself thought by essence, and wholly thought, and solely 
thought. According to thought he is himself essence, wholly essence, and solely essence. He is 
entirely above essence and entirely above thought, since he is an invisible monad, simple and 
without partsÉIn the multitude there is diversity, unlikeness, and difference. But in God, who is 
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in accordance with the divine nature, the creature will be one in energy with the 
Thearchy such that a perichoretic union emerges. ÔThrough the abundant grace of 
the Spirit it will be shown that God alone is at work, and in all things there will be 
only one activity [μίανÉἐνέργειαν], that of God and those worthy of kinship with 
God. God will be all in all wholly penetrating [περιχωρήσαντος] all who are his in a 
way that is appropriate to each.Õ44  
The present first fruits of the Spirit in baptism are also connected with the 
future eternal life of the faithful. In the resurrection, Maximus describes the 
kingdom of God as Ôthe imparting of gifts, according to grace, which belong to God 
by nature.Õ45 An example of such an eternal gift would be infinity. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
eminently one and unique, there is only identity, simplicity, and samenessÕ (PG 91: 1116A-1117B). Not 
only does Maximus appear to collapse the first and second hypothesis in the Neoplatonic system of 
the One and Intellect in a dialogical manner, but provides the context in which we should 
understand GodÕs essence. Kataphatically it must be affirmed that God is essence by thought and 
thought by essence, but apophatically as transcendent cause God is above and prior to thought and 
essence. This is because God is a totality that cannot be circumscribed and at the same time he 
utterly exists not bereft of being, life, and wisdom. Maximus also states in De Char. 3.25 that God 
grants the gifts of goodness and wisdom in order that what he is in essence, we might have through 
participation. Also, in Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137D) Maximus unequivocally states that God gives by grace 
and habit what he is in his very essence. There is the identification of essence and attributes in the 
ConfessorÕs theology as there is the affirmation through negation of his transcendent existence 
beyond all that can be known or experienced. This is evident in MaximusÕ Trinitarian theology as he 
warns his reader not to Ôsearch for states and aptitudes in the simple and infinite substance of the 
Holy Trinity, lest you make it composite like creatures. To have such notions about God is absurd and 
impiousÕ (De Char. 4.8).    
44 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1076C). 
45 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 2.90 (PG 90: 1168C). 
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resurrection to eternal life, the creature will participate in the gift of infinity. The 
grace of infinity is a full sharing in the essence of God (since his nature is infinity), 
but the very same gift of divine infinity is a created grace that the creature can 
participate in. The eternal gifts of the divine nature must be shared through grace 
because the gifts are not a sharing in the essence of God, which would destroy the 
natures of both beings.  
These two passages from Amb. 6 and 7 are not qualified by an apophatic 
reserve, but elsewhere in Amb. 7, Maximus does enforce an apophatic qualification 
in speaking about the Logos and logoi: 
We are speechless before the sublime teaching about the Logos, for He cannot 
be expressed in words or conceived in thought. Although he is beyond being 
and nothing can participate in him in any way, nor is he any of the totality of 
things that can be know in relation to other things, nevertheless we affirm 
that the one Logos is many logoi and the many logoi are One. Because the One 
goes forth out of goodness into individual being, creating and preserving 
them, the One is many. Moreover the many are directed toward the One and 
are providentially guided in that direction. It is as though they were drawn 
to an all-powerful center that had built into it the beginnings of the lines 
that go out from it and that gathers them all together. In this way the many 
are one.46  
The apophatic reserve in this passage guarantees that the transcendence of the 
divine is maintained while at the same time affirming that creatures really do 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
46 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1081B). 
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participate in the one Logos. Maximus is careful not to identify the logoi with 
Ôconcrete actual existenceÕ or ÔbeingÕ because of the Origenist theory of the pre-
existent henad of souls, but he also does not keep us from identifying the essential 
nature of each creature with its own being. The truth of every creature of God 
resides both in the divine model and will, but it must also be the nature of each 
creature as created. Participation within a Christian context of creation ex nihilo can 
only occur if both sides of the ontological divide are maintained.  
If the logoi are not one in God prior to creation as pure potentiality and only 
actually many once the logoi receives substantive creation (i.e., material creation, or 
as Maximus says ÔessentialÕ), then how do the logoi participate in the Logos as 
Maximus infers in this passage? Maximus is clearly discussing the part to whole 
participation of the many in the one, both in vocabulary and content. Further, the 
question of logoi participating in the Logos is also evidenced by MaximusÕs retelling 
of his theory in Ambiguum 7 as the Christian being a member of the one body of 
Christ. Are the many members of the one body of Christ only the divine wills of the 
Logos or are they real creatures participating in the unity of ChristÕs body through 
the power of the Holy Spirit? Maximus indicates the latter, and I think his whole 
argument concerning the Ôportion of GodÕ must be understood in a two-fold sense: 
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in the first instance the logoi are something like divine ideas.47 Second, by 
understanding the Logos-logoi in this instance within the Eastern Orthodox 
distinction between the divine essence and energies, as Vladimir Lossky in fact 
does,48 then one would be affirming that the ineffable divine energies participate in 
the Logos. How would God participate in himself? If the divine energies were also the 
                                                             
47 Aquinas also develops a notion of a plurality of ideas in the simple God. He bases the plurality on 
the created effects that can be in relation or participate in their exemplar, not on actual plurality in 
God. This is how Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus both seem to understand the plurality of existence 
coming forth from the simple God. In the De Veritate (q. 3, a. 3, ad. 3, Leonine ed., voL 22.1.108: 185-
94), Aquinas describes divine exemplars as ideas in both productive and speculative aspects, but in 
the In librum bellti Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio, Aquinas states that the exemplars can only be 
productive ideas, not virtual. Further, he identifies exemplars as divine willings, which is the use that 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus make of the logoi. The productive and willing nature of the ideas in 
God are also retained in the Summa Theologica q. 15 and 44. Gregory Doolan (Divine Ideas as Exemplary 
Causes, p. 15) describes how these aspects of ideas in God are present in created particulars, 'he 
observes that whenever a thing is not generated by chance, its form must be the end of generation. 
Furthermore, the agent that acts on account of form only does so because some likeness (similitudo) 
of that form exists in it-a likeness that can occur in one of two ways. In one way, a likeness is in a 
natural agent because the form of the generated thing preexists in the agent according to a natural 
being (esse naturale), as it does in things that act according to their nature. Thus, man generates man 
and fire, fire. In another way, the likeness of a generated thing can occur in the agent according to an 
intelligible being (esse intelliqibile); such is the case with those agents who act by means of intellect. In 
this way, the likeness of a house preexists in the mind of the builder. 'And this likeness,' Thomas 
concludes, 'can be called the 'idea' of the house since the artisan intends the house to be like the 
form that he conceived in his mind.Õ I think that the best approach to Maximus on the issue of the 
Logos-logoi is to embrace a two-fold understanding of logoi as both in God and also as descended in 
created principles and forms through divine economy and providence.  The creature is a portion of 
God and can participate in the Logos because of exemplary causality and residing presence of the 
Creator in the creature. This is thoroughly Proclean from a metaphysical point of view. Maximus 
rejects the notion of emanations or henads, and thus develops a more causal understanding of 
natural participation in God. Supernatural participation in God through grace and deification is of a 
different order and will be discussed below. 
 
48 Vladimir Lossky, Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary 
Press, 1976), p. 91. 
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participations that do not participate in anything higher,49 then they would not 
participate in God (this would be a self-defeating argument). As Polycarp Sherwood 
notes in relation to these two passages from Ambiguum 7, asserting an essence-
energies distinction here would be to treat MaximusÕs theology too casually.50 This 
equally applies to the claim that grace is an uncreated activity separated from the 
divine essence in the ConfessorÕs thought. This goes beyond what Maximus actually 
says, and it is also to treat his metaphysics too casually. 
There is a paradoxical dynamic at work in MaximusÕs theology of the Logos-
logoi. The logoi are one in the unity and singularity of the Logos, but many as 
distributed and created in the cosmos. This dynamic polarity is very similar to St. 
AugustineÕs notions of the aeternae rationes51 and the seminales rationes.52 The aeternae 
rationes are held in the Logos according to AugustineÑhe perceives the Ideas as in 
the Platonic container or reservoir rather than the providential will of GodÑ
whereas for Maximus they are not only the paradigms for creatures but also active 
principles of divine will. For Augustine, the seminales rationes, or seminal reasons, 
denote immanent forms within creation. Both Augustine and Maximus would hold 
                                                             
49 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 1.48-49. 
50 Polycarp, The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus, p. 179. 
51 Augustine, De Trinitate, 2.9, 3.13, and 4.16. 
52 Augustine, De Trinitate, 3.13; idem, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, books V and VI. 
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to a dynamic created reality that is at the same time rooted in a transcendent 
source. Stephen Gersh articulates this elimination of Platonic ontological 
intermediaries by Maximus (much more explicit than Pseudo-Dionysius) quite well 
in his study of Neoplatonism and the Dionysian tradition: 
Maximus the Confessor is perhaps the first thinker in the Neoplatonic 
tradition to tackle the problem [Emanation] head-on when he argues that a 
created thing participates in God but Ôdoes not flow forthÕ (οὐκ ἀπορρέει) 
[Amb. 7 1080C]. Elsewhere he argues that the notion of things Ôhaving flowed 
down from aboveÕ (ῥεύσοαντες δὲ ἄνωθεν) [amb 7 1081C] means simply that 
the creature is not longer living according to its preordained ÔreasonÕ (λόγος) 
in God [Amb. 7 1084B].53 
Through his intricate created ontology, Maximus will distinguish the αὐτό-realities 
(i.e., Being-itself, Life-itself, and Wisdom-itself) from any kind of intermediary 
hypostasis, as in Proclean Neoplatonism. However, Maximus will still place the 
source of these realities in God himself as attributes, and they will be more or less 
synonymous with the pre-existing logoi singularly united in the one Logos. 
Despite the paradox of the Thearchy being both One and multiple in 
creation, God is not completely unknowable. Instead, the Godhead is the ground for 
the knowledge of anything at all; he is the furnisher of both identity and non-
identity within each creature.54 Pseudo-Dionysius hints that there is an Ôanalogy of 
                                                             
53 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 18. 
54 In his Theologoumena Arithmeticae I on the Monad, Iamblichus (?) notes: ÔNicomachus says that God 
coincides with the monad, since he is seminally everything which exists, just as the monad is in the 
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structure between God and the scala naturaeÕ55 in DN: ÔBeing in itself is more revered 
than the being of Life itself and Wisdom itself and Likeness to divinity itself. 
Whatever beings participate in these things must, before all else, participate in 
Being. More precisely, those absolute qualities of which things have a share must 
                                                                                                                                                                              
case of number, and there are encompassed in it in potential things, which, when actual, seem to be 
extremely opposed, just as it is seen, throughout the Introduction to Arithmetic [of Nicomachus], to be 
capable, thanks to its ineffable nature, of becoming all classes of things, and to have encompassed 
the beginning, middle and end of all things (whether we understand them to be composed by 
continuity or by juxtaposition), because the monad is the beginning, middle and end of quantity, of 
size or moreover of every quality. Just as without the monad there is in general no composition of 
anything, so also without it there is no knowledge of anything whatsoever, since it is a pure light, 
most authoritative over everything in general, and it is sun-like and ruling, so that in each of these 
respects it resembles God, and especially because it has the power of making things cohere and 
combine, even when they are composed of many ingredients and are very different from one 
another,Õ On the Monad, in Theology of Arithmetic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes 
Press, 1988), p. 37. Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus, of course, do not have God and the Monad 
coincide with one another; they are identified with each other. Still, like Iamblichus, both 
theologians posit the Pythagorean principle of the One beyond Monad and Dyad (for Maximus see 
Amb. 10, sections 40-41 of LouthÕs notation, PG 91: 1184C-1188C). This One beyond both Monad and 
Dyad (The metaphysical pair is in view here, not the material. The Pythagoreans ascribed material 
existence to the dyad) and numeration is God without reception of duality (see Maximus, Amb. 10, PG 
91: 1185A-B). Without this transcendence, then, God cannot be the source of everything and reside in 
everything, nor can knowledge of anything subsist if it is not grounded in the transcendence of the 
One. Though God transcends Monad and Dyad, Maximus still collapses the Neoplatonic emanation of 
hypostases by ascribing God as the Monad in a very Iamblichian passage: ÔOnly the monad is properly 
speaking unmoved, because it is not number, nor numerable, nor numbered (for the monad is 
neither a part nor a whole nor a relation), and [only the monad] is properly speaking without 
beginning, because nothing is prior to it, from which, when moved, the monad receives being, and it 
is properly speaking infinite, because it is the cause of every number and everything numbers or 
numerable, as transcendent over every relation and every part and whole, and properly and truly 
and first and solely and simply, but all of this because the monad exists first and alone,Õ Amb. 10 (PG 
91: 1185B-C), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, pp. 142-43. This is the basis of MaximusÕ understanding 
of divine simplicity. All movement, being, or simple ÔexistenceÕ in God is only attributed to him. See 
the discussion below on how this relates to the essence-energies distinction in Maximus. 
 
55 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 160. 
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themselves participate in being itself.Õ56 Within the greater context of DN 5 as well, 
Pseudo-Dionysius indicates that the divisions of being in the creation are analogous 
to the divisions in the divine being.57 The relationship between the creation and 
divine is not one of a mirror, which would make Pseudo-Dionysius guilty of 
ontotheology, but it is an asymmetrical relationship of comparison between two 
completely different levels. Pseudo-Dionysius is using ἀναλογία here in the classical 
sense of proportionality.  
Maximus affirms this reading of the scala naturae58 in Pseudo-Dionysius, but 
adds a Christological focus. ÔAnd the same (Logos) is revealed and multiplied 
benevolently in all things derived from him according to the analogy59 of eachÉand 
everything participates in God by coming to be from him analogously either 
according to intellect, reason, sense, or vital motion, or according to existential and 
                                                             
56 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.2 (PG 3: 820A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 97. 
57 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 160. 
58 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1304D-1316A). 
59 Blowers translates ἀναλόγία in the general sense of ÔproportionÕ instead of Ôanalogy,Õ On The Cosmic 
Mystery of Jesus Christ (Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 2003), p. 55. In Neoplatonic and 
Christian literature, the common phrase Ôaccording to their capacityÕ (κατὰ τὴν σφῶν ἀναλογίαν) 
indicates participation of higher levels to the lower ones. For the relationship of this disposition 
within the various levels of being in Plotinus and Proclus, see Lucas Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-platonic 
Philosophy and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 100ff. 
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habitual fitness [the logoi and energies are in the purview here].Õ60 Maximus also 
affirms that we can have ÔconceptualÕ and ÔrationalÕ knowledge of God through the 
analogy of created things.61 There are many ontological levels in which Maximus 
conceives the human being as participating in God, but the supernatural 
participation in divine grace awaits the eschaton. In the end of times and the 
beatific vision, the creature will Ôknow none of the logoi of the things from which it 
has withdrawn; in its ineffable vision it knows only that Logos whom it approaches 
in grace.Õ62  
4.2 The Divine Works of God  
Can Pseudo-DionysiusÕs theology of primary beings (Being-itself, Life-itself 
and Wisdom-itself) be affirmed as realities on the side of creation beyond just 
epistemology? A little later in DN 10, in discussion of the name ÔAncient of Days,Õ 
Pseudo-Dionysius hints at this possibility. Pseudo-Dionysius frames our 
understanding of this divine title by distinguishing God as pre-existing time and 
                                                             
60 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1080B): Ôκαὶ τὸν αὐτον ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐαξ ἀλτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου ἀναογίαν 
ἀγαθοπρεπῶς δεικνμένόν τε και πληθυνόμενον...πάντα γ ὰρ μετέχει δι ὰ τὸ ἐκ θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι 
ἀναλόγως θεοῦ, ἢ κατὰ νοῦν ἢ λόγον ἢ αἴσθησιν, ἢ κίνησιν ζωτικήν, ἢ σὐσιώδη κα ὶ ἑκτικὴν 
ἐπιτηδειότητα.Õ 
61 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 77). 
 
62 Maximus, Ad Thal. 64 (CCSG 22: 213). 
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eternity and also as creator of time and eternity.63 In reading the Holy Scriptures, 
Pseudo-Dionysius instructs us not to understand things described as time or 
eternity as Ôthe absolutely uncreated, everlasting, incorruptible, immortal, 
unchanging, and immutable.Õ64 In some mysterious way, there are divine gifts that 
have a semi-temporal existence as lying Ômidway between things which are and 
things which are coming-to-be.Õ65 The reason for this semi-temporal existence, says 
Pseudo-Dionysius, is that Ôeternity is the home of being, while time is the home of 
things that come to be.Õ66 Among the gracious gifts of God (in this instance 
subordinated to God as transcendent Eternity and Immortality), there are those that 
transcend the limits of time because time is not predicated of them, or it is not their 
home or abode. This simply means that once eternal realities come into being (as in 
the case of the soul) they never fall from being.  
For the created gifts of God that are bound within time, Ôtheology tells 
usÉare destined to have a share of eternity when at last we attain the incorruptible, 
unchanging Eternity.Õ67 This eternity is not, however, to be understood as being Ôco-
                                                             
63 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.2 (PG3: 937B). 
64 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG3: 937D), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 120. 
65 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG3: 940A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 121. 
66 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG3: 940A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 121. 
67 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG3: 937D), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 120. 
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eternalÕ with God.68 Pseudo-Dionysius would not affirm a created being as Ôco-
eternalÕ with the Thearchy, and he explicitly rejects this Greek notion.69 ÔBeingÕ in 
this instance is eternal because God created it to last forever into eternity. This is 
what Maximus will also call Ôeternal being.Õ70 Pseudo-Dionysius calls God time and 
eternity as derivative of Being since He is the cause of time, eternity and ages. God 
both is Eternity as cause of eternity and transcends eternity as preceding eternity.71 
The names of God in this passage could be included among the Ôprimary beingsÕ 
(πρώτων ὄντων) mentioned previously.72 Despite the complete transcendence of the 
One above all unities, the whole God is participated, shared, and named (or 
ÔhymnedÕ as Pseudo-Dionysius must do with the names that imply the One beyond 
all).73 Pseudo-Dionysius again manages to hold the tension together between the 
kataphatic designation and the apophatic reserve. 
Pseudo-Dionysius provides a linguistic and theological context in which to 
understand the difficult passage in MaximusÕs Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50 that most Orthodox 
                                                             
68 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG3: 940A). 
69 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.6 (PG3: 953C-956B). 
70 Maximus, De Char. 3.25 (PG 90: 1024C). 
71 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG3: 940A). 
72 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 11.6 (PG3: 953C). 
73 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.1 (PG3: 816B). 
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scholars point to as evidence of the essence-energies distinction. According to 
Tollefsen, Bradshaw, Loudovikos and others, Maximus holds to a belief in the 
energies of God ad extra. That is, the activity of God is not only an economic 
distinction, but it is the activity of God Ôout of the essenceÕ (ἐνέργεια εκ τῆς οὐσίας) 
that remains GodÕs own natural energy (φυσικῆς ἐνέργεια).74 In Cap. Gnost. 1.47-50, 
Maximus contemplates the mystery of the Sabbath of God, when the Ônatural 
activityÕ of God takes root in those who are worthy and whose own Ônatural energyÕ 
is transformed by the divine energy.75 
Maximus then commends that the Zealous people of God to contemplate the 
works of God that he began to create in time (τὰ ἔργα ὧν ἤρζατο ποιῆσαι) and those 
that he did not begin to create in time (τὰ ἔργα ὧν οὐκ ἤρζατο ποιῆσαι).76 The works 
of God that did begin in time are all beings which share Ôthe different essences of 
beings for they have nonbeing before being.Õ77 These works consist of everything in 
                                                             
74 Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus Confessor (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2008) pp.  
29, 161. This theory of the energy out of the essence is very minimal in PlotinusÕ writings. In 
reference to οὐσίας in general, he ascribes energy to the essence:  Ôεἰ...ἔστιν ἡ τῆς ο ὐσίας α ὐτη 
ἐνέργειαÕ (Enneads I 4.9, 22, 23). In reference to the divine, Plotinus emphasizes the energy that the 
divine essence has: Ôτὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργειας αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δικαιον συνεκφέρει (τὸ θεῖον)Õ (Enneads 
III 2.13, 31). For an exhaustive list of PlotinusÕ use of ἐνέργεια, see J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet, 
Lexicon Plotinianum, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1980), pp. 274-286. 
75 Maximus Confessor, Cap. Gnost. 1.47 (PG 90: 1100C). 
76 Maximus Confessor, Cap. Gnost. 1.48 (PG 90: 1100D). 
77 Maximus Confessor, Cap. Gnost. 1.48 (PG 90: 1100D). 
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the cosmos that spans from the lowest particulars of existence to the most 
universal. Using the straightforward meaning of τὰ ἔργα in Patristic literature, all of 
the works that begin in time are simply creatures.78 But what are the ÔworksÕ that 
did not begin in time?  
Maximus presents a list of these beings that did not begin in time in the next 
section of the First Century: Immortality itself (αὐτή ή ἀθανασία); Life itself (αὐτή ἡ 
ζωή); Holiness itself (αὐτή ἡ ἁγιότης); Virtue itself (αὐτή ἡ ἀρετή); Goodness itself 
(αὐτή η ἀγατηότης); and Being itself (αὐτή ἡ ὀντότης).79 These ÔbeingsÕ are works 
that are participated (τὰ ὄντα μεθεκτά) rather than the works in time, which are 
participating beings (τὰ ὄντα μετ έχοντα). Maximus contrasts the ÔitselfÕ list of 
beings that did not begin with time with the participating beings that do begin in 
time: all immortal things (τά ἀθανατα πάντα); all living things (τά ζῶντα πάντα); all 
holy things (τά ἅγια πάντα); all virtuous things (τά ἐνάρετα πάντα); all good things 
(τά ἀγαθα πάντα); and all beings (τὰ ὄντα πάντα).80 So, in this passage of Cap. Gnost., 
Maximus is articulating the Proclean triad of imparticipable, participable, and 
                                                             
78 G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 546-47. 
79 Maximus Confessor, Cap. Gnost. 1.50 (PG 90: 1101B). 
80 Maximus Confessor, Cap. Gnost. 1.50 (PG 90: 1101B). 
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participant.81 Does this triad merged with Christian orthodoxy concerning creation 
necessitate the essence-energies distinction?  
Tollefsen and Bradshaw argue that the Ôworks of GodÕ that did not begin in 
time in Cap. Gnost. 1.48 are the divine energies and not created realities.82 This 
assumption is based on the fact that Maximus calls these works Ôparticipated beingsÕ 
instead of Ôparticipating beings,Õ which would indicate that these beings are other 
than God and also not on the same ontological level as creatures that participate in 
that which is higher. Tollefsen then argues that the reason why Maximus is using 
the phrase Ôparticipated beingsÕ is due to the Dionysian metaphysics of the divine 
processions (πρόοδοι). God dispenses the four sequential gifts of Goodness, Being, 
Life, and Wisdom.83 Pseudo-Dionysius affirms that the being of Life itself and 
Wisdom itself and Likeness to divinity itself all require a prior participation in Being 
itself.84 This is why the first gift and divine name of God is Ôpraised as He who is.Õ85 
Being, Life, and Wisdom must also proceed from Goodness itself. These varied 
processions from the One do not admit of plurality in God nor do they admit of 
                                                             
81 Proclus, ET 23. 
82 Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, p. 160. 
83 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG 3: 816B). 
84 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG 3: 820A); see also Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 161ff. 
85 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG 3: 820B). 
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hypostasis between the One and creation: ÔI [Pseudo-Dionysius] hold that there is 
one God for all these good processions and that he is the possessor of the divine 
names of which I speak and that the first name tells of the universal Providence86 of 
the one God, while the other names reveal general or specific ways in which he acts 
providentially.Õ87 I agree with Tollefsen that Maximus would understand the divine 
participations as following upon the primary participation of Being.88 For a creature 
to have life and wisdom, it would need first to reside in Being. Pseudo-Dionysius 
then discusses how each of these processions are held together in the unity of God 
in a manner similar to the way in which the Logos/logoi operates in Maximus:  
                                                             
86 In IamblichusÕ (?) Theologoumena Arithmeticae I on the Monad, he brings together the MonadÕs pre-
existing plan for the universe with Providence: ÔEvery compound of plurality or every subdivision is 
given form by the monad; for the decad is one and the chiliad is one, and again one tenth is one and 
one thousandth is one, and so on for all the subdivisions ad infinitum. In each of these cases there is 
the same monad in terms of form, yet different monads in respect of quantity, because it produces 
itself out of itself, as well as producing them, just as if it were the principle of the universe and the 
nature of things; and because it maintains everything and forbids whatever it is present in to change, 
it alone of all numbers resembles the Providence which preserves everything, and is most 
particularly suited both to reflect the principle of God and to be likened to him, in so far as it is 
closest to him,Õ trans. Robin Waterfield, Theology of Arithmetic (Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1988), 
p. 36. This perspective on unity and sharing out by Iamblichus (though he is pointing to the existence 
of the receptacle embracing all forms in this instance) could explain how Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Maximus understand the unity and diversity of God and the world (and this relationship as 
Providence). God pre-embraces the world in a unity of form (for Maximus this is the Logos-logoi 
relationship) that is undividedly divided out in shares that are unities in themselves because of the 
unity of form in the Monad. The plurality of the subsequent monads of numbers (and dyads?) is 
different only in terms of quantity. 
 
87 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG 3: 817A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 97. 
88 Torstein Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, p. 162. 
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Every number preexists uniquely in the monad and the monad holds every 
number in itself singularly. Every number is united in the monad; it is 
differentiated and pluralized only insofar as it goes forth from this one. All 
the radii of a circle are brought together in the unity of the center, which 
contains all the straight lines brought together within itself. These are linked 
one to another because of this single point of origin and they are completely 
unified at this center. As they move a little away from it they are 
differentiated a little, and as they are to the center point, the more they are 
at one with it and at one with each other, and the more they travel away 
from it the more they are separated from each other.89 
Given the nature of this illustration by Pseudo-Dionysius, it would be 
difficult to know where God ends and creation begins, but he is here concerned with 
the connection between the participations that creatures experience as a divine 
manifestation and the ultimate unified cause behind, or better grounding, that 
participation.  
As we saw earlier, Pseudo-Dionysius also characterizes these creative 
processions at times as being created by God and receiving substantial existence 
once they participate. Maximus also presents these Ôparticipated beingsÕ as ÔbeingsÕ 
and Ôworks of GodÕ in Cap. Gnost. 1.49, which is generally reserved for creatures. After 
listing the pairs of participated beings and participating beings in Cap. Gnost. 1.50, 
Maximus declares that ÔGod is the creator of all life, immortality, holiness, and 
virtue, for he transcends the essence of all which can be thought and said.Õ90 Is 
                                                             
89 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.5 (PG 3: 821A), tran. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, pp. 99-100. 
90 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 1.50 (PG 90: 1101B), trans. Berthold, p. 137. 
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Maximus subordinating the primary participations below God in this instance as 
their ÔCreatorÕ? It appears as if he does in fact do this in 1.48 and 1.50. This is 
difficult to interpret because he also says in De Char. 4.11 that ÔGod is participated 
only; the creature both participates and communicates.Õ Further, in De Char. 3.27 
Maximus plainly states that ÔGod is absolute existence, goodness, and wisdom.Õ He 
does qualify this as by stating that God transcends all of these as well, but the 
paradoxical both/and identification of God as Being, Goodness, Life, Wisdom, etcÉ 
and the creator of them makes it difficult to understand his intention.  
I think Eric Perl is closer to the truth in stating that the divine processions, 
or energies in the case of Maximus, are simply the acts of participation themselves. 
This makes the participated beings no less a gift to the creature in nature than it 
makes God the source and cause of the divinely shared gift. MaximusÕs Christology 
of a union without distinction will, I believe, provide a linguistic and metaphysical 
context in which to understand how we can be deified by God without losing our 
integrity of nature. Sheldon-Williams and Gersh are also correct that we should see 
these opposing perspectives of God as transcendent and immanent at the same 
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time.91  However, as I stated in the previous chapter, holding together two tensions 
does not fully embrace the paradox.  
There remains the question surrounding the nature of the Ôworks of GodÕ and 
the Ôparticipating beingsÕ in MaximusÕs other writings. Does Maximus use Ôworks of 
GodÕ in a similar fashion elsewhere? He in fact does in the De Char. 1.96 and 2.15. 
These two references take place within the contemplation of God and the ascent to 
Him in union. Writing to fellow monks on the spiritual journey, Maximus 
encourages them to climb the ladder of contemplation to God: 
Through the working out of the commandments the mind puts off the 
passions. Through the spiritual contemplation of visible realities it puts off 
impassioned thoughts of things. Through the knowledge of invisible realities 
it puts off contemplation of visible things. And finally this it puts off through 
the knowledge of the Holy Trinity. Just as the sun in rising and lighting up 
the world manifests both itself and the things which it lights up, so the sun 
of justice [Christ] in rising on a pure mind manifests both itself and the 
principles [i.e., principles or logoi] which have been and will be brought to 
existence by it. We do not know God from his being but from his magnificent 
works and his Providence for beings. Through these as through mirrors we 
perceive his infinite goodness and wisdom and power.92  
Maximus here describes how Christ gives the gift of the revelation of the logoi of 
existence through following the commandments and contemplating visible and 
                                                             
91 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, p. 167. See also I. P. Sheldon-Williams, ÔThe Greek Christian 
Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugina,Õ in CHLGEMP, ed. A. H. 
Armstrong (Cambridge: CUP, 1967), p. 532.  
92 Maximus, De Char. 1.94-96 (PG 90: 1121B-C), trans. Berthold, pp. 45-46. 
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invisible realities. There are certain realities or works of God that are knowable 
mirrors of the divine nature and attributes. These works of God are also described as 
being a part of his Provident actions towards creatures (grace as created in the 
creature), which Maximus associates with the logoi in Amb. 10.93 In the next century, 
Maximus uses Ôworks of GodÕ in a similar manner: ÔIn applying itself to visible things 
the mind knows them in accordance with nature through the medium of the senses, 
so that neither is the mind evil, nor is natural knowledge, nor the things, nor the 
senses for these are all works of God.Õ94 The works of God and Providence of beings 
fall on the side of creation and are sensible and intelligible symbols or mirrors of the 
transcendent divine being and His attributes. This is what Maximus describes in the 
vision of the Old Testament prophet Ezekiel in the Mystagogy. The spiritual world 
and the sensible worlds are interrelated to one another with signs and symbols that 
connect them together. ÔIn the spiritual world it is in principles [logoi]; in the 
sensible world it is in figures. And their function was like a wheel within a wheel, as 
says the marvelous seer of extraordinary things.Õ95  
                                                             
93 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1189A-C). 
94 Maximus, De Char. 2.15 (PG 90: 988C), trans. Berthold, p. 48. 
95 Maximus, Myst. 2 (PG 91: 669C), trans. Berthold, p. 189. I am grateful to John Milbank for pointing 
out this wonderful passage in the Myst to me. 
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Finally, in the third century of the De Char., Maximus discusses the works of 
God in the context of deification without referring to the works, which deify. 
Starting with the utterly free choice of the Creator, the Confessor delves into the 
insatiable participation in the divine: ÔGod who is beyond fullness did not bring 
creatures into being out of any needs of his, but that he might enjoy their 
proportionate participation in him and that he might delight in his works seeing 
them delighted and ever insatiably satisfied with the one who is inexhaustible.Õ96 In 
this passage, ÔworksÕ seems to be referring to his creatures, but the proportionate 
participation (ἀναλόγως μετέχοντα) is not described as Ôworks of God.Õ 
Neither in these three passages from the De Char., nor elsewhere in his 
writings other than the Cap. Gnost. 1.4-50, does Maximus describe the infinite 
goodness, wisdom and other attributes as being Ôworks of God.Õ The closest passage 
that we have is rooted in the Incarnation of Christ. In Amb. 10, Maximus 
contemplates the two modes of theology (i.e., kataphatic and kataphatic with 
apophatic reserve) in relation to the Transfiguration of Jesus. Interestingly, 
Maximus states that Christ became Ôthe type and symbol of Himself, and from 
Himself symbolically to represent Himself.Õ97 Although Christ in his divine nature is 
ineffable and an utter mystery, Ôout of his love for humankind He grants to human 
                                                             
96 Maximus, De Char. 3.46 (PG 90: 1029C), trans. Berthold, p. 67.   
97 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1165D). 
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beings intimations of Himself in the manifest divine-works [θεουργίαι] performed in 
the flesh.Õ98 Presumably, Maximus is talking about miracles that Jesus performed, 
but the immediate context would be the glory of God shown in the Transfiguration 
itself, which reveals God as incarnate with the principles of created being.  
These divine-works, which is a theurgical term derived from later 
Neoplatonism, are mediated through the ÔfleshÕ of Christ. If there are eternal 
uncreated divine works of God, they are only mirrored or manifest in sensible or 
invisible realities, most eminently in the incarnated Logos. In the age of the grace of 
the Incarnation, the Christian is blessed with the Ôgrace of faithÕ since he or she is 
only given symbols in the sensible world of the ultimate truth that all creation 
desires to know. In the future age, the grace of the Incarnation will be more fully 
revealed through the Ôgrace of vision,Õ and the Christian will participate Ôin [the gifts 
of the Holy Spirit] in very truth in their concrete reality.Õ99 The disciples were given 
a glimpse of this final gift and participation of grace in the Transfiguration, but the 
fullness of this vision remains for the end of the ages.100  
                                                             
98 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168A). 
99 Maximus, Myst., 24, trans. Berthold, p. 207. 
100 Maximus, Myst., 24, trans. Berthold, pp. 207-8. 
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Maximus also states in the Transfiguration scene in Ambiguum 10 that the 
light from the face of Christ that the apostles see is at the same time a complete 
apophatic theology. The divine light reveals that the Trinity is by essence Ôbeyond 
ineffability and unknowability and countlessly raised above all infinity.Õ101 The 
creature cannot comprehend how the Godhead can be both one and three at the 
same time, or can it know how the divine can become incarnate. Christ is the 
uncreated revelation of God both in this present world and in the age to come. 
Further, in the scene of the Transfiguration, there is also the affirmative or 
kataphatic mode of theology. Maximus says that within this mode there is a 
differentiation between activity (energy) and providence and judgment.102 The 
mode of activity, starting Ôfrom the beauty and magnitude of creatures, introduces 
the explanation that the God of all is the fashioner, this is shown through the 
radiant garments of the Lord, which the Word shows to be the manifestation of 
creatures [i.e., the works of creation].Õ103 Further, the kataphatic mode concerned 
with providence indicates that God has Ôimplant[ed] the divine lawsÕ because out of 
                                                             
101 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168A). 
102 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168B). 
103 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168B), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 133. 
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love he wishes to offer humans the ability to rise above corruption and evil in the 
flesh.104  
Moses represents the providential mode of revelation in the Transfiguration 
scene. Elijah represents the mode of judgment that punishes according to deed, 
either virtuous or evil. Maximus then restates the apophatic reserve concerning the 
ineffable will of God and his providential economy of salvation through time. This 
does not mean that this spiritual knowledge is not shared with those purified of 
mind. For Maximus then states such knowledge can be ÔgrantedÕ to those worthy.105 
The unknowable imparticipable God can indeed be shared through grace as He was 
to Moses and Elijah. What is important in this passage, coupled with the three from 
the De Char., is that Maximus does not use the phrase Ôworks of GodÕ in description of 
GodÕs uncreated energies, nor does he ever label the energies in general as 
uncreated. Activity, providence and judgment are manifested through the creation 
itself or as a grace implanted into nature, such as the divine laws of Moses as 
described in Ambiguum 10. GodÕs activity is divine, rooted in eternity, and will 
continue beyond time and nature as super-temporal works.  
                                                             
104 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168C). 
105 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1169B). 
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This is also true in our text from the Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50. In 1.47 Maximus 
mentions the Sabbath rest of God, whereby His singular Ônatural activity,Õ that 
works in an ineffable manner, will reach its end in created nature of beings. 
Maximus seems to use divine energy here to relate to the activity in creation that 
will come to an end at the end of all things in deification and return. However, this 
all-encompassing divine gift of energy relates to the kataphatic mode of theology 
with activity, providence and judgment as we discussed from Amb. 10. The works of 
God that did begin in time participate fully in God as the participated beings, but 
this kataphatic affirmation is qualified using the apophatic reserve. Maximus states 
that the works of God that did not begin in time are Ôimplanted by grace in 
creatures,Õ such as Ôan infused power which clearly proclaims that God is in all 
things.Õ106 The supernatural is implanted or created within the cosmos, and the 
creature will participate fully in these super-temporal works when it is transformed 
from the grace of faith to the grace of vision, the beatitude of the Incarnate Christ. 
Although the passage in De Gnost. 1.49-50 could be read with a distinction 
between GodÕs activity from eternity and in creation based upon one perspective on 
the divine proodoi, this does not invite the reader to distinguish between GodÕs 
essence and energies using a real metaphysical distinction. I believe that Maximus 
                                                             
106 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 1.49 (PG 90: 1101A), trans. Berthold, p. 137. 
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presents in De Gnost. 1.48-50 Pseudo-Dionysius presents concerning the divine 
names and processions. DN 10.3, cited earlier, could perhaps help understand what 
Maximus is trying to communicate in De Gnost. 1.48-50.  
If you will remember, Pseudo-Dionysius distinguishes between that Eternity 
which is Ôabsolutely uncreated, everlasting, incorruptible, immortal, unchanging, 
and immutableÕ and that eternity which Ôis the home of being.Õ107 Time, on the other 
hand, is Ôthe home of things that come to be.Õ108 Pseudo-Dionysius extols his readers 
to conceive of these eternal works as not being co-eternal with God, who Ôprecedes 
eternity,Õ but he does affirm that these things that Ôshare partly in eternity and 
partly in timeÕ are to be comprehended Ôas somehow midway between things which 
are and things which are coming-to-be.Õ109 Because God is still the Ancient of Days 
and cause of time and eternity, he can be predicated with time and eternity. Does 
Maximus also conceive of created beings in this Dionysian fashion? 
In Amb. 41, Maximus goes into a discussion of the five divisions of being. The 
first is the division between uncreated and created (i.e., between God and creation). 
Pagan Neoplatonists prioritized the distinction between intelligible and sensible 
                                                             
107 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG 3: 937C), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 120. 
108 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG 3: 940A), trans. Luibheid Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 121. 
109 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 10.3 (PG 3: 940A), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 121. 
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reality.110 For Maximus, the Christian theologian, creation ex nihilo is the central 
dogma to retain in his ontology. Next is the division between the sensible and 
intelligible worlds. Maximus states that this division Ôis that in accordance with 
which the whole nature that receives being from creation is divided by God into 
that which is perceived by the mind [i.e., the intelligible] and that perceived by the 
senses [i.e., the sensible].Õ111 The third division is the nature perceived by the senses 
that is divided into heaven and earth. The fourth division is that between paradise 
and the inhabited world, and the fifth division is the human person into male and 
female.112 In this schema of the division of being, the human being has the central 
role mediating all of the divisions into Ôone single creation.Õ113 Of interest here is the 
uniting of the second division between reality perceived through the senses and 
reality perceived through the mind. The union of the second division thrusts the 
human being to Ôequality with the angels in its manner of knowing.Õ114 There is no 
longer for the microcosm and mediator a division between what it can know or not 
know. Like the angels, the creature can have Ôknowledge and understanding of the 
                                                             
110 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 185-87. 
111 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1305A), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 158. 
112 David Balais, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ: ManÕs Participation in GodÕs Perfections According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa 
(Rome: Herder, 1966), pp. 45-52. 
113 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1308A), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 158. 
114 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1308A), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 158. 
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logoi in the things that exist.Õ115 Knowledge of the logoi in things that exist is 
furnished by the infinite gift of Ôtrue wisdomÕ that God Ôpours outÉwithout 
intermediary.Õ Maximus calls this gift a concept of the Divine Ôbeyond 
understanding or explanation.Õ116  
Maximus also presents the first two divisions in an interesting 
contemplation of the meaning of the Scriptural word concerning Melchisedec, 
Abraham and Moses as figures of the Incarnate Christ in Amb. 10.117 The 
contemplation begins with the second division in MaximusÕs five-fold division of 
being. After the division between God (uncreated) and creatures (created), there is 
the division between intelligible and sensible reality. A perplexing statement similar 
to Pseudo-Dionysius occurs within the second division of nature: ÔThere is that 
which is said to be and is eternal, since it receives the beginning of its being in 
eternity, and that which is temporal, since it is made in time; there is that which is 
subject to intellection, and that which is subject to the power of sense perception.Õ118 
Intelligible aspects of creation can include the soul, angels and other creative 
                                                             
115 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1308A). 
116 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1308B). 
117 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1153A-C). 
118 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1153A). 
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principles.119 Maximus indicates that the soul is in purview here since he begins a 
discussion on the unity of and reciprocal communication of the body and the soul, 
but other intelligibles, such as the created logoi, could be included among the list of 
options.  
The key distinction here, as in DN 10.3, is that there are created realities that 
do not begin in time. The works of God that do not begin in time could be 
interpreted in our passage in Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50 as being intelligible or spiritual 
realities. They would be both works of God and beings in the straightforward sense. 
I am convinced that given the eschatological nature of Cap. Gnost. 1.47-50 and the 
evidence in MaximusÕs theology of created realities that begin in eternity instead of 
time (from a metaphysical point of view), Maximus is talking about the future gift of 
eternal life. All of the participations listed in this passage are supra-temporal works 
of grace that are granted to those who are worthy. Further, if the works that did not 
begin in time are αὐτό-realities as received from Pseudo-Dionysius (Maximus 
mentions all four of the main processions of goodness, being, life and 
wisdom/virtue), then the Neoplatonic triad of imparticipable, participable and 
participant could be read in Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50 without an essence-energies 
distinction. 
                                                             
119 Louth (Maximus Confessor, intro. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 69-71) presents the 
case that intelligible being consists of souls and angels.  
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In addition to the lack of textual evidence to prove that Palamas was a 
faithful reader of Maximus, there are other elements to Pseudo-Dionysius and 
MaximusÕs theology that compel an economic reading of energy and grace. The 
Confessor makes several statements concerning the αὐτό-realities as being 
understood through the contemplation of the human mind. This does not make 
GodÕs being and action contingent on the human mind (although at times Erigena 
does present this possibility120), but it does emphasize the Dionysian formula 
mentioned above that outside of the mindÕs reflection on Ôcertain activities 
apparent to usÕ there is no deification, being or life.121 Maximus makes a similar 
dynamic between reason and the αὐτό-realities:  
And again as they combine movement with position, and mixture with 
difference, they distinguish the substance of all things indivisibly into being 
and difference and movement, and if they grasp that the cause is to be 
beheld from the things that are caused differently by an inventive and 
technical use of reason, they conceive this reverently as being and being 
wise and being alive.122 Thence they are taught the divinely-perfect and 
saving meaning concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, 
according to which they are hiddenly illuminated that the meaning of the 
cause is not simply that of being but are reverently initiated about the mode 
of existence.123 
                                                             
120 Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, pp. 271-73. 
121 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 5.7 (PG3: 645B). 
122 Maximus inverts second and third term. See Amb. 10  (PG 91: 1156D). Maximus holds life to be due 
to knowledge or wisdom of the source or true life or source of the proper food. 
123 Maximus, Amb. 10  (PG 91: 1136B), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 114. 
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Contemplation on the scala naturae and the differences among creatures moves the 
mind to abstract activities such as Being, Life and Wisdom from the things that are 
and see the divine cause present behind the veil of sensible reality. GodÕs divine 
natural activity toward the creation is only apparent to the reasoning mind. As 
Pseudo-Dionysius states, if the mind were not there to unify the intelligible and 
sensible worlds, there would be no observation of being, life, wisdom and 
deification. This is a wonderful example of the Confessor using the tension between 
the kataphatic and apophatic methods of theology to both affirm God as cause and 
deny his reduction to created things. Maximus further presses what Von Balthasar 
calls the Ôepistemological solutionÕ in his Scholia on DN:  
He [Pseudo-Dionysius] is attempting by this to explain that GodÕs being is 
completely without origin and inconceivable and that he has established the 
general being of all things in advance, through the preliminary plan of his 
own ineffable knowledge. For the created mind encounters this being [of 
God] first of all when it is focused on some thing, and only afterward does it 
come to know how the thing is. When Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of being-in-
itself, he is referring to being as such (τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι), not to being in some 
way (τὸ πῶς εἶναι); so later, when, he speaks of life-in-itself, or similarity-in-
itself, and similar concepts, he means the general character of life or life 
without qualification, not a life that is specifically determined in this or that 
way, and so on.124  
Maximus also alludes to this divine order of the cosmos in De Char. 3.24. 
Intellectual beings can perceive the wisdom found in the ordered nature of being 
                                                             
124 Maximus, Scholia on DN 5 (PG 4: 317C-320A), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmis Liturgy, p 123. 
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(i.e,. the logoi in their distribution). Maximus says that Ôthis wisdom exists in the 
mind [of the intellectual being] as simple and without substance of its own.Õ 
Maximus would not see the united principles of the cosmos as being ontological 
entities, such as the Neoplatonic divine henads, but they are just the principles of 
existence without qualification. So, GodÕs being and the worldÕs being are not the 
same, but the divine Being is the transcendent cause of the creatureÕs being. The 
eternal divine attributes in the essence of God still remain beyond creatures 
determined by time and nature, but God grants to those who are worthy a created 
likeness of these attributes that is the whole God.  
When reading this passage in Cap. Gnost. 1.47-50 concerning the works that 
do not begin in time, we must place them in the context of the whole passage, 
which is dealing with eschatology. This is why the works of God coming after the 
completion of his natural works of divine energy take place in eternity. The works 
that do not begin in time are the created modes of resurrected existence! 
Deification is ÔalreadyÕ but Ônot yetÕ in Maximus. Von Balthasar, then, is certainly 
correct in this instance to refer to these works as super-temporal works of God. 
They are created ÔbeingsÕ that the creature participates in through supernatural 
deification in the eschaton.  
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Maximus actually connects the divine energies with the divine logoi in 
supernatural deification at the end of the second century of the Cap. Gnos. In a 
discussion of the different kinds of ÔagesÕ mentioned in Scripture, Maximus asserts 
that there is a realm above time that is called the Ôpure reign of GodÕÑthough this 
realm is above naming.125 The creatureÕs ultimate desire is reached in the pure reign 
of God because all movement ceases due to the fact that time will not be necessary 
once the creature enters into the rest of God. This rest is also the vision of truth 
itself: Ôhe has yet to come at the end of the ages to the perfect rest which reveals 
face to face to those who are worthy the truth as it is in itself.Õ126  
At this moment, the creature will not have a part of truth and graceÑas in 
the implanted logoi and the seal of the Holy Spirit in this ageÑbut Ôacquire through 
participation the entire fullness of grace.Õ127 Maximus then strings together three 
passages from St. Paul to support his point: Ôall of us [those who are saved] will be 
that perfect man in the measure of the age of ChristÕs fullness;Õ in whom are hidden 
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;Õ and when he appears what is in part shall 
pass awayÕ (Eph 4:13; Col 2:3; 1 Cor 13:10). The elements of the passage from Cap. 
                                                             
125 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.86 (PG 91: 1165A). 
 
126 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.87 (PG 91: 1167D). 
 
127 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.87 (PG 91: 1167D). 
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Gnos. 1.47-50 begins to come into focus through the revelation and vision of Christ 
that transforms in knowledge and power the creature.  
The final crescendo to MaximusÕs cosmic recapitulation comes a few 
chapters later in 2.90. Here, the Confessor discusses the coming of the kingdom of 
heaven and the kingdom of God in the beatific vision. The question is posed to 
Maximus whether there is a substantive difference or notional difference between 
the two, and he answers:  
To them it should be said that they differ but not in their substance, for both 
substantially are one, but rather their difference is notional. For the 
kingdom of heaven is the apprehension of the pure eternal knowledge of 
beings in their inner meaning [logoi] of God. On the other hand, the kingdom 
of God is the imparting through grace of gifts which belong to God by nature. 
The former refers to the end of beings, the latter, by a notional change, to 
what comes after their end.128 
 
To receive the revelation of the divine logoi in the Ôpure reign of GodÕ is to 
receive GodÕs works that do not begin in time, and this is what Maximus means by 
divine energies. During the present age, the Ônatural energyÕ of God (Cap. Gnos. 1.47) 
is merely the manifesting of the logoi in part through created logoi, signs and 
symbols. This energy Ôis only apparent to [to the creature]Õ through itsÕ created 
effects. The creatureÕs knowledge of God is only conceptual, rational and analogical. 
In deification and resurrection, there is direct experience of God because the 
                                                             
128 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.90 (PG 91: 1168D), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, pp. 167-168. 
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fullness of the divine logoi is revealed through the creatureÕs resurrected existence 
and in the vision of the resurrected Christ. The creature will live the divine life of 
God because they will have a full knowledge of their original divine purpose: ÔFor 
now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall 
know fully, even as I have been fully knownÕ (1 Cor 13:12). Maximus says, Ôthe 
Kingdom of God the father is in potency in all those who believe, and in act in those 
who have completely laid aside all life of body and soul in an natural way to gain the 
mansion of the Spirit, and who can say ÔNot I but Christ lives in me.ÕÕ129  
There are three suggestions for the meaning of the kingdom of heaven that 
Maximus thinks align with the truth: the life of blessed in heaven, a state of 
existence like the angels, and the very form of divine beauty.130 Even though 
Maximus conceives of this revelation as beyond nature because of its divine 
transformation of it, mediation does not drop out of the beatific vision. The idea in 
all of MaximusÕs writings on the eschaton and the resurrection is that our bodily 
limits in this life with be transcended in the future age because the body will be 
transfigured as like the soul. The logoi cannot be revealed in a vacuum. Maximus 
always mentions the Logos as the embodied revelation of the logoi. This 
transformation in the beatific vision will be outlined in chapter six.  
                                                             
129 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.92 (PG 91: 1169A). 
 
130 Maximus, Cap. Gnos. 2.93 (PG 91: 1169B). 
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All of these dimensions within MaximusÕs metaphysics that we have been 
traversing lead to a reading of the Ôworks of GodÕ that did not begin in time in De. 
Gnost. 1.48-50 as both divine manifestations created in the creature and uncreated 
super-temporal works of grace in the age of deification. Maximus holds to a cosmic 
paradox, whereby God is absolutely transcendent but also immanent in the world 
through creative and gracious gifts. GodÕs imparticipable transcendence as a totality 
guarantees the creatures ability to participate in his very being, life, and wisdom. 
Essence and energy are not separate from each other; they are held together in 
paradox in order for true participation to occur, but supernatural participation in 
incarnated Logos awaits the parousia.  
Without an infinite division of divine henads subordinated below the One, 
Christian Neoplatonism was able to root created realities in the very essence of the 
divine life itself in a union without confusion of natures. Participation and energy in 
God can only be understood within the context of the grace of logoi, which lay on 
both sides of the ontological divide. Grace is created as it descends into creation, 
and it is also uncreated in its source and end in God (logoi). With grace, there is a 
coetaneous presence of God on both sides of the un-crossable chasm between God 
and creation. The participation of grace is this very dynamic itself, which is held 
  159 
together by what John Milbank calls an Ôineffable atunement.Õ131 Melchisedec 
Trnen describes the dynamic of the logoi in his book Union and Distinction in 
Maximus Confessor. Though an Eastern Orthodox scholar who accepts the essence-
energies distinction, Trnen presents the logoi as the theophanic Ôcreation songÕ of 
God. He references the song of the Lion Aslan in the classic C. S. Lewis series The 
Chronicles of Narnia.132 In the book The MagicianÕs Nephew, Polly hears music coming 
from out of the AslanÕs head, and the music creates primroses all around her.  In 
MaximusÕs version of this creation song, the logoi that pre-exist in God manifest 
directly in creation, and show traces of their existence through created logoi, signs 
and symbols. There are not energies of God in the in between of this process. On one 
side of the ontic divide is the uncreated grace of the divine essence (the logoi), and 
on the other side of the divide are their theophanies in creation. As Trnen argues, 
there is a union in distinction in the very nature of the created world that is not 
pantheistic or completely separated.133   
 
 
                                                             
131 John Milbank, ÔTheurgy and Sophiology: The New Theological Horizon,Õ in Encounter Between 
Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, ed. Adrian Pabst and 
Christoph Schneider (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), p. 78. 
 
132 Melchisedec Trnen, Union and Distinction in Maximus Confessor (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2007), p. 128. 
 
133 Melchisedec Trnen, Union and Distinction, p. 128. 
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4.3 The Uncreated Grace of Christ 
While Neoplatonism only began to speak about the grace of the One in the 
process of procession,134 orthodox Christian thought pressed the boundaries of 
philosophical theology to affirm a completely radical ontology of grace. This divine 
grace that is also created in the fabric of created being itself is almost always 
presented within a Trinitarian perspective. Surprisingly, in the Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50, 
Maximus does not reference the Logos or the Father and Spirit whom enlivens the 
creature to move from the image to the likeness of God, which in turn is the basis 
for deification. I believe that Maximus presents the dynamic behind the Ôworks of 
GodÕ (logoi) in Cap. Gnost. 1.48-50 through a Trinitarian contemplation on divine 
grace in the figure of Melchisedec in Ambiguum 10. 
With the five-fold contemplation of Melchisedec in Ambiguum 10 (PG 91: 
1137D-1145B), Maximus elucidates the transformation into God (i.e., deification) 
through image and likeness to the divine attributes. In the conclusion of the five-
fold contemplation of nature just prior to the reflection on Melchisedec, Maximus 
describes the results on the ascent up to God the Logos by contemplating the logoi of 
creation. Through the contemplation of the logoi, the mind through the power of the 
                                                             
134 There is a seminal notion of divine grace to the world in Plotinus: ÔThe god will come when he is 
called for Ð but we must prepare the way,Õ Enneads V.8.9 [31]. See also John Dillon ÔPlotinus and the 
Transcendental Imagination,Õ in Religious Imagination, ed. J. P. Mackey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 1986), pp.55-64. 
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Spirit reaches the ÔLogos,Õ135 who is Ôbeyond being and goodness.Õ136 Through being 
united to the Ônatural power that is within them,Õ the saint is made Ôby Him so 
receptive as to be known from the sole one and to possess completely through the 
divine characteristics [Θεοῦ Λόγου] the form of the whole God the Word, 
contemplated in the clearest of mirrors, missing none of the ancient characters, by 
which the human is naturally made known.Õ137 Deification of human nature takes 
place both in nature by grace and beyond nature by grace. Melchisedec experienced 
this transcendence of time and nature in union with Christ according to Maximus.  
                                                             
135 Louth translates Λόγον here with the lowercase Ôlogos.Õ Migne does not capitalize logos here or 
elsewhere when it is used in reference to Christ. However, Maximus appears to be referring to Christ 
here since he mentions ÔGod the WordÕ a couple of sentences later, and the ultimate logos is Ôbeyond 
being and goodness.Õ Louth probably is using the pattern of interpretation of the logos as he does in a 
paper presentation on the logoi, which refers to this ambiguity in Amb. 7 about the one Logos-logos and 
the many logoi. Torstein Tollefsen (The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus Confessor (Oxford, UK: 
OUP, 2008), p. 92) also make the same designation concerning the Logos-logos in Amb. 7. Eric Perl 
(ÔMethexis,Õ p. 169) makes the counter assertion in his dissertation on Maximus. Orthodox scholars 
generally do not connect the logoi and the Logos together in an ascending scale. 
136 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137C). It is important to note here that Maximus presents the ascension 
as going through the logoi to the Logos who transcends them. The Confessor associates the logoi of 
creation, which includes the logoi of sensible being and the Logoi of the virtues (intelligible being?), 
with the spiritual or gnomic cosmos (γνωμικοῦ κόσμου). Such an observation points to a much larger 
spiritual or intellectual cosmos than is generally presented in commentaries on Maximus. The tupoi 
are accessible and mysteriously revealing themselves in the sensible world. For Maximus there is 
both a cosmic liturgy being celebrated and an enchanted universe being displayed through signs and 
symbols. 
137 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137C).  
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As the great Melchisedec, the Christian can also be worthy to be called a son 
of God and be Ôlikened to the Son of God.Õ138 Such a transformation was possible for 
Melchisedec because Ôfor as far as possible, he had become such by grace and 
habit,139 as the Giver of grace is himself believed to be by essence.Õ140 Maximus 
attempts to interpret the difficult passage in Hebrews 7:3, where it is stated that 
Melchisedec was Ôwithout father or mother, without genealogy, without beginning 
of days or end of life, resembling the Son of God, he remains a priest foreverÕ (c.f., 
Gen 14, Psalm 110:4). Being without mother or father or genealogy should be 
interpreted to mean that Melchisedec has made himself so thoroughly infused with 
virtue and knowledge that he is deified beyond the limits of created nature, which is 
governed by time. Adding likeness to the image of God is the spiritual grace given to 
the creature that makes this ascent possible.  
The Confessor contrasts the natural gifts or properties that one receives 
according to the image with those supernatural gifts or properties that one receives 
according to the likeness. In De Char. 3.25, Maximus describes these two dimensions 
                                                             
138 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137D). 
139 Louth uses ÔhabitÕ here with grace (PG 91: 1137D). Habit is usually found in the Greek words 
διάθεσιν or ἕξιν. This is different from habit in the Thomistic tradition as being a faculty given from 
without to the creature. For Maximus, habit is a natural potency that must be actualized by an 
external agent (i.e., God). Grace here presupposes nature, but they are neither conflated nor 
completely and ontologically separated in the creatureÕs entative being.   
140 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137D). 
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of human existence. God communicates four divine attributes to creatures when he 
brings them into existence: being (τὸ ὄν), eternal being (τὸ ἀει ὄν), goodness (τὴν 
ἀγαθότητα) and wisdom (τὴν σοφίαν). The first two gifts of being and eternal-being 
are granted to the essence (οὐσίᾳ) of the creature, and the last two gifts of goodness 
and wisdom are granted to the volitive faculty (γνωμικῇ). These gifts are given in 
order that what God Ôis by essence the creature might become by participation.Õ141  
The participation of the creature in the attributes of GodÕs essence is 
proportionate according to image and likeness: Ôto the image of his being by our 
being, to the image of his eternal being by our eternal being (even though not 
without beginning, it is yet without end); to the likeness of his goodness by our 
goodness, to the image of his wisdom by our wisdom.Õ142 Maximus affirms that the 
first two are by nature, and the second two are by grace. This grace is given in an 
irreducible reciprocity of virtue on the side of the creature. A sharp division should 
not be placed here between nature and grace because earlier in the same passage he 
asserts that being, well-being, and eternal-being are all gracious gifts of God.143 
                                                             
141 Maximus, De Char. 3.25 (PG 91: 270D), Berthold trans. p. 64. 
 
142 Maximus, De Char. 3.25 (PG 91: 270D), Berthold trans. p. 64.  
143 Hans Urs Von Balthasar (Cosmic Liturgy, pp. 119-120) and Sherwood Polycarp (Earlier Ambigua, pp. 
170-72 ) both hold to a sharp Western distinction between the two orders of being. I believe Eric Perl 
(ÔMethexis,Õ p. 261.) is correct to emphasize the early point in De Char. 3.23 that all three elements of 
the triad of being, well-being and eternal-being are gifts of grace. Grace and nature are more 
organically intertwined in MaximusÕ theology. Maximus does, however, emphasize the more radical 
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Supernatural grace should not be interpreted here using the same Western dialectic 
of grace vs. nature, but Maximus easily and organically attributes grace to created 
nature as well. The created volitive faculty in the human being is imbued with 
divine attributes in such a way (i.e., divine virtue created in them in an unfolding 
process of deification) that deification is a natural potency within the creature to 
receive. 
Returning to the contemplation of Melchisedec, Maximus distinguishes the 
properties of nature bound by time (χρονικῶν ἰδιωμάτον) with those divine and 
blessed characteristics (θείων καί μακαρίων γνωρισμάτων) that deify the creature. 
The first set of characteristics should be understood to be by nature (though also 
communicated divine attributes), and this would relate to being (τὸ ὄν) and eternal 
being (τὸ ἀει ὄν) as presented in De Char. 3.25. The later divine characteristics are 
described as Ôthe divine, unoriginate and immortal essence of GodÕ (τάς θε ίας καί 
ἀνάρχους καί ἀθανάτους [οὐσίας144] τοῦ Θεοῦ).145 Maximus begins his contemplation 
                                                                                                                                                                              
grace of deification in Ad Thal. 60: ÔIt was indeed necessary that the maker by nature of the essence of 
things should be also the effector by grace of the deification of created beings; this is in order that 
the giver of being should appear also as the giver of ever-well-beingÕ (PG 91: 624D). These two 
perspectives should not be pitted against one another, but they should be understood within the 
stages of divine Providence. 
144 MigneÕs text supplements οὐσία here based upon the Latin text (essentia) since it is not specified in 
the Greek what the divine, unoriginate and immortal things are in this instance. Louth uses the 
English word Ôrays,Õ which in Orthodox thought carries a much different reading of the text. Perhaps 
he is thinking about a text in Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1077A), where Maximus speaks of the embracing of all 
sensible and intelligible things in Christ at the end of the ages. He compares it with the light from the 
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on Melchisedec by discussing the manner in which this Old Testament priest to 
Abraham was able to transcend time and nature, becoming Ôlikened to the Son of 
GodÕ (ὁμοιωθῆναι146 τῷ Υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ).147 The image of God being likened to the Logos 
is described by the Confessor as occurring in order that through grace Melchisedec 
could be as the ÔGiver of grace [i.e., Christ] is himself believed to be by essenceÕ (οἷος 
αὐτός ὁ δοτήρ τ ῆς χ άριτος κατά τήν ο ὐσίαν ὑπάρχων πιστεύεται).148 Because of 
Ôdivine virtueÕ that is Ôcreated in himÕ or Ôplaced inside of him,Õ Melchisedec is 
counted worthy to be an image of Christ and his ineffable mysteries.149 Christ is not 
only the central revelation of uncreated grace as the hypostatic holder of all logoi, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
stars: ÔThe stars do not shine in the day. When the greater and incomparable light of the sun appears, 
they are hidden and cannot be seen by the senses.Õ Maximus also calls Christ the ÔSun of justiceÕ in De 
Char. 1.95. However, since Maximus refers to participating through grace and habit in what God is in 
essence (οὐσία) at the beginning of the contemplation (PG 91: 1137D), οὐσία would be a legitimate 
reading.   
145 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1140D). 
146 The relation of ὁμοιωθῆναι to Trinitarian theology should not be overlooked. In the next column 
of Migne (PG 91: 1140A), Maximus describes the MelchisedecÕs habit of virtue as an ÔunchangeableÕ 
and Ôgodlike virtue.Õ The Greek word for unchangeable here is ἀπαραλείπτως, which is generally used 
as an adverb in Greek Patristic literature (c.f., Gregory of NazianzenÕs Oration 36, Chapter 12) in 
connection with the equality of the divine persons. For the passage in the Amb. 10, these linguistic 
connections are important because it places the grace and revelation of God in a Trinitarian heuristic 
whereby the Incarnate Logos is the uncreated grace given to the creature.   
147 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137D). 
148 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1137D). 
149 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141C): Ôἐμποιηθεῖσαν α ὐτῷ θείαν ἀρετήν ε ἰκων ε ἶναι κατηξίωται 
Χριστοῠ τοῦ Θεοῦ , καί τῶν ἀποῤῥήτων αὐτοῦ μυστηρίων.Õ 
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but He is the person to whom Ôall the saints are gathered together as to an 
archetype and source of the good impression that is in each one of them.Õ150 This 
divine imprint in Melchisedec is characterized as containing the Ôpatterns of ChristÕ 
(τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὰς ὑποτυπώσεις).151 What is this divine grace that this priest is named 
after in MaximusÕs contemplation? In rare fashion, Maximus describes this divine 
grace: 
Therefore the great Melchisedec is recorded as being without father or mother 
or genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life, as the true word of 
God-bearing men declares about him, not on account of a nature that is 
created and from nothing, in accordance with which he began to be and will 
cease to be, but on account of divine and uncreated grace [χάριν τήν θείαν 
καί ἄκτιστον], which eternally exists beyond every nature and all time, from 
God who eternally is, in accordance with which alone he is acknowledged as 
wholly begotten from the whole [God].152 
This passage is the only instance in MaximusÕs writings where he describes the 
grace, energy, or power of God as being specifically ÔuncreatedÕ (ἄκτιστον).153 
                                                             
150 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141C). 
151 Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141C). 
152 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141B). 
153 For a breakdown of the scholarly arguments concerning the uncreated grace in this passage, see 
Antoine Lvy, Le cr et lÕincr : Maxime le confesseur et Thomas dÕAquin : aux sources de la querelle 
palamienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), pp. 41-51. My own reading of this passage as participating in the 
divine essence is similar to M. Candal, ÔLa gracia increada del ÔLiber AmbiguorumÕ de San Mximo,Õ 
Orientalia Christiana Periodica 27 (1961): 131-149.  However, participating in the essence of God for 
Maximus means the creature receives the full revelation of its logoi, which has its origin in God. Only 
paradox can keep Maximus from collapsing into pantheism or over-expanding into extrincism. 
Creatures do fully participate in the essence through principled participation in the divine logoi, but 
the effect of this divine power takes place in the reality of the creature.  
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Generally, this designation occurs in reference to either the two natures in Christ154 
or the Trinity in general.155 According to this grace of divine characteristics, the 
creature can Ôunknowably, after every abstraction from all beings at the level of mind 
he enters into God himself, and made and transformed wholly to the whole, he is 
manifested in accordance with the verse: Resembling the Son of God he remains a priest 
forever.Õ156 Wholly in the whole essence by grace, Melchisedec and all the saints who 
live by divine virtue and knowledge (through their logoi) can enter into identity 
with God. Maximus even goes so far as to say that Melchisedec entered into spiritual 
generation from the Trinity. After the eternal priest opened his nous to the divine 
grace, Ôhe was begotten from God through the Word in the Spirit by grace, and bore 
in himself safe and true the likeness of God the begetter.Õ157  
Melchisedec embodied all of the patterns of Christ through the divine grace 
created in him. The uncreated grace created in the creature through virtue and 
knowledgeÑsomething communicated to the faculty of the will in the soul so that 
the well-being is dependent on the believerÑdeifies the mind of the creature and is 
rooted in the revelation of the Incarnate Christ. In the next section of the 
                                                             
154 C.f., Maximus, Th. Pol. 1: PG 91: 61A-D; 96A; 116D; 120A; 132B; 225B-D; and 269B. 
155 C.f., Maximus, Amb. 6 (PG 91: 1168A). 
156 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141C), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 117, italics mine. 
157 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141A), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 117. 
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contemplation, Maximus affirms the priesthood of Melchisedec is fulfilled in Christ. 
Jesus is without genealogy since he is ineffably and pre-eternally begotten from the 
Father, and he is without beginning and ending of days since he is by nature God.158 
All saints can have a Ôshare in this graceÕ (ἀμοιρεῖν τῆς χάριτος) even if Melchisedec 
is the only figure in the Scriptures who is characterized by it. Maximus concludes:  
For God provides equally to all the power that naturally leads to salvation, so 
that each one who wishes can be transformed by divine grace. And nothing 
prevents anyone from willing to become Melchisedec, and Abraham, and 
Moses, and simply transferring all these Saints to himself, not by changing 
names and places, but by imitating their forms and way of life.159  
The love of Christ is the divine grace that descends into our very created nature 
through being, eternal being, virtue and knowledge. Maximus encourages all to 
cling to Christ in union through virtuous and righteous actions, and to put to death 
the members of their bodies that focus only on sensible things. Through denying 
oneÕs life on account of divine grace, they will Ô[posses] the living and active and 
utterly single Word of God, who through virtue and knowledge penetrates to the 
division between soul and spirit (Heb. 4:12).Õ160 As we saw just a little earlier in this 
chapter, the divine logoi are the uncreated essence of God that is communicated to 
                                                             
158 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1144A). 
159 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1144A-B), trans. Louth Maximus Confessor, p. 118. 
160 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1144C), trans Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 119. 
 
  169 
the creature in deification. If this were the end of MaximusÕs reflection, then it 
would appear that he is asserting something like an energy distinction through the 
notion of Ôuncreated grace.Õ However, the deification of energy is actually a notional 
one of the knowledge of the logoi (where the creature gains knowledge of their being 
in itself) as I demonstrated from Cap Gnos. 2.92-3. This notional change is brought 
about from the face-to-face vision of Christ, who is the revealer of the logoi. It is only 
through hypostatic union of God and human in the person of Christ, that grace is 
uncreated. So, Maximus is making a bold claim, but he is rooting this claim in 
orthodox Christology.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 Maximus associates uncreated grace with the Incarnate Christ himself in his 
reflection on Melchisedec. The different gifts of grace that the creature both has in 
nature (being and eternal-being) and in potency (virtue and knowledge) are all 
divine attributes, from which their forms have been modeled.161 Grace is only 
uncreated through the Incarnate One, who lives and is begotten from all eternity 
from the Father, and the share of this divine grace is offered to creatures through 
their own nature as divine grace created and indwelling in them. This can only be 
                                                             
161 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1141A). 
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understood in MaximusÕs theology as the communication of the divine logoi. In the 
beatific vision, the resurrected Christ embodies the creatureÕs uncreated logoi. 
Divine grace offers a beatitude consisting of what the divine Giver of grace is in his 
very essence, but it is always mediated through the Incarnate nature of Christ which 
appears with the creature as in the Transfiguration. It would appear that divine gifts 
are always given through created mediations, but this is the only way that the full 
glory of the Godhead can impart itself so that the creature can be wholly in the 
whole of God. Grace is beyond the metaphysical in MaximusÕs theology, but it is 
always nearer to us than we are to ourselves because through the Incarnation grace 
now exists in the flesh. Maximus does not separate God from his actions. He roots 
everything in the cosmic mystery of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, and it is the 
grace of the Incarnation that we now turn our attention.    
171 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
ÔTherefore the mystery of the incarnation of the Word contains in itself the whole 
meaning of the riddles and symbols of Scripture, the whole significance of visible ad 
invisible creatures. Whoever knows the mystery of the cross and the tomb knows the 
meaning of things. Whoever is initiated into the hidden meaning of the resurrection 
know the purpose for which God created everything in the beginningÕ1 
 
 
5.1 Grace and Christology 
In the previous three chapters, our study focused on the connection between 
grace and metaphysics, or more precisely on the relation between divine energies, 
participation and grace. MaximusÕs theological system predicates energy of God, but his 
reflections on energy do not just stop with this predication because divine energy is 
rooted in an apophatic understanding of the logoi in this age with a kataphatic face-to-
face revelation of uncreated grace in the resurrected Christ. There is no separation 
between GodÕs essence and his energy, but energy and movement are predicated of God 
through remonstration from his created gifts. There are equally strong affirmations by 
Maximus of energy in GodÕs providential care of the cosmos (particularly through the  
                                                        
1 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 1.66 (PG 90: 1108AB). 
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created natural logoi) and movement and energy being only found in creatures as 
they relate to God.  
Maximus quite clearly delineates that movement (and for the interests of this 
study ÔenergyÕ) is not something that God does, but it is something that happens to 
creatures through revelation and divine economy.2 Maximus makes this point evident 
in Amb. 23, where he states that movement, as in the creation of art, only resides in the 
recipient of the causal principle (i.e., the idea in the artist). The cause only receives 
predications (through remonstration) of the artefacts created, not the passions or 
actual experience of its effects (a very Proclean and Pseudo-Dionysian position).3 God 
acting in creation through divine energy (ἐνέργεια) should be understood as acting in a 
principled manner and understood by the mind of the human being through 
illumination.4 Therefore, energy and grace are never understood in a vacuum; they are 
always in dialectic with the human mind and bodily experience as the microcosmic 
centre of the macrocosmic universe. GodÕs grace is always mediated in the world, but 
this mediation results in the paradox of the worldÕs direct participation in the whole 
                                                        
2 Maximus, Amb. 1 (PG 91: 1036B-C). 
3 Maximus, Amb. 23 (PG 91: 1260A-B). 
4 Maximus, Amb. 23 (PG 91: 1260C). 
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God. We observed at the end of the previous chapter that grace is uncreated and 
created depending on which side of the ontological divide is under reflection, but grace 
can only be uncreated as the creature receives the revelation of the pre-existing logoi of 
its being (which would be the divine essence) from the Incarnated Christ who unites 
uncreated and created natures in Himself. Grace as rooted in the Incarnation eclipses 
both an overly Tridentine separation of grace and nature and an overly Palamitic 
ontological distinction in God via a middle term of energy.  
Both Eastern and Western Christian theology generally do not allow for the full 
paradox of the participation of grace as always coming to the world as created but 
never separated from the divine source and principle from which it comes. Perhaps it is 
also accurate to say that the East and West focus on the false characterizations of the 
otherÕs position without addressing the real paradox underlying both viewpoints. 
Simply put, completely created grace or completely uncreated grace both obscures the 
full paradoxical nature of the Maximian vision of grace.  
For Maximus, God acts directly on the soul of the human person as a direct 
agent through the process of deification, but he contextualizes the direct giving of 
divine grace (i.e., grace as God himself) through the Incarnation: 
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God becomes to the soul (and through the soul to the body) what the soul is 
to the body, as God alone knows, so that the soul receives changelessness and 
the body immortality; hence the whole man, through divine works, is divinized 
by being made God by the grace of God who became man. He remains wholly 
man in soul and body by nature, and becomes wholly God in body and soul by 
grace and by the unparalleled divine radiance of blessed glory appropriate to 
him.5 
Christ is directly called the Ôgrace of GodÕ in this passage because all metaphysics, 
anthropology, soteriology and eschatology6 are wrapped up, as it were, in the mystery 
of the Incarnation. The significance of the Incarnation is the radical belief that God 
took on a human body. While the gifts of creation are observable graces of God, the 
Incarnation is the supreme embodiment of divine grace. The words of the opening 
chapter of the Gospel of John emphasize the connection between Christ and the full 
grace of God: 
And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as 
of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. John testified 
about Him and cried out, saying, ÔThis was He of whom I said, ÒHe who comes 
after me has a higher rank than I, for He existed before me.ÕÕ For of His fullness 
we have all received, and grace upon grace. For the Law was given through 
Moses; grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christ. No one has seen God 
                                                        
5 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1088C), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 63, slightly modified. 
6 In this chapter, I will use eschaton or eschatology in the general sense of the transformation into the 
second age of blessedness and deification. 
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at any time; the only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, He has 
explained Him.7 
I hinted in the previous chapter that the paradox of divine grace as being both created 
and uncreated at the same time is supremely represented in the second person of the 
Trinity. In this chapter, I would like to delve deeper into the gracious mystery of the 
Incarnation as it reveals the paradoxical grace of God.   
5.2 The Connection Between Grace and Christology Before Maximus 
Before examining the ConfessorÕs pristine Christological synthesis as a way of 
understanding divine grace, it will be helpful to examine the connection between grace 
and Christology in earlier church fathers. The Christological debates leading up to and 
following the Council of Chalcedon in 451 CE were centred on the person of the 
incarnate Logos. Throughout the debates over the nature of the Incarnation of the 
Word, theologians in the East and the West attempted to articulate the way in which 
the Logos as con-substantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father (as determined at the Council 
of Nicea 325 CE) descended into the world in the human Jesus and subsequently 
redeemed and saved the world. This kenotic (κένωσις) descent from divinity to 
humanity is beautifully described by St. Paul in Philippians 2:6-7: 
                                                        
7 NASB. 
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Have this attitude in yourselves which was also in Christ Jesus, who, 
although He existed in the form of God, did not regard equality with God a thing 
to be grasped, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a bond-servant, and being 
made in the likeness of men. Being found in appearance as a man, He humbled 
Himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.8  
The descent of the Word into the human story was universally recognized in the early 
Church as being faithful to the Holy Scriptures and tradition, but there were differing 
perspectives on how the divine and human natures in Christ came together. The fourth 
century raised the question of the relation of Christ with the Father, and the fifth 
century raised the question of the relation of human and divine natures in the 
Incarnation. At the core of both disputes was the nature of salvation. This is the reason 
why theologians such as Gregory of Nazianzen battled the Apollinarian threat to the 
full Incarnation of the Word. GregoryÕs famous dictum, ÔFor that which he has not 
assumed, he has not healed; but that which is united to his Godhead is also saved,Õ9 
echoes the desire during the Christological debates to safeguard both salvation and 
godly piety over the nature of God. 
 Until recently, two rival schools of thought, those of Alexandria and Antioch, 
were believed to have clashed over Christological doctrine in the fifth century. 
                                                        
8 NASB. 
9 Gregory Nazianzen, Ep. 101, 32 (SC 208, 50): ÔΤὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπον, ἀθεράπευτον.Õ 
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However, Donald Fairbairn has challenged such easy line drawing in his study, Grace 
and Christology in the Early Church.10 He challenges here the notion that there was utter 
Christological disagreement in the fifth century between two rival schools of thought 
by analysing their use of what he calls ÔChristological grace.Õ That is, Fairbairn argues 
for more of a consensus between East and West during this pivotal moment in 
Christological development than for the traditional view of the divisions. According to 
Fairbairn, this consensus is built upon the Cyrillian11 understanding of grace, where the 
grace of God is kenotic in the descent of the Logos in the person of Jesus. Grace is not a 
ÔthingÕ or mere power of God added to Christ for him to communicate to the faithful, 
but rather, the fullness of grace is the very giving of fullness of God himself as the 
incarnated Logos.12 I am convinced by FairbairnÕs thesis, and I believe Maximus held to 
this Cyrillian understanding of Christological grace, although with modifications and 
additions after the Monothelite Controversy. For the sake our study on Christological 
grace in Maximus, it will be helpful to trace the general points concerning grace and 
Christology in earlier Christological battles. 
                                                        
10 Donald Fairbairn, Grace and Christology in the Early Church, (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 
 
11 Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition I: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon, trans. John Bowden 
(London: A. W. Mowbray & Co., 1975), pp. 476ff.  
12 J. F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, (London: Methuen and 
Company Limited, 1933), p 275, cited in Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 9. 
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5.2.1 Theodore of Mopsuestia 
We begin our discussion on Christology and grace with the theology of Theodore of 
Mopsuestia (ca 350-428 CE) and Nestorius (ca. 386-451 CE) that influenced the Council of 
Ephesus in 431 CE and later Chalcedon in 451 CE. I will begin with his general 
understanding of grace and move into its relation to Christology.  
             For Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia (modern day Yakapinar), grace is conceived 
as the empowerment or aid of the Holy Spirit to progress to the second age of 
blessedness. This is most evident through his discussion of the grace of baptism: 
From him [Christ] you possess here the first fruits, because you now receive 
symbolically the enjoyment of those future benefits. But hereafter you will 
receive the entire grace, and from it you will become immortal, incorruptible, 
impassible, and immutable.13 
The recipient of birth in baptism possesses in himself all the potential of the 
immortal and incorruptible nature and possesses all its faculties. But he is not 
now able to put them into action, to make them work, or to show them forth, 
until the moment fixed by God for us arrives, when we will rise from the dead 
and be given complete actuality and perfect incorruptibility, immortality, 
impassibility, and immutability. For here he receives through baptism the 
                                                        
13 Theodore of Mopsuestia, Homiliae catecheticae 14.27, in Les Homlies catchtques de Thodore de Mopsueste: 
Rproduction phototypique du ms. Mingana Syr. 561, trans. Raymond Tonneau and Robert Devreesse (Vatican 
City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1949), p. 457-9, quoted in Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 34. 
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potential of the very things whose actual realization he will receive when he 
is no more a natural man but has become completely a spiritual man.14 
Theodore understands the gift of grace in these two passages as stemming from the gift 
of the Spirit to aid the Christian in his or her own moral and spiritual movement 
towards the second age. Donald Fairbairn describes this type of salvation arrangement 
as a Ôtwo-actÕ model, where the believer is elevated from one condition to a higher 
stage with the assistance of GodÕs power and grace.15 TheodoreÕs understanding of 
grace, which leads to the second age, is Ôprimarily something by which we attain to such 
a condition, rather than the gift of that condition itself.Õ16 In describing the gift of the 
Holy Spirit to the Christian, Theodore also endorses the idea of an empowered gift that 
is not really or essentially the gift of the Spirit itself: 
It was not the omnipresent divine nature of the Spirit that he was going to send 
to them; but he said this of the gift of the grace poured on them. He is also called 
the Paraclete, that is the ÔComforter,Õ because he was well able to teach them 
                                                        
14 Theodore of Mopsuestia, Homiliae catecheticae 14.10, in Les Homlies catchtques de Thodore de Mopsueste: 
Rproduction phototypique du ms. Mingana Syr. 561, trans. Raymond Tonneau and Robert Devreesse (Vatican 
City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1949), p. 423, quoted in Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 34. 
15 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, pp. 29-34. 
16 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 34. 
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what was necessary for the comfort of their souls in the numerous trials of 
this world.17 
From this short passage, it is evident that Theodore does not see the grace of the Holy 
Spirit that is sent by Christ as the grace of God Himself, but it is a comforter or advocate 
to weather the stormy trials of life. This divine aid is also dependent on the moral 
struggle of the believer to progress to the second age, but this is also placed within the 
will of God to obtain the life to come in the second age. This divine will does not 
unilaterally over-run the human moral response and progress in virtue, but it does 
work in synergy (συνέργεια) with the creature.18 
 Since the grace conferred on the Christian is generally understood by Theodore 
to consist of moral aid and power from the Spirit, one can see how this model translates 
into his Christological thinking. The divine nature of the eternal Logos acts on the 
humanity of Jesus. Grace is given to the human nature of the Incarnation in such a 
manner that it is deified, but the manner of sustaining virtue is due to the synergistic 
aid given to the humanity of Christ by the divine nature of the Logos. Theodore 
                                                        
17 Theodore of Mopsuestia, Homiliae catecheticae 10.7, in Les Homlies catchtques de Thodore de Mopsueste: 
Rproduction phototypique du ms. Mingana Syr. 561, trans. Raymond Tonneau and Robert Devreesse (Vatican 
City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1949), p. 257, quoted in Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 36. 
18 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, pp. 36, 38. 
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illustrates this idea through a discussion on the manner in which the boy Jesus grew 
in wisdom and grace (Luke 2:52):  
And Jesus increased in age and in wisdom and in grace with God and humans.Õ 
He [Jesus] increased in age, to be sure, because time moved on, and in wisdom 
because he acquired understanding to match his advancing years. But he 
increased in grace by pursuing the virtue, which is attendant upon 
understanding and knowledge. Because of this, the grace that was his from God 
received assistance, and in all these ways he advanced in the sight of God and 
men. People observed this growth, and God not only observed it but also 
testified [to it] and gave his cooperation with what was happening.19 
TheodoreÕs divisive Christology of the two separately interacting natures is clarified by 
the notion of grace that appears in this passage. Grace, like the divinity of Christ, is 
something that happens to the flesh, not something that is given through the union 
with the humanity of Christ. Theodore also draws upon the birth and death of Jesus to 
describe how the divinity and humanity are distinguished one from another.20 This 
separation of grace from Christ as the giver of grace creates a structure in which the 
personal presence of the Godhead in the world is not necessary.21  This can also be seen 
                                                        
19 Theodore of Mopsuestia, De incarnatione 7 frag. 5 (PG 66: 980A), trans. Richard Norris, The Christological 
Controversy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), p. 119, slightly modified. 
20 Theodore of Mopsuestia, De incarnatione 7 frag. 3, 6; 12 frag. 11. 
21 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 40. 
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in TheodoreÕs dismissal of the Monophysite notion of the divine and human natures 
becoming one in the incarnate Christ: 
In every way, then, it is clear in the first place that the notion of ÔmixtureÕ is 
both exceptionally unsuitable and does not follow, since each of the natures 
remains indissolubly in itself. Moreover, it is also quite evident that the notion 
of union is completely in line, for by means of it the natures which are brought 
together make up one person according to the unionÉ[with Christ] the personal 
union is not destroyed by the distinction of natures. When we distinguish the 
natures, we speak of the nature of God the Word as complete and of his person 
as complete (for there is no hypostasis without its person). Moreover, the 
nature of the man is complete, and likewise his person. But when we consider 
the union, then we speak of one person.22 
Though TheodoreÕs frequent language about the perfect alignment of the two natures 
in Christ is slightly downplayed by Fairbairn in his treatment of his Christology, I think 
that his argument concerning grace as an aided power in TheodoreÕs Christology is 
essentially correct. Despite TheodoreÕs emphasis on the union of the two natures, he 
limits the person (πρόσωπον) or subject of ÔChristÕ as being in the human nature and 
not in the Logos. The Logos gives the aid of grace so that the man Jesus Ôcan be 
considered one πρόσωπον with [the Logos] and can share in his honour.Õ23 What 
Theodore leaves his readers is really what Fairbairn calls ÔChrist as the supreme 
                                                        
22 Theodore of Mopsuestia, De incarnatione 7 frag. 7 (PG 66: 981A-B), trans. Richard Norris, The Christological 
Controversy, p. 120, slightly modified. 
23 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 50. 
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example of grace.Õ Christ is a moral stave of grace for the believer instead of the 
ontological giver of the grace, which he himself is. Theodore makes this point crystal 
clear in De incarnatione 7 frag. 2, where he denies any ÔindwellingÕ of God in the world 
through essence or activity: 
If it be asserted that God is present everywhere by reason of his essence, then 
absolutely all things must share in his indwellingÉif we say that the indwelling 
is effected in them by essenceÉThe same thing might be said in the case of 
active operation, for it is necessary in this case too for God to limit his operation 
to those in whom he dwellsÉWe should then say that he dwells in everything. 
Therefore, it is impossible to say that God makes his indwelling either by his 
essence or, further, by his active operation.24 
TheodoreÕs final vision of grace does not directly connect or identify grace with 
the eternal Logos. Because of the lack of a full incarnation of divine grace in the 
humanity of Christ, grace becomes extrinsic, a moral aid to deification. The full 
ontological descent of the Logos into flesh is needed for a complete ontological 
salvation. GregoryÕs dictum that everything in human nature that is not assumed by 
Christ is not healed cannot be fulfilled in TheodoreÕs Christology. Maximus, however, 
will draw out the full ontological implications of the descent and incarnation of the 
                                                        
24 Theodore of Mopsuestia, De incarnatione 7 frag. 2 (PG 66: 972D-974A), trans. Richard Norris, The 
Christological Controversy, pp. 114-15. 
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uncreated grace of Christ. In several subsequent thinkers in the East, such as 
Nestorius, the type of Christological grace that Theodore represents is maintained.  
 
5.2.2 Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople 
Nestorius was archbishop of Constantinople from 10 April 428 to 22 June 431. He 
studied at the school of Antioch, and is famous for his battle against the use of the term 
Theotokos (Θεοτόκος), or ÔGod-bearerÕ, for Mary, mother of Jesus. Towards the beginning 
of his Sermon 9, he asks the question, ÒIs Mary Theotokos, Ôthey say,Õ or Ôis she on the 
contrary Man-bearer (ὰνθρωποτόκος)?Ó25 He rejects the former in order to affirm the 
latter by a simple statement, ÔMary, my friend, did not give birth to the Godhead (for 
Ôwhat is born of the flesh is fleshÕ [John 3:6]). A creature did not produce him who is 
uncreatable.Õ26 His rejection of this title is rooted in his deep-seated belief in the 
transcendence of the Logos and His impassibility, which meant that any human actions 
or activities in the life of Christ, such as His birth, death and resurrection, could not be 
                                                        
25 Nestorius, Sermon 9, trans. Richard Norris, The Christological Controversy, p. 124. I do not have a workable 
knowledge of the Syriac texts that remain of Nestorius. Therefore, I will be relying on Fairbairn and 
NorrisÕs translations as noted. 
26 Nestorius, Sermon 9, trans. Richard Norris, The Christological Controversy, p. 124. 
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ascribed to Him. Mortal things are fleeting while the divine nature is not. Nestorius 
poetically begins his sermon with a description of the created world: 
The Creator God, after all, fashioned me in my motherÕs womb, and he is the 
first and supreme surety that in those hidden places of the interior I am kept in 
existence. I am bornÑand I discover fountains of milk. I begin to experience a 
need to cut my food in bits, and discover that I am equipped with knives of a 
sort in my teeth. I come to maturity, and the creation becomes the source of my 
wealth, for the earth nourishes me from beneath, and from heaven above the 
sun is kindled as a lamp for me. The spring season presents me with flowers, the 
summer offers me the ripe head of grain, the winter brings rains to birth, 
autumn hangs its gift out on the vine.27 
A created human being grows and is nurtured by the providential care that God 
instilled in creation to tend to needs of creatures. All of the grain and grapes on the 
vine will ultimately spoil, and Nestorius contrasts this with the permanence of gold 
that will not spoil. Like gold, the world was given and adorned with the undefiled gift of 
the Incarnation of the lord. Nestorius quickly turns his rhetoric against seeing the 
Word of God as actually becoming a part of creation (in other words, he is emphasizing 
the impassible nature of the Logos) in the same Sermon 9 on the Theotokos: 
That which was formed in the womb is not in itself God. That which was created 
by the Spirit was not in itself God. That which was buried in the tomb is not 
itself God. If that were the case, we should manifestly be worshipers of a human 
being and worshipers of the dead. But since God is within the one who was 
                                                        
27 Nestorius, Sermon 9, trans. Richard Norris, The Christological Controversy, pp. 123-24. 
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assumed is styled God because of the one who assumed him. That is why the 
demons shudder at the mention of the crucified flesh; they know that God has 
been joined to the crucified flesh, even though he has not shared its suffering.28 
Given an extreme form of impassibility, any real participation in the events of the life of 
the human Jesus, according to Nestorius, would mean an essential change in God from 
divine to human. He also understands this principle of piety to be of a logical character 
in reference to the Theotokos. If someone is born, then they must be homoousios 
(ὁμοούσιος) with the mother or bearer. Nestorius provocatively states that Ôno one 
gives birth to one older than herself.Õ29 With this strict logic, Nestorius notably coined 
the ascription of ÔChrist-bearerÕ (Χριστοτόκος) to Mary rather than Theotokos for which 
his opponent, Cyril of Alexandria, argued at the Council of Ephesus in 431. For 
Orthodox piety there would not really be a rejection of NestoriusÕs point here between 
the uncreated and the created ordersÑthis is certainly an Athanasian principleÑbut 
the Nicean Orthodox, and later Chalcedonian Orthodox under CyrilÕs theological 
influence, would equally argue in Gregorian fashion that without the full assumption of 
the Logos, the Christian is not healed or saved.  
                                                        
28 Nestorius, Sermon 9, trans. Richard Norris, The Christological Controversy, p. 130.  
29 Nestorius, Epistle 1, trans. Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 54. 
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 Given the separation between the human and divine natures of Christ in 
NestoriusÕs theology,30 it is not surprising to learn that he follows the divisions as laid 
out by Theodore. Nestorius also pressed further the division between the ÔcompleteÕ 
natures of the Incarnate one. As Fairbairn points out, the bishop of Constantinople 
often uses the word ÔChristÕ to be predicated of the human nature of Jesus aside from 
the divine Logos. Nestorius declares, ÔJust as Israel is called ÔsonÕ and Moses is called a 
Ôgod,Õ so likewise is Christ to be called ÔGod,Õ although he is neither by nature ÔGodÕ nor 
by nature ÔSon of God.Õ31 Here we can see that Nestorius does not consider the humanity 
                                                        
30 Nestorius does write that he believes Cyril has not fully represented his understanding of Christ: Ônor 
do I speak of an adhesion through love and through proximity, as though it were between those which 
are far apart [and] those united by love and not in the ousiai; nor again do I speak of a union in equality of 
honour and in authority but of the natures and of whole natures, and in the combination of the ousiai I 
concede a union without confusion; but in respect to one honour and of the authorityÉ[I spoke] not of 
the proximity nor the equality of honour nor of the dignity, but I said that I separate not God the Word 
himself in his nature from the visible nature, and by reason of God who is not to be separated I separate 
not even the honourÉfor he is one thing and his honour is another, and his ousia is another and 
whatsoever belongs to the ousia is another. But, although I have said that I separate the natures from one 
another by a separation of distance, as thou accuses me in thy calumniation,Õ trans. and quoted in 
Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition I, p. 515. CyrilÕs understanding of NestoriusÕs position is slightly 
skewed because he begins from the position of the perceiving Christ the Logos as a single subject and then 
the individual natures. Therefore, Nestorius seems to be arguing for a union where the two natures are 
only placed next to or alongside each other and bonded through mutual love. However, Nestorius here 
defends the charge that the two natures are not distanced from each other but in union without 
confusion. Grillmeier terms this a Ômutual compensationÕ or in the Greek tradition a Ôperichoresis,Õ see 
Christ in Christian Tradition I, pp. 515ff. This will be very important in MaximusÕs debates in the 
monothelite controversy.  Prestige counters some of the traditional assumptions surround Nestorius and 
says that he may not deserve the epithet ÔNestorian.Õ He says (God in Patristic Thought, pp. 143ff) that the 
Ôunorthodoxy of Nestorius was not a positive fact but a negative impotence.Õ 
31 Nestorius, Liber Heraclidis 2.1, in The Bazaar of Heracleides, ed. and trans. G. R. Driver and Leonard 
Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 182, quoted in Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 55. 
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to be identified with the true Son of God the Logos: ÔSince God is within the one who 
was assumed, the one who was assumed, after being conjoined to the one who assumed 
him, is called ÔGodÕ because of the one who assumed him.Õ32 Further, Nestorius connects 
and disconnects the assumption of the flesh with the Christotokos doctrine, ÔWhat was 
consubstantial with us was filled with inseparable divinity as he was born from the 
virgin.Õ33 
 Nestorius retains the notions of grace that Theodore had argued for previously. 
Though there are not many linguistic connections between Christology and grace in 
NestoriusÕs writings, he continues the Christology of Theodore in seeing Christ as more 
of a moral leader or aid in spiritual progress. Nestorius Ôemphasizes the role of the 
assumed man in redemption by arguing that we associate with that man in his triumph. 
The man has taken part in our death so that we can participate in the name above all 
names, a name that he has been given by the grace of the Logos after his resurrection.Õ34 
So, Christ can offer his followers the communication of grace through the power that 
the man or the flesh received at his resurrection. Grillmeier stresses that for Nestorius 
                                                        
32 Nestorius, Sermon 9, trans. Richard Norris, The Christological Controversy, p. 130. 
33 Nestorius, Epistle 9, trans. Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 55. 
34 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 60.  
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the absolute freedom and grace from on high on the humanity of Christ is key 
feature of his Christology:  
The Incarnation is not a necessary natural fact, a ἔνωσις κατὰ φύσιν, but a free 
disposal by the divine dispensation (οἰκονομία). Christ is therefore a ἔνωσις 
κατ« οἰκονομίαν, or κατ« εὐδοκίαν, or κατὰ χάριν. This is the proper sense of 
these expressions which have been expounded to fit a ÔBewhrungslehre.Õ They 
are not meant to loosen the unity in Christ; they merely stress the divine 
freedom in the work of the incarnation. In none of this is the human freedom of 
Christ a matter of concern. From ChristÕs Godhead finally come the honour 
(τιμή), glory (δόξα) and worship which are also bestowed on the man in Christ. 
Nestorius does not make this equality of honour, worship and grace the ground 
of unity in Christ; the equality follows from the fact of the taking of human 
nature by God in Christ.35 
Nestorius tries to establish divine freedom as the basis of the unity of Christ, which is a 
pious action on his part, but it does relegate the giving of grace to a sort of extrinsic gift 
apart from, or perhaps better alongside, the humanity of Christ. Grace descends from 
above in the Incarnation, but in NestoriusÕs theology GodÕs grace in Christ does not 
appear with and through created nature as a personal subject as it will for Maximus 
Confessor. The remaining question in the giving of divine grace according to Nestorius 
is, who communicates grace to the Christian? As Fairbairn notes, Nestorius is 
ambiguous about whether the follower of Christ must perform his or her own 
                                                        
35 Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition I, pp. 514-15. 
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obedience to Christ in order to access the grace of the resurrection or whether it is 
the man Christ who gives the gift of deliverance; nevertheless, what is certain is that 
Nestorius sees that it is the assumed man, that is, Christ, who is the one who brings 
about this transformation.36 Cyril, the Patriarch of Alexandria, met NestoriusÕs two-
nature Christology with opposition.  
5.2.3 Cyril of Alexandria 
Cyril of Alexandria was the Patriarch of Alexandria from 412 to 444, and he was a major 
actor in the Christological controversies of the fifth century. As noted above, he was a 
key opponent to Nestorius and Nestorianism, a form of dyophysitism whereby Christ 
had two very loosely connected or united natures. As John McGuckin notes concerning 
the defeat of Nestorius, Ôthe Two Sons approach to Christology was utterly wrecked, 
and exile from the bounds of classical orthodoxy.Õ37 Cyril left a pervasive legacy in 
Christology indeed. He was the principle player at the council of Ephesus in 431, which 
led to the deposing of Nestorius as Patriarch of Constantinople.  
                                                        
36 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 61. 
37 John McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: the Christological Controversy: ItÕs History, Theology, and Texts, 
(Crestwood, NY: St. VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 2004), p. 223. 
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At the centre of CyrilÕs Christology is the unity of Christ as the incarnate 
Logos. This unification in Christ provides a context where the grace given to humanity 
in Christ resides in the very giving of the Logos himself. The Alexandrian theme of 
deification describes salvation as becoming adopted sons of God, or simply gods, by 
grace. Cyril emphasizes the deification aspect of salvation to the exclusion of what 
Fairbairn describes as a two-act salvation scheme, where the Christian merely 
progresses to the second age as going from a lower level of existence to a higher one.38 
There is a distinctly ontological element to salvation in CyrilÕs three-act scheme as the 
grace of Christ renews human nature and progresses further to the likeness of God. 
Commenting on the creation of Adam and the giving of the breath of life to him, Cyril 
says that Ô[God] desires, therefore, the nature of man to be renewed (ἀνανεοῦσθαι) and 
moulded anew (ἀναπλάττεσθαί), as it were, into its original likeness, by communion 
with the Spirit, in order that, by putting on that original grace and being re-shaped 
                                                        
38 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 63. The three-act scheme of a restoration to the created condition can 
be observed in a passage from Cyril in the Commentarii in Johannem 2.10 (2.719) that Fairbairn quotes 
(Grace and Christology, p. 65), ÔFrom the Father he sought for us the holiness (ἁγιασμὸν) that is in and 
through the Spirit, and he desires what was in us by the gift of God as the first age of the world and the 
beginning of creation to be rekindled to life (ἀναζωπυρεῖσθαι) in us again.Õ  
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(ἀνακομισάμενοι) into conformity with him, we may be found able to prevail over 
the sin that reigns in this world.Õ39  
Notice in this passage that Cyril indicates that the gift of the spirit of life that is 
rekindled once again through Christ is due to grace and not a natural innate (ἕξις or 
ἐπιτηδειότης). Earlier in the same passage of the Commentarii in Johannem, Cyril 
emphasizes that salvation is a homecoming to that participation in the life of the Holy 
Spirit that re-kindles, re-forms, and re-shapes the believer to God.40 Essentially, the 
image of God given in the garden is re-impressed into the creature through the giving 
of grace and the Holy Spirit. Creation is not the same thing as deification in CyrilÕs 
anthropology and soteriology because he does mention that the new gift of grace in the 
Spirit is more stable than the previous one in the garden (or in some cases between the 
fallen and redeemed states41): 
Therefore, since our condition had been made wretched, it was necessary for 
God the Father to send the son himself, in order to transform our condition into 
one incomparably better than that of old and to rescue us who were on the 
earth, evidently by freeing us from sin and by destroying both sinÕs own root 
                                                        
39 Cyril, Commentarii in Johannem 2.10 (2.720), trans. and quot. Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 65. 
40 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 65. 
41 Walter Burghardt, The Image of God in Man According to St. Cyril (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), p. 
115, also cited in Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 68.  
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and that death which had sprung from it, and by delivering us from the 
tyranny of the devil over us.42  
The giving of the grace of the Logos provides a stable state for the redeemed that 
eclipses the Ôtyranny of the devil;Õ it is an Ôincomparably betterÕ (τὸ ἁσυγκρίτως 
ἄμεινον) ontological condition. Through CyrilÕs anthropology and Christology of an 
initial fall from creation and a subsequent recreation through Christ and the Holy 
Spirit, grace is understood as the giving of the Logos (and Holy Spirit) himself. Cyril 
connects the gracious giving of Christ also to adoption and deification: ÔHe descended 
into bondage, not thereby giving anything to himself, but graciously giving himself to 
us (ἡμῖν ἑατὸν χαριζόμενος), so that we through his poverty might become rich [2 Cor. 8:9], 
and by soaring up through likeness to him into his own proper and remarkable good, 
we might be made gods and children of God (θεοί τε καὶ Θεοῦ τέκνα) through faith.Õ43 
Thus deification in CyrilÕs theology is not separated from divine grace given through a 
person and all of the ontological implications that come with a charitology rooted in 
Christology. Later in his Commentarii in Johannem 2.3, Cyril connectsÑand practically 
equatesÑthe ontological implications of grace with the fullness of deity in Christ: 
                                                        
42 Cyril, Epistolae paschales 16.6 (PG 77: 765b-c), trans. Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 67. 
43 Cyril, Commentarii in Johannem 1.9 (1.141-2), trans. and quot. Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 69. 
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For grace was given by measure through the Spirit to the holy prophets, but 
in our Saviour Christ all the fullness of deity has been pleased to dwell bodily, as Paul 
says [Col 2:9]. Therefore we have all also received of his fullness, as John affirmed 
[John 1:16]. How then will the Giver be on a par with the recipients, or how will 
the fullness of deity (τὸ τῆς θεότητος πλήρωμα) be reckoned in the portion of 
the minister?44 
The primary grace of God in the Incarnation is the full indwelling of God in a 
human body, but Cyril also sees this indwelling as the grace of deification. For the 
patriarch of Alexandria, the grace of God kenotically descends into the material world 
through the personal subject of Jesus Christ. Foreign to this line of thought is seeing 
grace as extrinsic to the created order. Deification is a gift that must be given, but it is 
also a divine gift that results from GodÕs self-emptying and incarnation. Participation in 
the divine grace of God through Christ is complete all the way down into the very 
matter (ὕλῃ) of the cosmos. The question that arose in later debates after CyrilÕs death 
in 444 CE were concerned with the breadth or extent of the ontological giving of 
Christological grace. Does ChristÕs Incarnation affect every element of human existence 
including a human will? FairbairnÕs contrast between mediated presence vs. full direct 
presence will remain in force in the seventh century conflicts over Monothelitism.45   
                                                        
44 Cyril, Commentarii in Johannem 2.3 (1.250), trans. and quot. Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 70. 
45 Fairbairn, Grace and Christology, p. 10. 
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5.3 Maximian Christological Grace 
For Maximus, grace manifests itself in all areas of the cosmos. One can discover 
the energy of divine grace through the logoi of creation, the ChurchÕs mystagogy, and 
even through works of divine power on the soul and through it the body. Though 
Maximus does not have a worked out systematic theology of grace, it does not mean 
grace in his thought does not have a centre. Maximian scholars universally agree that 
the centre of his theological enterprise is the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. Through 
divine play in and within creation in a thousand different places, without confusion 
(ασυγχύτως) of essence, the Logos Ôwills always and in all things to accomplish the 
mystery of his embodiment.Õ46 There is a sense in Maximus of the innate presence of the 
Logos in creation before the historical Incarnation, but the radicalness of this presence 
is only fully understood (and realized for that matter) through the grace of Christ 
becoming incarnate as a human being. Following the connection between grace and the 
giving of the Logos through the flesh in Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus very clearly 
associates grace with the Incarnation itself: 
The knowledge of himself in his essence and personhood remains inaccessible 
to all angels and men alike and he can in no way be known by anyone. But St. 
John, initiated as perfectly as humanly possible into the meaning of the WordÕs 
                                                        
46 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1084C-D). 
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incarnation, claims that he has seen the glory of the Word as flesh, that is, he 
saw the reason or the plan for which God became man, full of grace and truth. For 
it was not as God by essence, consubstantial to God the Father, that the only-
begotten Son gave this grace, but as having in the incarnation become man by 
nature, and consubstantial to us, that he bestows grace on us who have need of it. 
This grace we receive from his fullness always in proportion to our progress. 
Therefore, the one who keeps sacred the whole meaning of the Word of GodÕs 
becoming incarnate for our sake will acquire the glory full of grace and truth of 
the one who for our sake glorifies and consecrates himself in us by his coming: 
ÔWhen he appears we shall be like himÕ [1 John 3:2].47  
There are several theological insights in this passage from Maximus. After a 
short reference St. PaulÕs famous saying concerning the partial knowledge of the Word 
that he received (1 Corinthians 9:13), Maximus brings in St. JohnÕs concept of the 
fullness of grace and truth in the Incarnation. He asks, ÔWhy did St. Paul state that he 
only had a partial knowledge of the divine Word?Õ48 He answers that since the divine 
essence and personhood transcend everything that can be known (the via negativa), we 
can know God only through his creative activities or energies. But Maximus does not 
stop with only partial knowledge in this passage. Instead, he uses the paradox of divine 
knowledge and grace, according to John, by offering a picture of divine grace as coming 
into the world through incarnation. 
                                                        
47 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 2.76 (PG 90: 1112B), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 164, slightly modified and 
italics mine. 
48 Maximus, Cap. Gnost. 2.76 (PG 90: 1112B). 
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Maximus retains the Cyrillian notion of Christological grace as the full 
Incarnation into human existence, not just a permanence of divine presence and aid. 
Because of the full Incarnation of the Word, God reveals His presence to the farthest 
ends of created existence. The Logos, who already pre-contains the pre-existing logoi of 
creation, does not come to the world as an essence but as a fully incarnated God-man. 
The fullness of the Godhead that cannot be shared is paradoxically fully revealed and 
fully descended into creation in Jesus Christ. The full Incarnation of Christ is the basis 
for the deification of the creature. In deification the words of St. John are fulfilled: Ôfor 
when he appears we shall be like him.Õ Through the grace of God, the creature will also 
experience the full knowledge of God through the face-to-face vision of Christ: Ôthrough 
the leading and guiding of the grace of the all-holy Spirit to those who press on in 
prayer through a pure and orthodox faith to the perfect face-to-face (1 Corinthians 
13:12) knowledge of the great God and Saviour of all, Christ (1 Titus 2:13), and initiation 
into him.Õ49  
MaximusÕs critical point of grace as incarnated reinforces the argument, 
presented in the previous chapters, that divine grace is not granted as an essence to an 
essence but as existing embodied person to an existing embodied person. Whatever the 
                                                        
49 Maximus, Th. Pol. 7 (PG 91: 73A), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 182. 
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nature of divine grace outside of creationÑif it were even possible to speak in this 
mannerÑit is revealed to creatures through created means. We only know the Godhead 
through the mediation of grace in creation; it is a participation in a likeness that is 
itself already a participation of God and is God. This divine mediation is found in the 
Incarnation of Christ. In order to see how Maximus extends the Christological gift of 
grace all the way down into creation, we will need to analyse his response to the 
Monothelite Controversy.    
5.3.1 Monothelitism and Enhypostatization 
Monothelitism (meaning Ôone willÕ) emerged in the early part of the seventh century in 
the eastern part of the Roman Empire. This Christological movement affirmed that 
were two natures in Christ but only one will, which when followed to its logical 
conclusions meant that there is an aspect of human existence that is not assumed by 
the Logos. For Maximus, only a fully assumed human nature, which would include the 
will, can be the basis for salvation. Further, with a dominant divine will in Christ, there 
emerges the possibility for a monenergistic view of humanityÕs salvation, which would 
limit the efficacy of a creatureÕs acts of virtue. This is not a theological viewpoint that 
Maximus, nor many other Byzantine theologians for that matter, would accept. His 
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position would be a synergism between the grace of God and the works of the 
human being.  
During the Monothelite controversies, there was confusion over the 
relationship between hypostasis and nature.  The Monothelite party held that 
hypostasis and nature is the same thing. This position, particularly as promoted by 
Patriarch Sergius I of Constantinople, led to some creative response by Neo-
Chalcedonian thinkers (a label suggested by J. Lebon50). There are several major players 
that influenced Maximus, such as Leontius of Jerusalem and Leontius of Byzantium 
(even the latter was possibly Origenist in his Christology51). What is creative in their 
Christology is the way in which they separated hypostasis and nature. The result was a 
new way of looking at the union of the divine and human in Christ, which they called 
ÔenhypostaticÕ (ἐνυπόστατος). 
 Hypostasis changes from being that which something is, its nature or essence, 
to that which provides the context for two things or natures to come together. In 
Christology this means that hypostasis is not the union of the divine and human in 
                                                        
50 Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition II part II: From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great 
(590-604), (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1995), p. 429ff. 
51 David Evans, Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology, Dumbarton Oaks Studies 13 (Washington, DC: 
Dumbarton Oaks, 1970). 
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Christ itself, but it is that in which the union takes place.52 For Leontius of 
Jerusalem, hypostasis indicates more of a relationship of the coming together more 
than the essence or nature of a union. John Meyendorff points out that for Leontius: 
The characteristic of the hypostasis is therefore to be Ôby itselfÕ (καθ' ἑαυτὸ 
ὑφεστός). One could in this way say that there is one nature in Christ, if there 
existed a Ôspecies of ChristsÕ (εἶδος Χριστῶν); but there is only one Christ, and 
the only term suitable to designate him is Ôone hypostasis,Õ which is an 
individual whole made out of parts, each one of which is a complete nature. The 
term hypostasis reflects essentially and only a connection and a relationship.53 
Since hypostasis reflects a relationship between the two natures, Leontius was able to 
introduce the idea of enhypostatization without going beyond the bounds of 
orthodoxy. Through enhypostatization, one can conceive of an Ôexistence within 
something.Õ54 Leontius is clearly trying to maintain both the position of Cyril, involving 
the unity of Christ, and the Chalcedonian definition that preserves the operations of 
the two natures. The distinction between nature and hypostasis is made perfectly clear 
by Leontius: 
                                                        
52 Kenneth Wesche, ÔThe Defense of Chalcedon in the 6th Century: The Doctrine of ÔHypostasisÕs and 
Deification in the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem,Õ (Ph.D. Diss., New York: Fordham University, 
1986), p. 52; quoted in Michael Butler, Hyostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 47.  
53 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 65-66. 
54 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, p. 67. 
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We say the Logos assumed a certain proper nature of its own from our 
nature into his own hypostasis. So then, the union is of natures in the 
hypostasis, that is to say, the union of one [nature] with the other. But from 
these natures there has not been produced a composite nature, since they are 
not united by confusion, nor is there a composite hypostasis, since the union is 
not from hypostases. But the property of the hypostasis of the Logos has 
become more uncompounded since more properties have been drawn together 
[in it] after the Incarnation, which proves that neither his nature nor his 
hypostasis is composite or mutable.55 
Through LeontiusÕs distinction between hypostasis and nature, Christological thinking 
could move past the fear that by admitting two natures one would therefore divide the 
person of Jesus into two or meld them into one. The hypostasis of Christ is still the 
single divine Logos, but he has hypostatized the human nature (not a hypostasis in 
Christ) to the divine Logos.  
 Later, Sophronius of Jerusalem, MaximusÕs close friend and possible mentor, 
uses the Neo-Chalcedonian distinction of nature and hypostasis to counter the 
arguments of the Monothelites in designating a single divine will in Christ: 
And the same is acknowledged to be one and two. It is one according to 
hypostasis and person, and two according to the natures themselves, and their 
natural properties, from which it obtained single existence and maintained 
double continuity in nature. 
                                                        
55 Leontius of Jerusalem, Adverses Nestorius 1.20 (PG 86: 1485C-D), trans. Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union 
and Monothelitism, pp. 48-49. 
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Whence the same one, remaining one Christ and Son and Only-begotten, is 
seen undivided in both natures, and operates both essences naturally according 
to an essential property present in each, or even a natural property. If it had a 
nature that was single and uncomposite, just as it had the hypostasis and the 
person...the one and the same would not have perfectly accomplished the things 
of each nature.56 
Sophronius ascribes the unity to hypostasis and the operations or essential properties 
(which would include will) to the natures. Building upon earlier Neo-Chalcedonian 
thought, Sophronius also uses the logical argument that since the two natures in Christ 
are not identified, therefore the two operations should likewise not be identified.57 This 
line of thought also continues the Cyrillian emphasis on grace not being extrinsic to the 
giving of the Logos itself. Since the human nature of Christ does not have a hypostasis of 
its own (i.e., a personal subject or individual), and all the human operations apply only 
to the human nature, the will is also assumed in the Incarnation. The personal subject 
of Christ fully acts with the human nature in all of its operations. Grace thus appears 
with and through humanity in Christ, and ontologically grace is the full gift of the divine 
Logos. It is grace as made incarnate in time and embodied that reveals the foundational 
purpose for the cosmos. 
                                                        
56 Sophronius, Epistola Synodica ad Sergium Patriarcham Constantinopolitanum (PG 87: 3168A-B), trans. 
Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, pp. 67-8. 
57 Sophronius, Epistola Synodica (PG 87: 3169D). 
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 Moving on to MaximusÕs critique of Monothelitism, we see a similar thought 
frame as that of Sophronius. In his famous dispute with Pyrrhus Maximus deconstructs 
the argument of the Monothelites that will and hypostasis are identified. After Pyrrhus 
makes the claim that if Christ is one, then he certainly is only one person willing, 
Maximus shrewdly retorts: 
Now then, if Christ exists as God and man by nature, then did he will as God and 
man, or only as Christ? But if it was antecedently as God and man that Christ 
willed, then it is clear that, being one and the same, [He willed] dually and not 
singly. For if Christ is nothing else than his natures from which and in which he 
exists, then he obviously [wills] according to each of his natures; being one and 
the same, he wills and operates as each [nature] is able, if indeed neither is 
without will or operation. So if Christ wills and operates according to each of his 
natures, as each one [of the natures] is able to [will and operate], and if he has 
two natures, then by all means he must have two natural wills, and in equal 
number, essential energies.58 
If Christ is fully incarnate, then according to Maximus he must also will through both 
natures. If Christ is willing from something other than his two natures, then his will 
becomes a tertia quid. Pyrrhus was concerned that by asserting two wills in Christ, one 
was therefore introducing conflict in Christ. Maximus counters that this does not 
divide Christ but guards their distinct natures, even in the union.59 He even uses 
                                                        
58 Maximus, Pyrrh. 13 (ButlerÕs numbering, not Farrell) PG 91: 289A-B. 
59 Maximus, Pyrrh. 13 (ButlerÕs numbering, not Farrell), PG 91: 289B-C. 
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Trinitarian theology (though revealed in economy) to argue his point. If will is 
connected with hypostasis, then would not the Godhead has three different wills?60 The 
definition of an existing thing is based upon its nature or logos, and one recognizes a 
logos through the expression of energy or operation.61 If hypostasis is the mark of 
operation and identification, then one would have to ascribe singular operation and 
will in Christ. Therefore, it is more orthodox to say that will is an operation of nature 
instead of hypostasis because the Incarnation requires that one recognize human and 
divine operations in Christ.  
 A final move that Maximus develops against Monothelitism that I would like to 
briefly touch upon is his own development of enhypostatization. In 
Neochalcedonianism (especially that associated with Emperor Justinian and Leontius of 
Jerusalem), the phrases Ôin two naturesÕ and Ôfrom two naturesÕ are both used in 
reference to Christ.62 Maximus is familiar with the ÔinÕ and ÔfromÕ phraseology of the 
Neo-Chalcedonian theologians, and their distinction between hypostasis and nature as 
                                                        
60 Maximus, Pyrrh. 15 (ButlerÕs numbering, not Farrell), PG 91: 289D-92A. 
61 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, p. 88. 
62 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 93ff. 
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noted above, but as Michael Butler (following Piret63) argues in his dissertation on 
the ConfessorÕs Christology, Maximus creatively develops the triad Ôfrom which, in 
which, and which Christ is.Õ64  
The importance for the triad, according to Butler, is that Maximus needs to 
emphasize both that Christ is from two natures, but also that after the union the two 
natures subsist.65 This is critically important because, given the distinction between 
hypostasis and nature, orthodox Christology must also affirm that each of the 
attributes of the two natures should truly belong to Christ.66 Maximus brings the triad 
into consideration in Th. Pol. 19: ÔThose who believe in him in an Orthodox way do not 
rely upon such reasonings, [which are] like a cobweb of thought in their feebleness, for 
[the two natures] from which Christ is, Christ is in, and [the two natures] in which 
                                                        
63 Pierre Piret, ÔChristologie et thologie trinitaire chez Maxime le Confesseur, dÕaprs sa formule des 
natures Ôdesquelles, en lesquelles et lesquelles est le Christ,Ó in Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur 
Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, ed. Felix Heintzer and Christoph von Schnborn, 
Paradosis: tudes de literature et de thologie anciennes 27 (Fribourg: 1982), pp. 215-22. For the 
viewpoint of the third member of the triad not being significant, see Marcel Doucet, ÔEst-ce que le 
monothlisme a fait autant dÕillustres victims? Reflexions sur un ouvrage de F.-M. Lthel,Õ Science et spirit 
35 (1983), pp. 53-83. 
64 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 99ff.  
65 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 102. 
66 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 102. 
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Christ is, Christ is. Thus Christ is identically both God and man; he is in the divinity 
and humanity.Õ67  
For Maximus, in order to maintain the operation of will in the human nature of 
Christ, it is important to protect the integrity of the human nature after the union, 
which would then ground the continuance of the human will.68 Therefore, the Ôand 
which Christ isÕ part of the triad maintains the integrity of the human will in the 
human nature after the union in Christ. In this way, we can say that Christ wills as one 
but resides in two natural wills at the same time.  
 The importance of the triad Ôfrom which, in which, and which Christ isÕ for our 
discussion on Christological grace in Maximus is three-fold. First, the triad re-affirms 
the concept of grace as deriving from the Logos and through the humanity. Only by 
conceiving of grace as ontological can the extrinsic notions of grace as mere moral 
empowerment be overcome (although the moral dimension is certainly important for 
Maximus). Second, without the ontological giving of grace through the Logos, 
deification is not possible, and thus the continuance of the Gregorian phrase Ôthat 
which is not assumed is not healed.Õ Healing is a dominating motif for salvation in the 
                                                        
67 Maximus, Th. Pol. 19 (PG 91: 224A), trans. Butler, Hyostatic Union and Monothelitism, pp. 101-102. 
68 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 103. 
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Greek patristic tradition. The incarnate Logos is our healer precisely because he has 
hypostatically assumed all the characteristics of created human nature save sin.  
Finally, the Maximian triad clarifies the Cyrillian notion of the union of grace 
and nature in Christ by providing a framework in which the uniting of the two can be 
understood without confusion (ασυγχύτως). The Chalcedonian schema of Christological 
orthodoxy is maintained while the integrity of the individual natures is affirmed even 
after the union. MaximusÕs understanding of enhypostatization is the beginning of his 
many reflections on the paradoxical nature of grace in Christology. Logos vs. tropos and 
perichoresis are two other important elements in his Dyothelite Christology that need to 
be examined in order to see the full picture of Christological grace and the gift of 
deification in Maximus.      
5.3.2 Logos vs. Tropos 
A common theme in MaximusÕs Christology, anthropology and soteriology is the 
distinction between logos and tropos. Given that logos (λόγος) can have a plethora of 
definitions and meanings (word, reason, meaning, principle, etc.), and that there is no 
truly accurate way to translate it into English, I will retain the scholarly custom of 
leaving the Greek word un-translated in this discussion. The logos of a creature in 
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Maximus is its definition, cause and nature. Maximus generally uses the phrase logos 
of nature (λόγος φ ύσεως69) to indicate this idea. A logos is a pre-existing divine 
paradigm and will for any created thing that comes into existence. It is an eternal 
divine idea, and thus it is ineffable according to Maximus, but it also revealed to the 
creature through grace. We will examine this revealed aspect of logos below. The pre-
existing logos also descends into the created cosmos through natural principles and 
symbols. 
It is important to note that for Maximus a creatureÕs logos is fixed and not 
corruptible.70 This is elucidated by Maximus in Amb. 42, ÔEvery innovation, to speak 
generically, has naturally to do with the mode of the innovated thing but not with the 
logos of nature; because a logos innovated corrupts the nature, as not retaining 
unchanged the logos according to which it exists, but the mode innovated manifests 
miraculous power due to the logos being preserved in its nature.Õ71  
                                                        
69 Earlier Patristic writings sometimes use λόγος οὐσίας; c.f., Sherwood Polycarp, The Earlier Ambigua, pp. 
155-64. 
70 Lars Thunberg (Microcosm and Mediator, p. 91.) describes λόγος as a Ôthe fixity of a lawÕ and τρόπος as 
Ôthe possibility of degrees of realization of the natural powers.Õ However, as Thunberg also notes there 
are instances where tropos is understood to have fixity as well. There is a proper mode of existence that 
one should realize according to logos. An example would be Ômodes of virtue,Õ Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 143). 
71 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1341D). 
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As we discussed in the previous two chapters on metaphysics and grace, 
Maximus distinguishes between the logos of nature and the tropos of existence. In his 
scholia on the DN of Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus (?) notes that God, Ôhas established the 
general being of all things in advance, through the preliminary plan of his own 
ineffable knowledge. For the created mind encounters this being [of God] first of all 
when it is focused on some thing, and only afterward does it come to know how the 
thing is.Õ72 Maximus is clear that there is an essential identity of a thing and a mode as 
known through existence. The human mind does not really know a nature or essence 
apart from its mode of existence. As mentioned in the previous chapter, logos and tropos 
also relate to the apophatic and kataphatic in Christ as revealed in the Transfiguration 
in Amb. 10. The tropos of existence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως) is a common phrase in Greek 
patristic literature that generally describes the difference between essence and 
hypostasis in the Trinity,73 but Sophronius also uses it in a Christological context.74 
                                                        
72 Maximus, Scholia on DN (PG 4: 317C-320A), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p 123. 
73 C.f., Athanasius, Letter 235, 2 (PG 32: 872C); Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 3.6.14 (PG 45: 773B). For a 
study of these instances in the earlier Fathers, c.f., Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 246ff; Sherwood 
Polycarp, The Earlier Ambigua, pp. 155-64; Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, pp. 90-3; K. Holl, 
Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhltnis zu den grossen Kappodoziern (Tubingen, 1904), pp. 240-45. 
74 See SchnbornÕs study on τρόπος ὑπάρξεως in Maximus that discusses this phrase in Sophronius, 
ÔPlaisir et douleur hans lÕanalyse de S. Maxime, dÕaprs les Quaestiones ad Thalassium,Õ in Maximus 
Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, ed. Felix Heintzer and 
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Maximus uses the logos-tropos distinction in many different contexts, including 
Trinitarian ones,75 but the Christological passages are important for our study.76 
 I will begin with an exchange between Maximus and Pyrrhus in their great 
public debate over the Monothelite question. Maximus distinguishes between the 
faculty of will and its mode of existence: 
The will and the mode of willing are not the same, just as sight and the mode of 
seeing are not the same. For will, like sight, is natural, and is [so] in all those 
that are of like nature and like origin. But the mode of willing, like the mode of 
seeing, that is, to will to walk or not to will to walk; or to look to the right or to 
the left, or up or down; or concupiscence, or to contemplate the logoi which are 
in things, this is the mode of the use of will and sight, [which belongs] only to 
the user. And the same distinction [may be applied] to other things, following 
common usage.77 
The will is a natural faculty, which is apparent from MaximusÕs answer to Pyrrhus, but 
there is also the action of engaging those faculties. Creatures generally contain these 
dual aspects. An analogy would be the Aristotelian concept of potency (δύναμις). A 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Christoph von Schnborn, Paradosis: tudes de literature et de thologie anciennes 27 (Fribourg: 1980), 
pp. 273-84. 
75 Sherwood Polycarp (The Earlier Ambigua, p. 164) notes at least three clear uses of logos-tropos by 
Maximus within a Trinitarian context (in the dialectic of monad and triad): Myst. 23 (PG 91: 701A); Amb. 67 
(PG 91: 1400D); and Amb. 1 (PG 91: 1036C). 
76 For an extended examination of the logos-tropos pair in Maximus, see Sherwood Polycarp, The Earlier 
Ambigua, p. 164-8. 
77 Maximus, Pyrrh. 23 (ButlerÕs numbering, not Farrell), PG 91: 292D-93A, trans. Michael Butler, Hypostatic 
Union and Monothelitism, pp. 129-30. 
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baby can have the innate potential (δύναμις) to learn mathematics, but it will not 
actually learn mathematics until that potency is activated. Similarly, a creature will not 
be an actual living creature until it acts in reference to its nature.78 All of the human 
faculties and natural powers would apply here, but Maximus is trying to connect the 
hypostasis-nature distinction with that of will. In Th. Pol. 10, Maximus makes the logos-
tropos distinction with reference to Christ: 
And according to the same text, [Theodore of Pharan] conceals and obscures 
[the Incarnation], [for he] gave to the person as person the operation that 
[properly] characterizes nature, instead of [giving to the person] the mode 
(τρόπον) of the natural accomplishment, by which the difference between the 
doers and the things done is recognized, [whether it be] according to nature or 
contrary to nature. For yet as being something chiefly, but not as someone, each 
of us acts, that is as a human being; so someone, like Peter or Paul, shapes the 
mode of operation, for example, by decline or progress, and [he] is formed in 
this way or that by [the mode] according to volition. Whence it is in the mode 
that the difference between person is recognized with reference to conduct; but 
it is in the logos that the unchangeable [character] of the natural operation [is 
recognized]. For operation or reason is not [a matter of] more or less, but we all 
equally have the logos, and its operation by nature.79 
 
Here Maximus brings together many of the elements of the Christological debates of 
the sixth century. Both natures have a logos of nature that operates in their respective 
                                                        
78 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, p. 88. 
79 Maximus, Th. Pol. 10 (PG 91: 136D-137B), trans. Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, pp. 
130-31, slightly modified. 
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tropos. The confusion of hypostasis and nature surfaces again as Maximus 
distinguishes between λόγος φύσεως and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως. 
 The logos-tropos distinction in MaximusÕs Christology grounds his theology of 
creation and deification. Grace is not explicitly used in the Christological references to 
the logos-tropos distinction, but it is impliedÑand also directly used in soteriological 
passages. For example, in Th. Pol. 1, however, Maximus does connect the Christological 
uses of logos-tropos with deification:  
And no one who recalls these statements [of mine] should [think that we] assert 
that the operation of Christ is one. For we do not proclaim that Christ is a 
deified man, but God who perfectly became man, and by the same ineffable 
Godhead, the infinite, innumerable and infinitely more than infinite operations 
of the flesh were, by nature, intellectually animated by a conspicuous 
powerÉHe operates in a manner befitting his nature and he is an object of belief 
because of the things through which he operates the reality of those things 
from which, in which, and which he was.80  
Christ was not merely a deified man but was truly incarnate in both human and divine 
operations and in the two operations together (i.e., enhypostatization). We can infer 
from MaximusÕs language here that the human nature is deified by being hypostatized 
to the divine Logos and its natural divine energy (acting Ôin a manner befitting his 
natureÕ). In this sense, Christological grace is not the extrinsic empowerment of the 
                                                        
80 Maximus, Th. Pol. 1 (PG 91: 36A-C), trans. Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, pp. 131-32. 
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human nature in Christ, but it is the personal subject of the Logos who Ôperfectly 
became man.Õ Grace fully interpenetrates (περιχώρησις) human nature in salvation, but 
it does not alter or corrupt the underlying logos of that nature. Therefore, the grace of 
deification relies upon the grace that is conferred by the fully incarnate Christ. As 
Sherwood Polycarp notes concerning the logos-tropos distinction in Maximus, Ôit makes 
possible the development of a safe doctrine of the Trinity, of grace, of divinizationÉThe 
second, however, is primary, but does not stand alone. In fact it dependsÉon the 
doctrine of the Incarnation.Õ81  
5.3.3 The Natural and Gnomic Wills 
MaximusÕs theology of the logos-tropos distinction in the Monothelite debate could not 
be separated from a discussion of the natural will (φυσικῇ θέλημα) and the gnomic will 
(γνωμικὸν θέληµα) in Christ and human beings. While almost every scholar of Maximus 
finds it difficult to understand what the Confessor actually means by the gnomic will, 
one can distinguish it from the Ônatural willÕ by simply defining it as determinative 
willing.82 Maximus himself defines will as Ôa faculty desirous of what is in accordance 
                                                        
81 Sherwood Polycarp, The Earlier Ambigua, p. 165. 
82 For the purposes of this study, I will not go into the debate concerning whether Maximus created the 
notion of the faculty of will apart from reason in the modern sense. For an exposition on the theory that 
Maximus did have a creative and philosophic understanding of the will, see David Bradshaw, ÔMaximus 
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with nature, which holds together all the attributes that belong essentially to a 
beingÕs nature.Õ83 For Maximus, the will as a natural faculty or operation must be free 
and exhibit free choice (προαίρεσις). Paramount to a proper synergistic anthropology is 
the ability to choose otherwise, and Maximus continues the Greek patristic tradition of 
holding strongly to an emphasis on free will in the process of salvation. The gnomic will, 
on the other hand, is a will that is in a fallen state of improper human choice in relation 
to the logos of virtue or nature. The concepts of the gnomic will and tropos are related to 
one another. Through a creatureÕs free choice to sin, they enter the state of a fallen 
gnomic will. To expound upon this creative distinction in Maximus, it would be helpful 
to describe the differences between the East and West on the nature of the fall in 
relation to the gnomic will. 
5.3.4 Gnomic Will , Original Sin and the Sin that Originates 
Maximus presents his distinction between the natural and the gnomic wills in Ad Thal. 
42 by illuminating a passage from St. Paul in 2 Corinthians 5:21, ÔFor our sake God made 
him become sin who knew no sin.Õ The Confessor begins his meditation on this passage 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Confessor on the Will,Õ (forthcoming). A key issue with BradshawÕs argument is that it could lead to a 
kind of voluntarism.  
83 Maximus, Th. Pol. 1 (PG 91: 12C), trans. David Bradshaw, ÔMaximus the Confessor on the WillÕ 
(forthcoming). 
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of scripture by stating that AdamÕs mode of existence was corrupted from it natural 
design through free choice (προαίρεσις).84 The result was that he Ôforfeited the grace of 
impassibility (ἀπάθεια).Õ Because of this forfeit, sin came into the world.  
Maximus never clearly explains why Adam chose a false good by eating the fruit 
in preference to the sustaining grace of God, but he does affirm that humankind fell 
into a false gnomic mode of existence almost immediately. This is most evidently seen in 
the opening response of Ad Thal. 61, where Maximus discusses the creation of human 
nature not including sensible pleasure or pain. Instead, humankind was furnished with 
a type of Ôspiritual capacity for pleasureÕ that would allow it to enjoy God ineffably. But 
Ôat the instant he was created, the first man, by use of his senses, squandered this 
spiritual capacityÑthe natural desire of the mind for GodÑon sensible things.Õ85 So in 
effect humanity fell at the first instant of creation and not necessarily due to the actual 
temptation to eat the fruit. There is a bit of dualism implicit in this belief of Maximus. 
Irenaeus emphasized the goodness of the physical creation of Adam in the garden, but 
Maximus seems to align physicality with the Fall. Maximus does balance this view in 
                                                        
84 Maximus, Ad Thal. 42 (CCSG 7: 285). 
85 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:85), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 131. 
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other places in his writings with the affirmation of the body, but in the Genesis 
story he falls short of defending material existence.  
The nature of the Fall was also two-fold according to Maximus: the first ÔsinÕ was 
the wilful rejection of the good; the second ÔsinÕ was an unintentional putting off of 
incorruption.86 The consequences of these two sins were pain (ὀδύνη), sensible pleasure 
(ἡδονή), and death (θάνατος) as a Ônatural punishment.Õ87 Maximus ascribes these 
effects of the fall as providential and according to the Ôeconomy of salvation.Õ He even 
says that it is not a debt owed for sin, but a vehicle to curb our mind from inclining to 
sin.88  
 It is from this point that irrational pleasure and pain enter the human story. 
Maximus states, ÔFor every suffering (πόνος), effectively having pleasure as its primary 
cause, is quite naturally, in view of its cause, a penalty exacted from all who share in 
human nature.Õ89 Like Augustine, Maximus holds that this tropos of being is conferred on 
all human beings through the pleasure of procreation. Ancestral Sin is not to be seen 
                                                        
86 Maximus, Ad Thal. 42 (CCSG 7: 285). 
87 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:87). 
88 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:85). 
89 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:85), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 132. 
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here as the passing on of a corrupt nature, but the passing on of a dis-ordered tropos 
of being in the world that includes death and passibility. MaximusÕs emphasis differs 
from the Western tradition of Original Sin in that he still distinguishes between nature 
and tropos, and he does not associate the guilt of Adam with his descendants, because 
this would offend the notion of justice.90 The descendants of Adam inherit a fallen mode 
of existence, but they do not inherit a fallen or corrupted nature.91 
 Sin is also not a legal phenomenon but something that affects humanity 
ontologically, even if it does not ontologically corrupt human nature. Sin is a false 
                                                        
90 Augustine makes a contrasting argument against the Pelagians to affirm the need for the passing on of 
a corrupt nature: ÔBut how do the Pelagians say Ôthat only death passed upon us by Adam's meansÕ? For if 
we die because he died, but he died because we sinned, they say that the punishment passed without the 
guilt, and that innocent infants are punished with an unjust penalty by deriving death without the 
deserts of death. This, the catholic faith has known of the one and only mediator between God and man, 
the man Christ Jesus, who condescended to undergo deathÑ that is, the penalty of sinÑ without sin, for 
us. As He alone became the Son of man, in order that we might become through Him sons of God, so He 
alone, on our behalf, undertook punishment without ill deservings, that we through Him might obtain 
grace without good deservings,Õ On Two Letters Against the Pelagians, 4.6, NPNF I vol. 5, p. 419. The key to 
understanding the difference between AugustineÕs and MaximusÕs positions is to affirm the distinction 
between nature and tropos. Augustine believes that nature can be corrupted (given the Latin more 
tertiary understanding of nature), and thus original sin must be a communication of this corruption. 
Following this line of thought, Christ must have also had to conquer this sinful nature in its corruption 
through death. For Maximus, death is certainly a consequence of the Fall, but it is apart of humankindÕs 
gnomic and tropological existence. Therefore, it is not the essential logos of human nature that is corrupted 
and in need of a savior (for no logos can be corrupted), but the tropos of existence that needs 
transformation.  
91 The logos-tropos distinction is an important hermeneutical key in reading MaximusÕs understanding of 
the Fall. He takes sin very seriously, and there are some passages where he does state that sin corrupted 
human nature. C.f., Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 285). 
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simulacrum of created human nature; it is inhuman. Maximus sees the Incarnation 
as the true substitution for humanity caught in the cycle of pain and suffering. Because 
of the virgin birth, Jesus was not conceived in a tropos of death and Ôa life given over to 
the passions.Õ92 JesusÕs human nature provided the open capacity that Adam enjoyed in 
Paradise, but His divine nature eclipsed the possibility of actual sin. For Maximus, the 
death of Christ on the cross was not a Ôpenalty exacted for that principle of pleasure 
like other human beings, but rather a death specifically directed against that principleÕ 
as a Ôjudgment on sin itself.Õ93 Maximus also relates this principle of exchange to the 
reciprocality of the two natures in Christ: ÔHe exhibited the equity of his justice in the 
magnitude of his condescension, when he willingly submitted to the condemnation 
imposed on our passibility and turned that very possibility into an instrument for 
eradicating sin and death which is its consequence.Õ94 
 Jesus conquered the mode of sinÑrooted in the fallen gnomic willÑthat placed 
humanity in slavery. The Confessor further comments that, ÔHaving given our human 
nature impassibility through his passion, remission through his toils, and eternal life 
                                                        
92 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:87). 
93 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:89), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 134. 
94 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:89), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 134. 
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through his death, he restored that nature again, renewing the habitudes of human 
nature through his own incarnation the supernatural grace of deification.Õ95 Finally, 
Maximus held that Christ did not have a human gnomic will but only a natural human 
will:96 
Therefore, his humanity, not because of the logos of nature, but because of the 
new mode of begetting, is different from our humanity. For it is the same [as 
ours] by essence, but it is not the same because of [its] seedless generation. 
Thus, it was not in the mere [human nature] that belonged to the one who truly 
became human for us. His will in a proper sense is natural like us, but it was 
formed in a divine way transcending us. For just as generation with or without 
seed does not constitute nature, but are distinctions concerning the same 
nature, so too are unbegotten and begotten. 
If, perhaps, the Logos as man had a different nature from ours because of the 
seedless generation, then he certainly will have a different essence than the 
Father because of his generation. For unoriginateness and generation are not 
the same. So will we have [a different nature] from Adam and Eve of old, who 
were also begotten without seed. For Adam was a form of the Former, while Eve 
was a portion of the formed. But the Son is the same as the Father through the 
Divinity, just as we, related through the humanity, are homoousios with Adam 
and Eve and with God himself who became flesh for us. For unoriginateness and 
generation are not the essence of God (for who says this?), so neither is 
generation with or without seed the nature of humanity. 97 
                                                        
95  Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:91), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 135. 
96 Maximus, Ad Thal. 42 (CCSG 7: 287). 
97 Maximus, Th. Pol. 4 (PG 91: 60C-61A), trans. Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 134. 
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From this perspective of will, Maximus quite clearly denies that Christ had the same 
gnomic will as human beings.98 His underlying human nature contained the full capacity 
of the passions, but the actualization of that capacity in tropos was fully conformed to 
ChristÕ divine tropos of being. Maximus similarly applies this principle to ThalassiusÕs 
question in Ad Thal. 42:  
Therefore the Lord did not know my sin, that is, the mutability of my free 
choice. Neither did he assume nor become my sin. Rather, he became the sin 
that I caused; in other words he assumed the corruption of human nature that 
was a consequence of the mutability of my free choice. For our sake he became a 
human being naturally liable to passions, and used the sin that I caused to 
destroy the sin that I commit.99 
The kenotic descent of Christ brings about a new possibility that Adam did not 
have, the chance for a Ôsecond nativity for human nature.Õ100 Sin Ônailed itself in Adam 
to the very depths of [human] nature...pressing the nature of all created beings towards 
mortal extinction,Õ but Christ Ôconverted the use of death, turning it into a 
condemnation of sin but not of human nature itself.Õ101 The substitution that Maximus 
affirms is condemnation of our human nature through death because of sin for the 
                                                        
98 C.f., also Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1317A-C). 
99 Maximus, Ad Thal. 42 (CCSG 7: 287), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 120. 
100 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:91), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 135. 
101 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:93), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, pp. 136-37. 
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condemnation of sin in Christ because of his righteousness.102 In this perspective 
Christ does not suffer and die because of sin, but instead bestows grace in the economy 
of salvation as the condemnation and destruction of sin and death.103 This incarnated 
conquering is what Maximus sees as the Gospel of God.104 Because Christ took on the 
two-fold sins of Adam and their consequences through a double energy of the two 
natures, humanity has a new way of existing. Christ becomes the ÔNew AdamÕ by 
Ôperfectly combining the two parts in himself in a reciprocal relation, he effectively 
rectified the deficiency of the one with the extreme of the other.Õ105 The grace of the 
double mode of the Incarnation of the Word also brings about reconciliation with God 
the Father and the eternal and supernatural grace of theosis: ÔThe incarnate Son is God's 
ambassador and advocate for humanity, and has earned reconciliation to the Father for 
                                                        
102 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:97). 
103 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:97). 
104 Adam Cooper summarizes the significance of the suffering of Christ on the behalf of the world and the 
implicit meaning it has for deification: ÔIn Christ, in so far as he actually embodies the point at which the 
future fullness of human deification is realized, pathos becomes Ôsupernatural.Õ Deification is as much 
ÔsufferedÕ as it is Ôachieved.Õ From the redemptive complex of evidence on display in the the incarnation, 
Maximus brings to bear upon his readers the conviction of the catholic patristic tradition that ChristÕs 
suffering, death, and holy flesh, and, implicit with these, the inherent possibility of created human 
nature, are not obstacles to union with God, but the fundamental loci of GodÕs proleptic demonstration 
and historic realization of humanityÕs goal of union with him, and indeed, the expansive media through 
which he turns suffering and death on its head and brings the whole cosmos to its pre-planned 
perfection,Õ The Body in St. Maximus Confessor, p. 164. 
105 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1317A), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 81. 
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those who yield to him for the deification that is without origin.Õ106 We will analyse 
what Maximus means by the grace of theosis below in 5.5.1. 
MaximusÕs anthropological grace is directly connected to his Christological 
charitology through the grace of the New Adam. The grace of Christ that is 
transformative in the tropos of the believer is truly active to the extremities of human 
nature. Like the prophet Jonah, Christ went down into the depths of the earth to 
conquer death and corruption, and he enacted the age of grace, which brings with it 
the deification of the saints: 
Truly he is our repose, our healing, our grace: our repose since, with his timely 
human life, he freed the law from the situation of its carnal bondage; our 
healing since, by his resurrection, he cured us of the destruction wrought by 
death and corruption; our grace insofar as he distributes adoption in the Spirit 
by our God and Father through faith, and the grace of deification to each who is 
worthy. For it was necessary, necessary in truth, for him to become the light 
unto that earth (Jn 1:9), to be the power of our God and Father (1 Cor 1:18) in the 
earth with its abiding darkness and eternal bars, so that, having dispelled the 
darkness of ignoranceÑbeing the FatherÕs light, as it wereÑand having crushed 
the bars of evil insofar as he is the concrete power of God, he might wondrously 
liberate human nature from its bondage to these things under the Evil One, and 
endow it with the inextinguishable light of true knowledge and the 
indefatigable power of the virtues.107  
 
                                                        
106 Maximus, Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:101), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 141. 
107 Maximus, Ad Thal. 64 (CCSG 22: 195-97), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 150. 
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5.3.5 Perichoresis 
Maximus extends the hypostasis and nature distinction made by Neo-Chalcedonians 
and Dyothelites through his discussion of the complete perichoresis (περιχώρησις) of the 
divine and human natures without confusing or mixing them into a singular identity of 
essence. The ConfessorÕs vision also brings divine grace and human nature into a 
greater reciprocal synergy in his anthropology through the notions of interpenetration 
that the term perichoresis108 implies. With perichoresis there arises, through union, a 
single energy of God and the human creature (in function), though without confusion 
(ἀσύγχυτος). As we will explore further below, Christology, anthropology and 
soteriology really are inter-connected in MaximusÕs theology.  
 The term perichoresis (περιχώρησις) was generally used in patristic literature in 
reference to the inner-relations of the Trinity.109 Maximus was the first theologian to 
import perichoresis from Trinitarian theology to Christology,110 and it becomes a central 
paradigm for other areas of his theology, such as deification. Thunberg even sees 
                                                        
108 In the Latin West the term ÔcircumcessioÕ is used 
109 C.f., Karen Kilby, ÔPerichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,Õ New 
Blackfriars, 81 (2000), pp. 432-445; also G. W. H. Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 1077-78; also the 
excellent study of perichoresis by Charles Twombly, ÔPerichoresis and Personhood in the Thought of John 
of DamascusÕs (PhD. diss., Emory University, 1992).  
110 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 291ff. 
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perichoresis as lying at the centre of MaximusÕs Christology.111 The main issue with 
MaximusÕs use of the term stems from the varied meanings that it has, particularly 
when applied to Christology. Prestige argues that Maximus uses perichoresis in the 
primary sense of ÔrotationÕ around something, and when applied to Christ it indicates a 
Ôreciprocity of actionÕ through adhesion.112 Further, Prestige argues that perichoresis is 
always connected with the preposition ÔtoÕ (εἰς, πρός) and not Ôin.Õ113 This would guard 
the divine aseity, but this reading is not easily applicable in all instances of the term in 
Maximus. I think that PrestigeÕs position is further supportedÑalthough not really 
discussed in the scholarly literatureÑby MaximusÕs contemplation of the Providence of 
God through the logoi in Amb. 10. Maximus counters the argument that God knows 
intelligible things intelligibly and sensible things sensibly by stating that he knows all 
things as Ôacts of his own will.Õ114 This is a very reminiscent of Thomas AquinasÕs 
discussion of the divine ideas in the Summa, but here it provides some basis for saying 
that God is not fully affected or penetrated by the human nature. GodÕs knowledge of 
                                                        
111 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, pp. 23-37. 
112 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 293; Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, p. 24. 
113 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p. 294. 
114 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1085B). 
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creatures goes to the very core of their essential nature, but He does not know 
creatures in a substantive and existential manner.  
Other scholars, such as Wolfson,115 Thunberg116 and Lossky,117 have argued the 
opposite perspective, namely that MaximusÕs use of perichoresis emphasizes a reciprocal 
penetration ÔthroughÕ two subjects, but that the initiation of interpenetration begins 
with God and is exemplified in the Incarnation.118 It is difficult to not see confessional 
interpretations at work on this particular issue in MaximusÕs Christology, but I think 
that both sides of the debate are actually correct if one maintains the notion of 
paradox.119 Maximus presents a reciprocal model of perichoresis based upon several 
passages cited by scholars,120 but the majority of these passages are in the context of 
                                                        
115 Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 
424. 
116 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, pp. 23-37. 
117 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 145. 
118 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, p. 25. 
119 In order to avoid the ever-tempting false choice fallacy, Maximus could certainly be interpreted as 
using hyperbolic language to express the completeness of the union of the two natures. Such a reading 
would be legitimate since he does use other non-penetrative analogies for the same reality. However, 
other analogies or expressions, such as Ôimmovably moved,Õ are still paradoxical. 
120 Gersh (From Iamblicus to Eriugena, pp. 253-60) also attempts to hold the two meanings of circumcession 
(περιχώρησις) together (i.e., rotation of motion and penetration), but his schema is not particularly clear. 
Instead of pressing the paradox, he tries to fit each type of circumcession passage together in tension 
using each of his three types of God-world relations in Christian Neoplatonism: God as transcendent; God 
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divine economy, which includes both the Incarnation and deification. Still, the 
language employed in these passages indicates a penetrative interpretation. Michael 
Butler agrees with Thunberg and Lossky that MaximusÕs Christology does indicate a bi-
directionality in perichoresis, but he uses the hermeneutic of the logos-tropos distinction 
to clarify what is meant by ÔinterpenetrationÕ in the ConfessorÕs Christology. I will 
proceed by noting the relevant passages in the scholarly literature on perichoresis, and 
then summarize following the logos-tropos distinction of Butler. However, I will also 
draw out the paradoxical implications that neither side of the issue fully develops. 
 Butler quotes and translates a passage from Amb. 5 that I believe to be the most 
Christologically significant of the perichoresis passages. Here, Maximus is affirming the 
full perichoresis of the two natures into each other, but he is also limiting it at the same 
time. This is what Thunberg121 and Butler122 refer to as the ÔtantumÉquantumÕ (Ôinsofar 
asÕ or Ôas much asÕ): 
Christ accomplished human things in a super-human way: according to the 
strong union [of the two natures] that took place without change, and he 
showed human operation by means of divine power, since the [human] nature, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
as immanent, and God as transcendent-immanent. This schema helps to organize the concepts, but it 
does very little in explaining what Maximus actually means by circumcession. 
121 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, p. 33. 
122 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 170. 
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united in an unconfused manner to the [divine] nature, wholly penetrated 
[it], having nothing whatsoever destroyed by or separated from the divinity 
united with it by hypostasis.123 
Maximus limits the extent of the interpenetration of the two natures in Christ using 
the Chalcedonian language of Ôwithout confusionÕ (ἀσύγχυτος) and Ôwithout changeÕ 
(ἀτρέπτως).124 The distinction of the natures is maintained even though the two in a 
very real way penetrate each other. A union without confusion is the key to 
interpreting perichoresis in an orthodox manner that does not lead to a Monophysite 
Christology and charitology of grace as we examined earlier. Maximus does not 
promote a view of perichoresis that would involve blending or mixing into a third thing. 
However, because the human nature in Christ is hypostasized to the divine Logos, Christ 
has uniquely demonstrated a new mode of being human (see 5.4.3).   
The tantumÉquantum formula emerges in several places in MaximusÕs oeuvre that 
are relevant to perichoresis. Butler quotes three major passages, but only two will suffice 
to make our point. The first one is from Amb. 10: 
They say that God and man are paradigms of each other, and insofar as God is 
hominized for man through his love for man, so too did man empowered 
through love divinize himself to God; and insofar as man is ravished in mind by 
                                                        
123 Maximus, Amb. 5 (PG 91: 1053B).  
124 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 172. 
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God toward the unknown, so too did man by the virtues manifest the 
naturally invisible God.125 
Maximus perceives spiritual growth to be a reciprocal engagement between the two 
extremes of created nature and uncreated nature. This is termed by Maximus as a 
Ôblessed inversionÕ (καλὴν ἀντιστροφήν126), whereby the incarnation of the Logos 
becomes all that human beings are without losing his divine distinction in essence just 
as human beings receive all that God is without losing their human distinction of 
essence. The paradox is that this inversion can take place without mixing or blending 
in the Neoplatonic sense. Also, love127 is at the centre of his cosmic vision for 
incarnation as the basis of the inversion. Maximus presents the love of God for man as 
mirrored in humanÕs love for God in deification. Finally, there is another type of 
exchange mentioned by Maximus in this passage: mind↔virtue. He hints at the 
revelation and grace of God to the mind (i.e., the gift of theological logoi in deification) 
that we will explore in section 5.6, but this gift is in reciprocal exchange with the 
actualization of the virtues in humans. Given that Christ is the Ôsubstance of the virtue,Õ 
                                                        
125 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1113B-C), trans. Michael Butler, Hypopstatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 170. 
126 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084C). 
127 Interestingly, Maximus does not use ἀγαπῇ or ἔρος in Amb. 7 to describe this reciprocation of love. He 
uses a beautiful wordplay of φιλάνθρωπον (love of man) and φιλόθεον (love of God). The symmetry here 
brings out the Chalcedonian notions of full union and communicatio idiomatum.  
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humans participate in God through the practice of the virtues according to habit.128 
So, to the extent that human beings manifest the invisible God through virtues 
performed, Christ permeates and deifies the mind of the Christian. Maximus even goes 
so far as to say that they are ÔparadigmsÕ (παραδείγματα) of each other. 
The second tantumÉquantum passage is from Amb. 60: ÔMan becomes God 
inasmuch as God becomes man, for man is exalted through (διὰ) God by divine 
ascensions in the same measure as God is abased through man in achieving without 
change the extremity of our nature.Õ129 This passage continues the argument from Amb. 
10 that there is a reciprocal exchange between the divine and human, but this 
exchange also carries with it a limiting ÔmeasureÕ (τοσοῦτον). The union and perichoresis 
of the two natures in Christ press into each other as far as the extremity of both 
natures, but there is not a destruction of logos.130 Maximus does not collapse the 
                                                        
128 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1081D). 
129 Maximus, Amb. 60 (PG 91: 1385B-C), trans. Michael Butler, Hypopstatic Union and Monothelitism, p. 171. 
130 Maximus (Th. Pol. 1, PG 91: 36A-C) makes an interesting claim that the operations of the divine and 
human natures in Christ had an underpinning Ôlogos.Õ This makes sense given that for Maximus no nature 
is understood through expression (i.e., energy) apart from an underlying logos, but he then affirms that 
Christ had a natural energy or operation that manifested itself since he is the super-essential Logos of the 
Godhead. It is difficult to understand how the divine could be super-essential but also manifest through 
an operation underpinned by a logos, but Maximus generally qualifies the operation of the divine nature 
by referring to it as a mode befitting the divine. This is similar to what Pseudo-Dionysius says in DN 9.9 
concerning divine movement of the Godhead as taking place through a mode befitting God and reason.  
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paradox here, and it is paradox that should enlighten this ambiguous notion of 
perichoresis in his Christology.  
The first thing that the tantumÉquantum passages indicates is a logical need for a 
logos-tropos distinction.131 Maximus wishes to affirm that the Incarnation goes all the 
way down into extremities of creation, and also that by an equivocal inversion in the 
process, the creation ascends to the furthest heights of the divine. A contradiction now 
emerges. How can such a complete interpenetration of natures in Christ not destroy 
the natures in the process? Butler argues that the logos-tropos distinction provides a 
model for understanding perichoresis as a transformation into a new mode of being 
rather than an absolute mixing that would corrupt a nature, destroy it, or create a tertia 
quid that would not be a grace that was salvific of human nature. Essentially, I agree 
with ButlerÕs answer to the problem, but he leaves out the paradox (though I doubt he 
would dismiss it) that underlies the model he is endorsing.132  
The second element that the tantumÉquantum passages reveal in relation to the 
equally important emphasis on perichoresis is the need for a full paradox of Incarnation 
                                                        
131 Michael Butler, Hypostatic Union and Monothelitism, pp. 173ff. 
132 Andrew Louth also mentions paradox in a few places, Maximus Confessor, e.g., pp. 9, 52-54. 
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and subsequently for a full paradox of grace. In the new mode of being133 that Christ 
opens up for humanity, there are a movements on the side of the human being that 
transcends the motion and movement of created beings as well: 
Since then the human person is not moved naturally, as it was fashioned to do, 
around the unmoved, that is its own beginning (I mean God), but contrary to 
nature is voluntarily moved in ignorance around those things that are beneath 
it, to which it has been divinely subjected, and since it has abused the natural 
power of uniting what is divided, that was given to it at its generation, so as to 
separate what is united, therefore Ônatures have been instituted afresh,Õ and in a 
paradoxical way beyond nature that which is completely unmoved by nature is 
moved immovably around that which by nature is moved, and God becomes a 
human being, in order to save lost humanity.134   
The task has been given to human beings of mediating the unification all creation 
through the unique faculty of mind, which was lost in the Fall. Through the divine 
grace of Christ, the immovable has been immovably moved around human nature to 
become incarnate. Maximus uses images that are paradoxical here but not the same 
penetrating ones that perichoresis indicates. I believe that Maximus is trying to 
communicate the same thing with his phrase Ôimmovably movedÕ as that of the 
hypostatic union in perichoresis. This is evident in Ad Thal. 59, where Maximus identifies 
                                                        
133 At the end of Amb. 41, Maximus restates the paradox of the Incarnation, but he adds the paradox of the 
virgin birth itself being without seed (PG 91: 1313C). 
134 Maximus, Amb. 41 (PG 91: 1308D), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, pp. 158-59. 
 232 
perichoresis with participation, which is also nothing more than the reception of 
divine grace (without confusion).  
The Incarnation is as paradoxical in the full perichoresis of the two natures as the 
imparticipable God who nonetheless fully shares himself through grace. Because of the 
complete aseity of Christ, who is the eternally begotten expressive Logos of the 
Godhead, human nature can fully penetrate the divineÑparadoxically itself a kenotic 
gift (Phil 2:7)Ñthrough the Incarnation. The priority must be the kenotic initiation on 
the side of the divine. The perichoresis is a paradox to be embraced because it is a 
paradox rooted in the economy of salvation, but GodÕs aseity does remain intact. If 
paradox and economy are removed, then Maximus is guilty of idolatry, which would 
hardly seem likely in this instance.  
MaximusÕs concepts of logos-tropos and perichoresis are significant contributions 
and developments to Chalcedonian Christology, but they also explicate the full weight 
of Cyrillian Christological grace. The super-essential Logos does not come to us as an 
essence but as an incarnate God-man. The utter ontological grace of the eternal Logos is 
united to human nature to create a new mode of being human that can synergistically 
cooperate with the divine life in a perichoretic manner. While the term perichoresis 
would seem to provide a way around embracing the paradox of Christological grace, 
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Maximus employs it to emphasize the full and equal Incarnation of the two natures 
of Christ while still holding on to the notion of paradox in their coming together.  
5.4 The Kenotic Grace of Christ 
In Amb. 5, Maximus asks the question, ÔWho knows how God is made flesh and 
still remains God?Õ135 His answer of course is that this is only something faith can 
understand. Logic is pressed beyond its limits when the divine takes on flesh in its 
entirety. In the previous section we analysed the notion perichoresis in MaximusÕs 
thought as the ultimate example of the Biblical idea of the kenosis (κένωσις) of God into 
creation. The communication of the divine grace of the incarnate Christ still needs 
further elucidation. Although the communication of grace takes place in MaximusÕs 
anthropology and soteriology, it is always rooted in the full paradox of the Incarnation. 
I use paradox here instead of mystery (although Maximus just as frequently describes 
the Incarnation as mystery) because of the conflict that bubbles up when one affirms 
both that the divine is completely impassible and that the divine fully penetrated his 
human nature to its extremities. This dialectic is compounded with the daring 
affirmation by Maximus that human nature also inter-penetrates the divine nature of 
Christ. However, despite the requirement of faith to embrace these conflicting 
                                                        
135 Maximus, Amb. 5 (PG 91: 1057). 
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affirmations, Maximus does hold that in the next age through deification (though 
also beginning in this age), all of the logoi will be revealed to the human creature in a 
knowledge that transcends this present age of sensible creation.136 Congruent with the 
revelation of the principles of creation is the visio beatifica of the uncreated grace of the 
divine Logos, but the grace of the fullness of truth comes to the present age through 
kenotic descent. Grace is not extrinsic to nature (nature presupposes it), but it descends 
into it. In fact, the ascent to God in deification is impossible without a reciprocal 
constant descending of the Word into creation.137 Grace must always be at the centre of 
salvation. 
In Amb. 71, Maximus makes a ÔmodestÕ conjecture concerning the descent of the 
divine grace into creation, describing it as the Ôfoolishness,Õ ÔweaknessÕ and ÔplayÕ of 
God.138 According to Gregory Nazianzen, ÔThe high Word plays in every kind of form, 
                                                        
136 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1133A-B). 
137 John Milbank contends that through true kenosis of the Incarnate Christ, as experienced in bodily 
temporal existence, is the only viable mediation. Neither the perpetual ascent of Gregory of Nyssa nor 
the extrinsic participation in the energies of God as espoused by Palamas can offer a direct mediation 
that avoids ontological limbo between God and the world, what he calls Ôan impossible mediating ladder.Õ 
See ÔTheurgy and Sophiology: The New Theological Horizon,Õ in Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and 
Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word ed. Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider 
(Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), p. 78. 
138 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1409A-12B). 
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mixing as he wills, with his world here and there.Õ139 Maximus reflects on this 
curious statement of Gregory and understands the mysterious descent of God into 
creation as being a sticking to the middle between the extremities of intelligible and 
sensible nature.140 He is not speaking about an ontological intermediary plane between 
God and creation141 but about the paradoxical kenotic descent into creation that bridges 
the gulf between God and creatures, particularly as it will be revealed and 
communicated fully in the eschaton.142 Maximus describes the paradox of the grace of 
divine play in the following way: 
                                                        
139 Gregory Nazianzen, To the Virgins 2 (PG 37: 624). 
140 Maximus will also raise several possible interpretations in this passage, one being the difference 
between the created world as the creature experiences it now and the next age when the creature 
experiences the gift of deification. This is why von Balthasar (Cosmic Liturgy, p. 124) can interpret the 
super-temporal works of God as being those works in the eschaton that move the creature to eternity. 
However, Maximus certainly believes that traces of these future works are implanted in creation now as 
Ôdivine playÕ for the future age of deification. 
141 Maximus quotes a passage Pseudo-Dionysius from DN 4.13, but reads it in a Christological light: ÔAnd, 
in truth, it must be said too that the very cause of the universe in the beautiful, good superabundance of 
his benign yearning for all is also carried outside of himself in the loving care he has for everything. He 
is, as it were, beguiled by goodness, by love, and by yearning and is enticed away from his transcendent 
dwelling place and descends within all things, and he does so by virtue of his supernatural and ecstatic 
power inseparable from himself,Õ trans. Leibhold, p. 82, slightly modified. Leibhold translates the last 
phrase Ôκατ' ἐκστατικὴν ὑπερούσιον δύναμιν ἀνεκφοίτητον ἑαυτοῦÕ as Ôby virtue of his supernatural and 
ecstatic capacity to remain, nevertheless, within himself.Õ The most straightforward translation is close 
to that of Louth Ôby his ecstatic and supernatural power inseparable from himself.Õ This is perhaps a good 
example where GodÕs essence and his actions are not separable from one another. 
142 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1413A). 
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Éthe play of God spoken of by the great teacher [Gregory Nazianzen] is a 
kind of keeping to the middle,143 staying equidistant from the extremes, by 
weaving about and quickly changing oneÕs position, or, to put it better, by a 
flowing that remains still. And this is the paradox: to behold stillness eternally 
flowing [ῥέουσαν] and being carried away, a flowing, eternally-moving, divinely 
contrived to contribute providentially to the improvement of the whole divine 
economy, capable of making wise those who are taught by it to hope always for 
change, and to believe that the end of this mystery for them is that by an 
inclination towards God they might be securely deified by grace. By the middle I 
mean the totality of things visible which now surround the human being or in 
which the human is; by the extremes I mean the reality of everything not 
manifest and which is going unfailingly to surround humanity, things that have 
properly and truly been made and come into being in accordance with the 
ineffable and pre-eminent purpose and reason of the divine goodness.144 
The Incarnation teaches the human being through the divine descent and 
enhypostasization with created nature that there is hope for the divine grace of the 
Logos to stabilize and fix the human beingÕs deification through grace. Maximus places 
the middle movement of play in between God as origin and end to show that GodÕs 
power is implanted in creation as a manifestation of his providence and care. The 
eschatological grace of God is manifested visibly in the Incarnation, and the deposit of 
hope is offered to saints who are deified in proportion to their faith and virtue. So, it is 
                                                        
143 The idea of God staying to the middle is a Pythagorean principle, where the Monad is in the middle of 
the four elements (Iamblichus(?), Theologoumena Arithmeticae I on the Monad) and described as a ÔhearthÕ 
(Euripides, fragment 938). 
144 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1412C-D), trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 166. 
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the descent of Christ through kenosis that reveals the hope for a grace that will 
never falter.  
A key connection between the kenosis of the Logos and deification is the 
unshakable divine will that perfectly deified the human nature of Christ. Maximus 
believes in the Fall of humankind with its corrupted mode of being and willing, but the 
underlying logos remains intact. Bodily existence is corrupted in its actions not in its 
nature: 
Whoever abandons his own beginning [i.e., logoi] and is irrationally swept along 
toward non-being is rightly said to have Ôslipped down from above,Õ because he 
does not move toward his own beginning and cause according to which and for 
which and through which he came to be. He enters a condition of unstable145 
gyrations and fearful disorder of soul and body, and though his end remains in 
place, he brings about his own defection by deliberately turning to what is 
worse.146 
                                                        
145 Maximus uses ἀστάτῳ here to indicate instability as the soul and body become disunified. In 
Neoplatonic thought the identifier ÔMonadÕ generally indicated stability since it is derived from the verb 
μενεῖν (to stabilized or remain). Iamblichus defines the Monad as Ôthe non-spatial source of number,Õ 
because of its Ôstability, since it preserves the specific identity of any number with which it is conjoined.Õ 
See his attributed work Theologoumena Arithmeticae I on the Monad, trans. Robin Waterfield (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1988), p. 35. This is an important Pythagorean principle in relation to Pseudo-
Dionysius and MaximusÕs understanding of the Monad that gives rise to the dyad (or God beyond both) as 
being able to maintain the unity of each of its subsequent division or shares in reality.     
146 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084D-85A), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, pp. 60-61. 
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As we saw above, grace and nature are understood differently in Greek and Latin 
patristic traditions. In terms of kenosis, what the incarnate Christ offers creation is the 
stability of will that is the foundation for the deification of the creature through virtue:  
He [Christ], who did not disdain to be created as man because of the creation of 
the first Adam, and who did not disdain to be born for the sake of his sin, 
showed by his creation his condescension toward him who had fallen, and by his 
birth his voluntary emptying [κένωσις] toward him who was condemned. By his 
creation he became identical to man by nature by means of the life-giving 
breath by which he received as man the image [of God], and he guarded it 
without default of his freedom, neither soiled it in his innocence. By his birth in 
the Incarnation he voluntarily took on, through the form of a slave, similarity to 
the corrupt man, and he accepted by his own will to be subject like us to the 
same natural passions, but not to sin, as if he who was without sin were so 
dependent.147  
In perichoresis, human nature touches the divine through the very tips of its 
being. Through kenosis, the eternally begotten Son exchanges his place at the right 
hand of the Father for the lowly pits of human existence. Happily taking on the role of a 
slave, Christ inverts weakness to power, and He creates divine grace in each of the 
saints by offering a divine tropos of existence unto deification. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
147 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91 1316C-D).  
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5.5 Christological Charitology and Theosis 
The Byzantine doctrine of theosis (θέωσις) has a long history in the Greek 
patristic tradition.148 Originally starting out as a moral metaphor for the spiritual life,149 
Theosis developed into fully ontological principle of salvation. Although theosis emerged 
from the cult of Pharoah in Egypt and later through the Caesar in Rome, the Christian 
appropriation of the doctrine focused on the soteriological aspects of being deified by 
God. Further, the doctrine was grounded in several important Biblical texts. Primary 
among the Biblical affirmations of theosis were Psalm 82:6, ÔI say, ÒYou are gods, 
children of the Most High, all of you; nevertheless, you shall die like mortals, and fall 
like any prince,Ó and 2 Peter 1:4, 'For by these He has granted to us His precious and 
magnificent promises, so that by them you may become partakers of the divine nature, 
having escaped the corruption that is in the world by lust' (δι' ὧν τὰ τίμια καὶ μέγιστα 
ἡμῖν ἐπαγγέλματα δεδώρηται, ἵνα διὰ τούτων γ ένησθε θε ίας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως, 
ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορᾶς). St. PaulÕs theology generally used 
more familial language, according to Semitic tradition, such as 'adoption' and 
                                                        
148 I will also use ÔdeificationÕ and ÔdivinizationÕ interchangeably with theosis. 
149 Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: OUP, 2006). See also 
Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ. The Nature of the Human Person, trans. N. Russell (Crestwood, NY: St 
VladimirÕs Seminary Press, 1987; and more recently, S. Thomas, Deification in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition: 
A Biblical Perspective (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2008). 
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'reconciliation,' but he also spoke of a more mystical reality like deification in his 
sermon on Mars Hill (Acts 17:28), 'For in Him we live and move and exist' (Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ 
ζῶμεν κα ὶ κινούμεθα κα ὶ ἐσμέν). Paul also taught a union model of theosis with his 
mystical statement in Galatians 2:20, 'For it is no longer I that live but Christ in me' (ζῶ 
δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός).  
The ontological implications for the grace of deification were also associated 
with Christ in the Alexandrian tradition. Athanasius famously asserted that, 'He [the 
Logos] became man that we might be deified' (Αὐτὸς γ ὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς 
θεοποιηθῶμεν).150  Similarly, in his Defense of the Nicene Definition, Athanasius avers, 'The 
Word was made flesh in order to offer up this body for all, and that we, partaking of His 
Spirit, might be deified, a gift which we could not otherwise have gained than by His 
clothing Himself in our created body.Õ151 Here, we see the necessity of the blessed 
exchange between the human and divine natures in Christ in order to ground salvation. 
Maximus extends and enriches the Ôblessed inversionÕ motif of the Incarnation and 
applies it to theosis: 
 
                                                        
150 Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi (PG 25b: 192B). 
151 Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi (PG 25: 448C-448D). 
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Through them [logoi] [man] places himself wholly in God alone, wholly 
imprinting and forming God alone in himself, so that by grace he himself 
is God and is called God. By his gracious condescension God became man 
and is called man for the sake of man and by exchanging his condition 
for ours revealed the power that elevates man to God through his love 
for God and brings God down to man because of his love for man. By this 
blessed inversion, man is made God by divinization and God is made man 
by hominization.152  
The kenosis and perichoresis imagery is certainly in the background of this passage from 
Amb. 7. To the extent that Christ becomes human (the hominization) the human 
becomes god (divinization) in salvation. God voluntarily descends into human flesh and 
existence in order to raise or lift humankind up to God, and in short, to make human 
beings divine. Maximus also connects Christological grace and the blessed inversion in 
Amb. 7, Ôhence the whole man, as the object of divine energy, is divinized by being made 
God by the grace of God who became man.Õ153 The human being also wholly lives in God 
by exercising virtue in reference to his or her pre-existing logoi securely fixed in God.154 
Because of the Incarnation of the Logos, who embraces all logoi as Creator, the creature 
                                                        
152 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:10845C), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 60. 
153 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1088C), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 63. 
154 Maximus uses participatory language in reference to the λόγοι in Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084B), ÔFor whoever 
does not violate the logos of his own existence that pre-existed in God is in God through diligence; and he 
moves in God according to the logos of his well-being that pre-existed in God when he lives virtuously; 
and he lives in God according to the logos of his eternal being that pre-existed in God.Õ 
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can ascend back to God. MaximusÕs doctrine of the logoi is just as important to 
soteriology as it is to metaphysics.     
It is important to note the distinction between the triad, being (τὸ εἶναι), well-
being (τὸ εὖ εἶναι), and eternal well-being (τὸ ἀεὶ εὖ εἶναι) in relation to MaximusÕs 
Christo-ontological understanding of salvation through the grace of theosis. Christ not 
only descends to exchange the divine life for the human one, and vice-versa, He also 
ontologically bridges the gulf between Creator and creature that was due originally to 
the Fall, and which still continues in the wilfully sinful choices of human beings. The 
Incarnation (also a pre-existing plan of God) provides the foundation for the deification 
of the creature through free choice (προαίρεσις). Further, deification through grace is 
not revealed unless humankindÕs free choice is enacted. Maximus establishes this in 
Amb. 42:  
Éin order to be perpetually born by the Spirit in the exercise of free-choice, and 
to acquire the additional gift of assimilation to God by keeping the divine 
commandment, such that man, as fashioned from God by nature, might become 
son of God and divine by grace through the Spirit. For created man could not be 
revealed as son of God through deification by grace without first being born by 
the Spirit in the exercise of free-choice, because of the power of self-movement 
and self-determination inherent in human nature.155 
                                                        
155 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1345D), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 93. 
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As you will recall from the De Char. 3.25, Maximus distinguishes between the 
gracious gifts of being, well-being and eternal well-being. Being and eternal well-being 
are the gifts of God according to nature (both having a secure logoi), but well-being is 
due to the free-choice of humans through grace.156 Free choice does not mean that 
grace is somehow not necessary for the whole transformation of theosis to be possible. 
ÔAll the achievements of the saints were clearly gifts of grace from God. None of the 
saints had the least thing other than the goodness granted to him by the Lord God 
according to the measure of his gratitude and love. And what he acquired he acquired 
only in so far as he surrendered himself to the Lord who bestowed it.Õ157 Quite clearly, 
then, the grace of theosis is purely due to the beneficence of God. The reception of grace 
is due to the human beingÕs free choice, but the originating foundation for the 
exchange of such a gift is rooted in GodÕs movement towards the creature. Maximus 
beautifully connects how Christ ontologically restores this possibility of well-being in 
human nature through the grace of baptism a little later in Amb. 42: 
For the Saviour the order [for my salvation] was: first of all, incarnation and 
bodily birth for my sake; and so thereupon the birth in the Spirit through 
                                                        
156 However, the virtues are also natural with proper logoi and a mode of participation as well; see Pyrrh. 
88-95 (ButlerÕs numbering, not Farrell), PG 91: 309B-11A. 
157 Maximus, Philokalia, vol 2, eds. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware (London, UK: Faber 
& Faber, 1982), p. 216. 
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baptism, originally rejected by Adam, for the sake of my salvation and 
restoration by grace, or, to describe it even more vividly, my remaking 
(ἀνάπλασις). God, as it were, connected for me the principle of my being and the 
principle of my well-being, bridging the separation and distance between them 
that I had caused, and thereby wisely drew them together in the principle of 
eternal being.158 
Christ bridges the gulf created by human beings by becoming through the 
Incarnation what Maximus describes in this passage as the three modes of birth: the 
first is the natural birth; the second birth is the well-being received through the Spirit 
in baptism; and the third is the transformation through grace to eternal being. 
Maximus perceives theosis to be a restoration (a ÔremakingÕ) of the human faculties due 
to the Fall, but he also implies that in the age of deification there is a transcending of 
the natural faculties to a mode of existence beyond nature. Maximus would certainly 
fall here under the three-act scheme of Fairbairn.159 For Western theologians, the 
emphasis on grace in the process of theosis is critically important, but Maximus does 
not limit grace merely to being outside of nature. Virtues are even natural according to 
Maximus because human beings have a natural logos of virtue as a part of created 
                                                        
158 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1348D). 
159 Maximus does use the image of restoration in his writings, but he very clearly distinguishes the 
beatitude of the resurrection from that of creation in Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1097C), Blowers,  Cosmic Mystery, p. 
71: ÔFor this reason [humankindÕs choice not to willfully use their created natural powers for the things 
of God] another way was introduced, more marvelous and more befitting of God than the first, and as 
different from the former as what is above nature is different from what is according to nature.Õ 
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nature.160 Being and eternal well-being are also a graces of God, and the human 
beingÕs essential logos already presupposes grace. ÔFor truly he who is the Creator of the 
essence of created beings by nature had also to become the very Author of the 
deification of creatures by grace, in order that the Giver of well-being might appear 
also as the gracious Giver of eternal well-being.Õ161 The Western theological dialectic of 
grace over nature is not equivocal with MaximusÕs understanding of grace and nature. 
We will look at the notion of Ônatural fitnessÕ (ἐπιτηδειότης) for grace in the next 
chapter, which deals with theurgy and Neoplatonism, but for now it is vital to 
understand that Maximus conceives of theosis in the next age as being due to a 
supernatural divine grace. The Confessor makes this very clear in Th. Pol. 1:     
Deification does not belong to what lies within our potentiality to bring about 
naturally, since it is not within our power. For no logos of that which transcends 
nature lies within nature. Therefore deification is not an accomplishment that 
belongs to our potentiality: we do not possess the potentiality for it by nature, 
but only through the divine power, since it is not a reward given to the saints in 
requital for righteous works, but is proof of the liberality of the Creator, making 
the lovers of the beautiful by adoption that which he has shown to be by 
nature.162 
                                                        
160 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084D). 
161 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22, 2:79, 117-120), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 60 n. 43. 
162 Maximus, Th. Pol. 1, (PG 91: 33A-36A), trans. Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification, p. 277, Greek 
inserted by me. 
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According to Maximus, Ôgrace alone illuminates human nature with supernatural 
lightÉand elevates our nature above its proper limits in excess of glory.Õ163 Salvation 
through theosis is a supernatural gift of God beyond created nature, but at the same 
time Maximus believes that there is a logos that qualifies the mode of the faithfulÕs 
future eternal well-being, which is the unification with the pre-existing logos in God, or 
God himself (i.e., the two-fold order of Ideas).164 The distinction comes from the logos of 
nature vs. the logos of theosis. Every gift of God, whether it be being, well-being or 
eternal well-being is rooted in the pre-existing logos and under the creative and 
providence of the Logos. Even though the human beingÕs essential nature also has its 
pre-existing logos in Christ, the logos of its deification and eternal being is a future gift 
of God. So, God offers divine grace through the Incarnation of the Logos, but the full 
grace of the Incarnation (the life of divine qualities) is not complete until the next age. 
In this way, God is both the giver of the grace of being and the author of the 
supernatural grace of deification.  
                                                        
163 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 141). 
164 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084B), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, pp. 59-60: ÔBut in the future age when 
graced with divinization, he will affectionately love and cleave to the logoi already mentioned that pre-
existed in God, rather, he will love God himself, in whom the logoi of beautiful things are securely 
grounded.Õ 
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In Ad Thal. 22, Maximus describes another aspect to deification in reference 
to the natural capacity for virtue and the unlimited capacity for spiritual knowledge. 
He also adds the movement into complete passivity in the visio beatifica: 
For we are active agents insofar as we have operative, by nature, a rational 
faculty for performing the virtues, and also a spiritual faculty, unlimited in it 
potential, capable of receiving all knowledge, capable of transcending the 
nature of all created beings and known things and even of leaving the ÔagesÕ of 
time behind it. But when in the future we are rendered passive (in deification), 
and have fully transcended the principles (logoi) of beings created out of 
nothing, we will unwittingly enter into the true Cause of existent beings and 
terminate our proper faculties along with everything in our nature that has 
reached completion.165  
Maximus clearly presents the difference between the deification that begins in this life 
(well-being) and the complete deification in the age to come. The human mind through 
contemplation (θεωρία) and disciplined practice (πρᾶξις) has the natural ability to 
initiate theosis in the spiritual life here and now through the virtues. Within the natural 
powers of rational beings is the ability to contemplate the principles of created beings 
and transcend them in the future age. In the eschaton, the fullness of the grace of 
theosis will render the creature utterly passive to the power of God. Maximus holds to a 
realized eschatology (but with an Pauline Ôalready but not yetÕ formula), whereby the 
complete potential for theosis is given to the creature as a grace in potential, but the 
                                                        
165 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 141), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 117-18, Greek inserted by me. 
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fullness or actualization of that grace, which must be used by the human agent, 
awaits the resurrection as symbolized on the day Ôthe grace of the new mystery 
arose.Õ166 It is a potency that must be activated by God initially, but proper use of the 
will lies with the creature.167  
Maximus relates his realized eschatology to the mystery and grace of the 
Incarnation as well. He divides the divine mystery of grace into the age of the 
Incarnation and the age of deification in Ad Thal. 22. Maximus describes the complete 
deification of the faithful due to the completion of the mystical work of Incarnation, 
ÔFor if he has brought to completion his mystical work of becoming humanÉand even 
descended into the lower regions of the earth where the tyranny of sin compelled 
humanity, then God will also completely fulfil the goal of his mystical work of deifying 
humanity in every respect.Õ168 The telos of the gift of deification is the full assimilation 
                                                        
166 Maximus, Ad Thal. (CCSG 22: 219). 
167 See Amb. 6, where Maximus distinguishes between the grace of adoption in faith (in full potency) and 
the grace of likeness to God beyond faith. The movement is from faith to knowledge, which comes about 
through ἄσκεσις and θεωρία.  
168 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 139), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 116. 
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to God. ÔIt is to this exalted position that the natural magnitude of GodÕs grace 
summons lowly humanity, out of a goodness that is infinite.Õ169 
As mentioned earlier, the liberality of the Creator does not truncate the 
responsibility of the creature for its own well-being. It is paramount to Maximus that 
well-being be the choice of the human being to live by divine virtue or stumble into 
eternal ill-being through ignorance and vice. The virtues are the means to effecting 
deification, or better to make deification effective. Christ can make practicing the 
virtues effective for deification because of the blessed inversion of the Incarnation, but 
Maximus also sees the practice of virtue as participating in Christ himself. As noted in 
the previous two chapters, Maximus calls Christ Ôthe substance of all the virtuesÕ in 
Amb. 7.170 As long as the human being participates in the virtues through an intentional 
habit, he or she will be participating in Christ. Through virtue, created likeness of God 
is added to the image of God in each person.171 The dynamic and spiral movements of 
Incarnation and deification in relation to the virtues in the last few paragraphs points 
                                                        
169 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 139), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 116. 
170 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1081D). 
171 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084A). 
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to the plan for the gift of Christological grace through theosis as summarized by 
Maximus in Ad Thal. 22:172 
So it does not seem, then, that the end of the ages has come upon us (1 Cor. 10:11) 
since we have not yet received, by the grace that is in Christ, the gift (δωρεάν) 
of benefits that transcend time and nature. Meanwhile, the modes of the virtues 
and the principles of those things that can be known by nature have been 
established as types (τύποι) and foreshadowings of those future benefits. It is 
through these modes and principles that God, who is ever willing to become 
human, does so in those who are worthy. And therefore whoever, by the 
exercise of wisdom, enables God to become incarnate within him or her and, in 
fulfilment of this mystery, undergoes deification by grace, is truly blessed, 
because that deification has no end. For he who bestows his grace on those who 
are worth of it is himself infinite in essence, and has the infinite and utterly 
limitless power to deify humanity.173 
The eschatological union of creature with the pre-existing logoi of the Logos will bring 
about the final divine qualities that transcend time and nature, but the logoi of created 
beings that can be comprehended by the human mind serve as typoi for the grace of 
deification. Through the natural modes of the virtues and the contemplation of nature 
through the natural logoi, the saints can have a real share in divine grace as it is created 
in them, which Maximus here describes as enabling God to become Incarnate in the 
                                                        
172 Maximus actually has four slightly different answers to ThalassiusÕs question concerning the end of 
the age ÔalreadyÕ coming upon us. See Paul Blowers, ÔRealized Eschatology in Maximus the Confessor, Ad 
Thal. 22,Õ Studia Patristica vol. 32, ed. Elizabeth Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1997), pp. 258-63. 
173 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 143), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 118, Greek inserted by me. 
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them. All three elements of Logos-tropos, perichoresis and kenosis are all important for 
understanding MaximusÕs doctrine of theosis. Through the divine descent of the Word 
and his interpenetration with human nature, He can institute nature afresh through 
theosis without corruption or altering the creatureÕs existing Logos. The grace of theosis 
begins in this life, but awaits a supernatural transformation in a new stable habitual 
tropos of being in the age to come. In the eschaton, ChristÑas the only uncreated 
graceÑwill appear face-to-face with the divine revelation of the pre-exiting logoi, and 
God will then be both the arche and telos of the movement of created beings. 
 Maximus also perceives the consummation of the creature in theosis not to be a 
rational understanding of the divine glory, but an active knowledge of it through 
experience (πεῖρα) of the divine glory. The eternal active experience of God in 
deification (even when completely passive, as noted above) is also advanced as a fixed 
stability around God.174 In relation to the knowledge of divine things, Maximus argues 
that Ôrational knowledgeÕ of God cannot exist alongside of the Ôdirect experienceÕ 
(πεῖρα) of God.175 Rational knowledge is a relative knowledge since it is found in this life 
through reason and ideas concerning the creation, but there is also a Ôtruly authentic 
                                                        
174 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 75-77). 
175 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 77). 
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knowledge, gained only through actual experience, apart from reason and ideas, 
which provides a total perception of the known object through participation (μέθεξις) 
by grace.Õ176 Is Maximus contending for an irrational fideism in relation to knowledge of 
God? I do not believe this to be the case since he gives affirmation of the positive 
knowledge of God in his apophatic theology. He holds to the Pseudo-Dionysian dialectic 
of kataphatic affirmation based upon an apophatic reserve. A paragraph later in Ad 
Thal. 60, Maximus defines what he means by rational knowledge of God, ÔI mean the use 
of the analogy of created beings in the intellectual contemplation of God.Õ177 So, the 
experiential knowledge of God in theosis, which is a grace of participation (of likeness), 
transcends the rational knowledge of God. The rational knowledge of God is what 
human beings know of him through the remonstration of creatures (the analogy of 
being). Since divine ideas transcend finite creatures, knowledge of God in theosis must 
be given in the order of supernatural grace.  
5.6 The Grace of the Logoi in Deification Through The Logos Who Embraces all Logoi 
In the previous section, I suggested that in theosis the creature returns to the 
pre-existing logoi in God so that God might be both Creator of essence and Author of 
                                                        
176 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 77). 
177 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 77), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 126. 
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deification (Α and Ω). To my knowledge, Maximus never describes the pre-existing 
logoi as graces, but given that they are ideas in the divine mind this is not surprising. In 
Amb. 10, Maximus evinces that in the resurrection Ôwe shall know the meanings [logoi], 
that is to say the ultimate meanings that we long to know.Õ178 The logoi are the inner 
ideas and wills of the transcendent God, but they are also hypostatically held in the 
Logos in a uniform way, similar to Aquinas. After the Incarnation, the eternally 
expressive Logos as Creator becomes the eternally expressive grace of the logoi in 
theosis.  
 Responding to ThalassiusÕs question concerning who foreknew Christ before the 
foundations of the earth (1 Peter 1:20), Maximus states that other members of the 
Trinity foreknew Christ through the logoi of his humanity, not in essence. The cosmic 
mystery of Jesus Christ was Ôknown to the Father by his approval (εὐδοκία), to the Son 
by his carrying it out (αὐτουργία), and to the Holy Spirit by his cooperation (συνέργεια) 
in it.Õ179 The Incarnation itself reveals the reason why Christ is the beginning and end of 
cosmic history through the logoi: 
                                                        
178 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1133A). 
179 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 79), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 127. 
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Because of ChristÑor rather, the whole mystery of ChristÑall the ages of 
time and the beings within those ages have received their beginning and end in 
Christ. For the union between a limit of the ages and limitlessness, between 
measure and immeasurability, between finitude and infinity, between Creator 
and creation, between rest and motion, was conceived before the ages. This 
union has been manifested in Christ at the end of time, and in itself brings GodÕs 
foreknowledge to fulfilment, in order that naturally mobile creatures might 
secure themselves around GodÕs total and essential immobility, desisting 
altogether from their movement toward themselves and toward each other.180 
 In Chapter Four, I mentioned that Tollefsen and Perl both deny participation in 
the logoi given that they are essentially God and his divine wills. Maximus actually 
affirms the opposite in the age of theosis after the resurrection:  
Only God, who transcends created beings, and who knows what he himself is in 
essence, foreknows the existence of all his creatures even before their creation. 
And in the future he will by grace confer on those created beings the knowledge 
of what they themselves and other beings are in essence, and manifest the 
principles [λόγους] of their origin which pre-exist uniformly in him.181  
Knowledge of the pre-existing logoi, for which creatures only have created logoi as types 
and figures in this life, will be given to the creature in the resurrection. Maximus often 
labels logoi that deal with Providential economy as ÔtheologicalÕ or ÔspiritualÕ logoi, 
which should conceptually be distinguished from the logoi of nature. However, 
knowledge of created and uncreated principles are both given by GodÕs grace in Christ: 
                                                        
180 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 76), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 125. 
181 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 79), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 128. 
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Who enlightened you with the faith of the holy, adorable, and consubstantial 
Trinity? Or who made known to you the incarnate dispensation of the one of the 
holy Trinity? Or who taught you about the principles of incorporeal beings and 
those concerning the origin and end of the visible world, or about the 
resurrection from the dead and eternal life, or about the glory of the kingdom of 
heaven and the awful judgment? Was it not the grace of Christ dwelling in you, 
which is the pledge of the Holy Spirit? What is greater than this grace, or what 
is better than this wisdom and knowledge?182 
Through his doctrine of the pre-exiting logoi, Maximus is able to refute the Origenist 
theory of motion, where the pre-existing henad of intellects that were once in stasis fell 
into being and then movement. Now, the Logos as Creator wills (logoi) the whole history 
of the cosmos before time according to Providence. Body and soul do not pre-exist; 
they are created in being, then progress to movement, and end in rest. At the end of the 
ages, the faithful saints will receive their origin as their end, but it is an end based upon 
the grace of theosis. The grace of theosis is and will be revealed from the uncreated grace 
of the incarnate Christ. Through the grace of participation, the body of Christ will be 
fully and perichoretically recapitulated into its head, which is Christ, and God will be all 
in all. 
 
 
                                                        
182 Maximus, De Char. 4.77 (PG 90: 1069A), trans. Berthold, p. 84. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
As we saw in Chapter Four, Maximus does not separate GodÕs essence from His 
energies. When God acts in the world through his divine energies, Maximus holds that 
the energies are created effects, which Ôhappen to us.Õ183 This does not mean that God is 
related to his creation only through extrinsic action; God never holds back the 
Ô[activation] of his graceÕ184 in the world. The Incarnation of Christ is supreme 
revelation of the uncreated grace of God in the flesh. Through kenotic descent and a 
Ôblessed inversionÕ of characteristics, Christ wholly enters into human life, including 
the assumption of a natural human will, soul and body. Not only is the Incarnation the 
unique event in world history, since it fully reveals the nature of divine paradox of 
grace as being both uncreated and created, but the grace of ChristÕs Incarnation is the 
foundation for the future deification of the Christian and the revelation of the 
uncreated grace of the logoi. In the next chapter, we will unpack the meaning of the 
grace of the Incarnation for the material world and human embodiment.   
 
                                                        
183 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1036C). 
184 Maximus, Ad Thal. 64 (CCSG 22: 199). 
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CHAPTER 6 
   
 
ÔTheurgies are the consummation of the theologies.Õ1 
 
6.1 The Theurgic Society 
In an article by John Rist entitled, ÔPseudo-Dionysius, Neoplatonism and the 
Weakness of the Soul,Õ there is an intriguing description of the aims of the theurgic 
Neoplatonic philosopher Iamblichus to create a Ôtheurgic society.Õ2 What Rist means 
by this expression is that theurgic Neoplatonism, as embodied in theurgic rites, 
resisted the narrow view of many Platonists who saw salvation as accessible to only 
the select few, the philosophers.3 The search for a via universalis (that is, a universal 
liberation of the soul) accessible to all people led Iamblichus to assert the theurgic 
rites of the gods over, but not completely against, rational philosophy.4  Iamblichus 
                                                             
1 Pseudo-Dionysius, EH 3.3.5 (PG 3: 432B): Ôκαὶ ἔστι τῆς θεολογίας ἡ θεουργία συγκεφαλαίωσις.Õ In this 
passage Pseudo-Dionysius is discussing the relationship between the two testaments in the 
Scriptures and how Jesus is the theurgia (θεουργία) of economy. 
2 John Rist, ÔPseudo-Dionysius, Neoplatonism and the Weakness of the Soul,Õ in From Athens to Chartres: 
Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought: Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau, ed. Haijo J. Westra (Leiden: 
Brill, 1992), p. 145. 
3 For PlotinusÕ disdain for ritual observances, see John Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1967), pp. 203-212. 
4 John Rist, ÔPseudo-Dionysius, Neoplatonism and the Weakness of the Soul,Õ p. 145. IamblichusÕ 
position countered his contemporary and mentor Porphyry, who retained the search for the via 
universalis through transcendent philosophy. In De Civ. 10.2, Augustine notes that Porphyry could not 
find the via universalis among the any of the philosophical or religious sects, even among the 
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differs from many of his Neoplatonic predecessors in that he completely affirms 
material reality as the only true place5 for participation in the gods, and theurgy is 
the universal mechanism for the liberation of the soul. Christian theologians also 
posed the same criticisms against Platonism that would merely cultivate the souls of 
the learned few,6 but the Christian affirmation of the body and material reality as 
the location for GodÕs manifestation often struggled up a steep path. However, the 
body is held to be sacred in orthodox Christian theology because it is rooted in GodÕs 
plan for creation. Though patristic theologians, such as Origen,7 can see the body as 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Ôinduction of the Chaldeans.Õ See Andrew Smith, PorphyryÕs Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in 
Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 136-41.  
5 The concept of ÔplaceÕ and Ôsacred spaceÕ in theurgic Neoplatonism delimits an ÔoutsideÕ or Ônatural 
realmÕ apart from divine action. Iamblichus does distinguish between thing and symbol, or between 
place and sacred, but natural place is also where the sacred can emerge. For Iamblichus, the making 
sacred of a ÔplaceÕ is rooted in its association with divine myths and cosmogony. This cosmic aspect 
of sacred space declined in later medieval and early modern thought. For a study on this 
transformation away from a Pseudo-Dionysian and Iamblichian notion of place and on Ôsacred placeÕ 
in early Medieval Neoplatonism, see Michael Harrington, Sacred Place in Early Medieval Neoplatonism 
(Hampshire: UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
6 E.g., Origen, Contra Celsius, 5.43. There are Church Fathers who also rejected or criticized the 
Hellenic theurgic rites, but this does not mean that theurgy as a deifying act is not also implicit in 
their sacramentalism. For a reflection on this issue in Augustine, see John Milbank, ÔTheurgy and 
Sophiology: The New Theological Horizon,Õ in Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical 
Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, ed. Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider (Surrey, 
UK: Ashgate, 2009), p. 75, n. 81. 
7 For an intriguing argument that Origen also taught a Christian form of theurgy, see Jason Parnell, 
ÔThe Theurgic Turn in Christian Thought: Iamblichus, Origen, Augustine, and the EucharistÕ (PhD. 
diss., University of Michigan, 2009). 
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a fall from a pre-existing ethereal unity with God,8 there are equally counter 
positive affirmations of the body. The Cappadocian doctor Gregory Nazianzen 
beautifully describes the gift of the body in his Oration 38.11: 
 
Intellect and the senses, once distinguished from one another, remained 
within their own limits, and bore the magnificence of the Creator-Word in 
themselves, silent praisers and thrilling heralds of His mighty work. The two 
had not yet mingled due to the mind and the senses not being joined 
together yet. The mingling would be a mark of greater wisdom and 
generosity in the creation of living things, but the exceeding goodness of 
God was not yet made known. Therefore, the Creator-Word, desiring to 
display this mingling, fashioned a single living being out of both the visible 
and invisible realities. Taking a body from already existing matter and 
breathing life into it from Himself, the Word fashioned an intellectual soul 
made in the image of God as a kind of second cosmos. He placed this creature 
on the earth, though weak in comparison to other animals, as an angel, able 
to worship God with the senses as well as the intellect.9 
Patristic theology did not see sensible creation as a hindrance to fulfilling human 
nature because from the beginning it was an intrinsic aspect of humankindÕs 
anthropological makeup. Gregory envisions the physical body to be an instrument 
for worship of the Creator, not an object of disdain. As we will see, the sensible is 
also an intricate aspect of Christian sacramentalism and theurgy, particularly for 
Maximus. 
                                                             
8 Origen, De Principiis 2.9.1-8. 
9 Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38.11 (PG 36: 321C-324B). Maximus also cites this passage in Amb. 7 (PG 
91: 1093D-96A). 
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Iamblicus did not abandon the philosophic quest for truth, but he did 
challenge the assumption that only the mind could ascend to the gods and unite 
with them. Unlike PlotinusÕs Gnosticizing ontology of the soul, Iamblichus believed 
that the soul was fully descended into the body, not just the lower aspect of it.10 This 
principle helped to solidify the need for material theurgic rites to divinize human 
beings.11 In his classic De Mysteriis, Iamblichus defends the descent of the gods 
through what I will call ÔNeoplatonic graceÕ in the theurgic rites:  
Granting, then, that ignorance and deception are faulty and impious, it does 
not follow on this that the offerings made to the gods and divine works are 
invalid, for it is not pure thought that unites theurgists to the gods. Indeed 
what, then, would hinder those who are theoretical philosophers from 
enjoying a theurgic union with the gods? But the situation is not so: it is the 
accomplishment of acts not to be divulged and beyond all conception, and 
the power of the unutterable symbols, understood solely by the gods, which 
establishes theurgic unionÉHence it is not even chiefly through our 
intellection that divine causes are called into actuality; but it is necessary for 
these and all the best conditions of the soul and our ritual purity to pre-exist 
as auxiliary causes; but the things which properly arouse the divine will are 
the actual divine symbols. And so the attention of the gods is awakened by 
themselves, receiving from no inferior being any principle for themselves of 
                                                             
10 Plotinus, Enneads 4.8.8.1-4. See also A. C. Lloyd, ÔThe Later Neoplatonists,Õ in CHLGEMP, ed. A. H. 
Armstrong  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 287-93. 
11 Gregory Shaw convincingly argues that the descent of the soul is not a completely sufficient 
explanation of the move to the need for theurgy. Given that the ontological separation of higher 
aspects of the soul were more permanent in Plotinus, Iamblichus more reacted to the newer 
Gnosticizing aspects of Neoplatonism than to older forms of Platonism that did not make this 
absolute divide, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park, PA: Penn State 
Press, 1971), pp. 10-17. 
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their characteristic activity.12  
IamblichusÕs almost postmodern response to an overt rationalism is countered by 
the affirmation of a pure soul and the engagement in the material theurgic symbols 
that ignite the interests and powers of the gods. It is also interesting that the last 
sentence quoted from the De Mysteriis 2.11 (96) concerns the utter gratuitousness of 
the godsÕs descent in the theurgic rites. There are no receptive ÔprinciplesÕ (ἀρχαί) 
in lower beings that conjure up the celestial ÔenergiesÕ (ἐνεργείαι). Though 
Neoplatonic theurgy is a type of magic, it is not a system of practices that asserts 
control over the gods.13 E.R. Dodds labelled IamblicusÕs De Mysteriis as a Ômanifesto of 
irrationalism,Õ and due to obvious bias he instead sings the praises of the beautiful 
system of Plotinus. Dodds summarizes the choice of ritual over the theoretical in 
very scathing words: 
                                                             
12 Iamblicus, De Mysteriis, 2.11 (96), trans. Emma Clarke, John Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), p. 115. 
13 Iamblichus uses a clever distinction in De Mysteriis 4.2 (184) between being able to control the gods 
and being able to control the divine symbols that signal the established hierarchy of the gods (and 
down through this hierarchy to spirits, angels, demons, etcÉ): ÔThe whole of theurgy presents a 
double aspect. On the one hand, it is performed by men, and as such observes our natural rank in the 
universe; but on the other, it controls divine symbols, and in virtue of them is raised up to union 
with the higher powers, and directs itself harmoniously in accordance with their dispensation, which 
enables it quite properly to assume the mantle of the gods. It is in virtue of this distinction, then, that 
the art both naturally invokes the powers from the universe as superiors, inasmuch as the invoker is 
a man, and yet on the other hand gives them orders, since it invests itself, by virtue of the ineffable 
symbols, with the hieratic role of the gods,Õ trans. Emma Clarke, John Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell, 
p. 207. This is a fitting example of divine-human synergy in theurgic Neoplatonism. Humans can 
enact the power of the gods, but only through the prior establishment of a sacred hierarchy and 
sacred system of symbols connected with that hierarchy (this could be termed Neoplatonic grace). 
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To the discouraged minds of the fourth-century pagans such a message 
offered a seductive comfort. The Ôtheoretical philosophersÕ had now been 
arguing for some nine centuries, and what had comes of it? Only a visibly 
declining culture, and the creeping growth of that Christian (ἀθεότης) which 
was too plainly sucking the life-blood of Hellenism.14 As vulgar magic is 
                                                             
14 Contrary to Dodds assertion, the life blood of Hellenism, which he probably identifies with the 
liberation of the soul through rational philosophy, was not vanquished but merely transformed 
through emergence of Christianity as the supreme religion of the Roman Empire. The Greek spirit 
remained after the advent of Neoplatonic theurgy, but there was a renewed focus on myths and 
cosmogony in relation to religious-philosophic practice. As Mircea Eliade elucidates concerning 
myth in general, ÔNot only is all that is told about the various events that took place and characters 
who lived mythical, but everything connected, directly, or indirectly, with those primeval events and 
characters is mythical alsoÉfrom one point of view, every myth is ÔcosmogonicÕ because every myth 
expresses the appearance of a new cosmic ÔsituationÕ or primeval event which becomes simply by 
being thus expressed, a paradigm for all time to come,Õ Patterns in Comparative Religions (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 416. For Eliade, there is a distinction between the cosmogonic 
myth and other myths such as an origin myth. The Ônew situationÕ that he describes is an origin myth 
tied to a cosmogonic one. Therefore, myth is a dynamic interplay between human actions and the 
cosmogonic stories of the gods and goddesses. Every new act of human mythic creation, through 
mimesis, is rooted in a foundational cosmogonic context in which to see the drama unfolding. 
Neoplatonic theurgy provided a religious-philosophic system based upon theurgic ritual in which 
eclectic Hellenism could take mythic drama and convert it to deifying theo-drama. Iamblichus 
himself describes his doctrine as being an embodied ritualized cosmogony: ÔAnd indeed, speaking 
generally, this doctrine constitutes the ruination of sacred ritual and theurgical communion of gods 
with men, by banishing the presence of the higher classes of being outside the confines of the earth,Õ 
De Mysteriis 1.8 (28), trans. Emma Clarke, John Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell, On the Mysteries, p. 35. 
The mimesis of the gods became more than just imitation. Through material ritual, the participant 
was deified and united (ἕνωσις) with their god, and thus it liberated the soul. The Plotinian and 
Porphyrian systems of rational philosophy were transcended through descending into materiality in 
theurgy. Iamblichus connected the myths and cosmogony with participations in the gods through 
ritual theurgy. For Christian theurgy, the eclectic via universalis of the Hellenic theurgists were 
subsumed under the cosmogony of the Ecclesia. With Dionysius and Maximus, the cosmosÑwith all of 
its powers and principalitiesÑbecomes the Church writ large even though the specific rites in the 
Church are retained as being special and uniquely deifying. This theurgic transformation does not 
assert hegemony over natural diversity (as a negative movement), but emphasizes the cosmogonic 
context of Christian monotheism and a theology of participation that allows for the very possibility 
of the affirmation of diversity (there is no true saeculum). Only the imparticipable One beyond 
participation can paradoxically give a share of itself with seemingly infinite variety and particularity. 
This is the brilliant insight of the Neoplatonic theurgists who saw reality both inside and outside the 
theurgic rites as expressions of, and participation in, the transcendent One. Gregory Shaw asserts 
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commonly the last resort of the personally desperate, of those whom man 
and God have alike failed, so theurgy became the refuge of a despairing 
intelligentsia which already felt la fascination de lÕabme.15 
 
It is quite apparent that via universalis sought after by Dodds resides in the ÔpristineÕ 
expressions of prior Neoplatonic systems.16 Such bias has more recently been 
rejected through renewed studies of theurgic Neoplatonism, both in its own Pagan 
context and in relation to Christianity,17 but several scholars of early Byzantine 
                                                                                                                                                                              
that Christian theurgy under Dionysius cuts off potential for a true plural Ôtheurgic societyÕ rooted in 
natural symbols that unite one with their god, ÔNeoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite,Õ 
pp. 597-98. I agree with Shaw in terms of Pseudo-Dionysius, but the scope of Christian theurgy is 
much larger with later commenters of Pseudo-Dionysius, such as Maximus Confessor and John 
Scotus Eriugena. Michael Harrington describes the movement from Hellenic theurgy to Christian 
theurgy in this way: ÔThe Christians, like the Hellenes, have a temple and an altar, but they have 
moved the altar indoors, and the walls of the church now enclose the space within which things can 
become symbolic. Where Iamblichus simple says that the sacred place is the medium for divine 
union, Dionysius begins to explain how this is possible,Õ Sacred Place in Early Medieval Neoplatonism, p. 
12. Christian theurgy indeed grounds the participation in the divine in ecclesial symbols, but the 
scope expands into a cosmic liturgy, which then unified all reality in the Providential care of the One 
Λόγος. I hope to show that DionysiusÕ thoroughly ecclesial theurgy is complimented by MaximusÕ 
natural typoi (τύποι) in this regard because he makes the Church more an image of the cosmos. 
15 E. R. Dodds, ÔTheurgy and its Relationship to Neoplatonism,Õ The Journal of Roman Studies, 37 (1947), 
p. 59. Since the 1950Õs, there has been a more positive assessment of Neoplatonic theurgy. For an 
excellent summary of these developments, see Serio Knipe, ÔRecycling the Refuge-Heap of Magic: 
Scholarly Approaches to Theurgy Since 1963,Õ , eds. Peter Brown and Rita Lizzi Testa in Pagans and 
Christians in the Roman Empire: The Breaking of a Dialogue (IVth-VIth Century A.D.), Proceedings of the 
International Conference at the Monastery of Bose (Mnster: LIT Verlag Mnster, 2011), pp. 163-70. 
16 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). 
17 C.f., Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul; also Gregory Shaw, ÔNeoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius 
the Areopagite,Õ Journal of Early Christian Studies 7.4 (1999), pp. 573-99; John Milbank, ÔTheurgy and 
Sophiology,Õ pp. 45-85. 
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theology, such as Andrew Louth18 and Vladimir Lossky, articulate the position that 
the terms and expressions that Christian theologians, such as Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Maximus Confessor, use are more due to the shared Hellenic philosophical 
vocabulary than to agreement on the content of theurgy.19 Louth and Lossky are 
indeed correct that Christian theology and Neoplatonic theology shared a common 
cultural milieu, but the question is not Ôwho borrowed from whom.Õ Instead, one 
should ask Ôhow do the two traditions correlate in terms of theurgy, properly 
understood?Õ   
 In this final chapter, I would like to introduce an alternative narrative to 
DoddsÕs understanding of theurgic Neoplatonism and to LouthÕs20 and LosskyÕs 
                                                             
18 Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (Wilton: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989), pp. 23-24. Louth actually 
goes into the connections between the Christian and Hellenic versions of theurgy, but his 
conclusions fall slightly short due to a misreading of grace in the theurgic Neoplatonists. 
19 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1976), p. 32. 
20 To be fair to Louth, he does not reject the efficacy of grace in the sacramental rites of the liturgy. 
He does, however, distinguish between the Neoplatonic usage of theurgia (θεουργία) and the Pseudo-
DionysiusÕ usage of the similar term ieurgia (ἱερουργία, the celebration of the liturgy itself, or the 
individual rites themselves), furning a plethora of passages to demonstrate his point. Louth notes 
that Pseudo-Dionysius uses theurgia mostly in a Christological context, where the liturgy celebrates 
the works that Christ has accomplished. In this application of the term, theurgy does not apply to the 
rites being performed. See his ÔPagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism in Denys the 
Areopagite,Õ in Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), p. 435. This analysis, however, does hinge 
around the understanding of grace in theurgic Neoplatonism, which I think would counter the 
argument that the influence goes beyond word usage to content. Also, Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Maximus both see the rites as deifying the faithful (even those without understanding), which is a 
thoroughly theurgic principle. Finally, if sacramental rites are connected with deification and then 
rooted in Christology, which in fact they are for both theologians, then the theurgia of Christ 
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understanding of a Christian theurgic ecclesiology by analysing the theurgic and 
sacramental ecclesiology of Maximus Confessor as found in his treatment of the 
holy synaxis (σύναξις) in the Mystagogy.21 Maximus does not provide a systematic 
treatise on ecclesiology, but such a theological and dogmatic concern did not really 
emerge until much later. MaximusÕs reflections on ecclesiology are also very sparse 
in his surviving writings. We can, however, gain a sense of the importance of the 
ecclesial hierarchy and the sacred rites on the basis of his Myst.22 Following Pseudo-
DionysiusÕs own Celestial Hierarchy and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy,23 Maximus unifies most 
all of the themes of his metaphysics and Christology into a reflection on the inner 
meanings of the liturgy.  
For centuries scholars did not pay attention to MaximusÕs Myst. because it 
was perhaps assumed that he did not contribute anything particularly unique to 
Pseudo-DionysiusÕs own theology of the liturgy and ecclesiology, or perhaps that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
descends into materiality and sensible symbols to deify the faithful and unify them in their ascent to 
God. There must be an interchange between the sensible symbols and the contemplative ascent. 
21 Going forward, the Mystagogy will be abbreviated as Myst. 
22 Andrew Louth, ÔThe Ecclesiology of Saint Maximos the Confessor,Õ International Journal of the Study of 
the Christian Church 4 (2004), pp. 109-120. 
23 John Meyendorff argues that Maximus corrects Pseudo-DionysiusÕ separation of theology 
(θεολογία) from divine works in the liturgy (θεουργία), Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 98-111. 
Andrew Louth convincingly debunks this distinction through analysis of Pseudo-DionysiusÕ 
Christological focus in theurgia and from MaximusÕ own citations of Pseudo-Dionysius in the actual 
liturgical rites. See ÔSt. Denys the Areopagite and St. Maximus the Confessor: a Question of Influence,Õ 
ed. E. Livingstone, in Studia Patristica 27 (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1993), pp. 166-174. 
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the Myst. merely intends to give a spiritual interpretation of the synaxis to the loss of 
its sacramental materiality. I will argue on the contrary that Maximus thoroughly 
includes the body and materiality in his Myst. of the holy synaxis. Despite MaximusÕs 
cosmological meditations being intertwined with liturgical practice, worship 
through liturgical act is always an embodied experience, both individual and 
collective.24 Through an embodied hierarchy and liturgy, the Church comes in direct 
contact with the full presence of God. Adam Cooper summarizes this position well:  
It is precisely as a sacramental, hierarchical, liturgical community that the 
Church is encountered as the true cosmos, as an ordered universe 
penetrated by the presence of God. This affirmation does not simply set 
before us a rhetorical image for mental appreciation, but a profound truth 
that identifies the liturgically constituted phenomenon which is the Church 
as the concrete locus whereby Christ is universally identifiable and tangibly 
accessible in all his salvific splendour.Õ25  
Instead of a spiritualizing attitude towards materiality and the body in liturgical 
practice, Maximus emphasizes the deification26 of grace upon all who attend the 
                                                             
24 Mark Searle, ÔRitual,Õ eds. Cheslyn Jones et al, The Study of the Liturgy, 2nd rev. edition (London: SPCK: 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 56, also cited in Adam Cooper, The Body in Maximus 
Confessor, p.165. See Adam CooperÕs chapter on ÔCorporality and the ChurchÕ in Maximus, The Body in 
Maximus Confessor, pp. 165-205; idem. ÔSt. Maximus the Confessor on Priesthood, Hierarchy, and 
Rome,Õ Pro Ecclesia 10/3 (2001), pp. 346-67. 
25 Adam Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus Confessor, p. 167. 
26 Instead of the Church being just a sub element of MaximusÕ theology, Larchet has more recently 
emphasized how the Church is the locuna for the deification of human beings: ÔIt is only in the church 
that [humankind] could be deified. Indeed it is the Church that bears the power of Ônew mystery,Õ 
which is that of the Incarnation but also the end in deification. To her the mystery of deification of 
[humankind] has been given. For Maximus like his predecessors, the Church is the place where we 
reach union with God, the environment in which deification takes placeÕ (CÕest dans lÕglise 
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synaxis regardless of their philosophical development,27 and he exhorts the faithful to 
attend the theurgic rites, which carries them up to God as God descends down to 
them through the liturgy: 
This, indeed, is why the blessed old man28 believed that every Christian 
should be exhortedÑand he never failed to do thisÑto frequent GodÕs holy 
church and never to abandon the holy synaxis accomplished therein because 
of the holy angels who remain there and who take note each time people 
enter and present themselves to God, and they make supplications for them; 
likewise because of the grace of the Holy Spirit which is always invisibly 
present, but in a special way at the time of the holy synaxis. This grace 
transforms and changes each person who is found there and in fact remoulds 
him in proportion to what is more divine in him and leads him to what is 
revealed through the mysteries which are celebrated, even if he does not 
himself feel this because he is still among those who are children in Christ, 
unable to see either into the depths of the reality or the grace operating in 
it,29 which is revealed through each of the divine symbols of salvation being 
accomplished, and which proceeds according to the order and progression 
                                                                                                                                                                              
seulement que lÕhomme pourra tre divinis. CÕest lÕglise en effet qui porte la puissance du 
Çnouveau mystreÈ, qui est celui de lÕIncarnation mais aussi de la divinisation qui en est la fin. CÕest  
elle que le mystre de la divinisation de lÕhomme a t confi. Pour Maxime comme pour ses 
prdcesseurs, lÕglise est le milieu o lÕon atteint lÕunion avec Dieu, le milieu o sÕopre la 
divinisation.), La Divinisation de LÕhomme, p. 400. 
27 It is important to point out that Maximus does conceive of deification as being both ontological 
and moral. There is a dual aspect to deification. On the one hand, the Christian shares in the grace of 
God through imitation of His way of life (Amb. 10, PG 91: 1144B) by practicing the virtues. On the 
other hand, the full ontological transformation of deification awaits completion in the eschaton (Ad 
Thal. 22, CCSG 7: 141). See Norman RussellÕs analysis of these two dimensions to deification, The 
Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 262-95. 
28 Berthold notes that the Ôblessed old-manÕ is not identified by Maximus. Following Pseudo-
DionysiusÕ reference to his master Hierotheos, which could indicate a fictional creation of the 
Confessor for modesty. However, Berthold notes that it could be St. Sophonius or another 
acquaintance. See Christoph Schnborn, Sophrone de Jrusalem (Paris, 1972). 
29 Note the passage in IamblichusÕ De Mysteriis 2.11 (97) quoted above that emphasizes that the power 
of the gods works on the participants even though they may not be engaged in intellection.  
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from preliminaries to the end of everything.30   
Grace is at work deifying the participants in the liturgy through the power of 
the Holy Spirit as each of the Ôdivine symbols of salvationÕ are accomplished from 
beginning to end. So then, at the centre of the divine mysteries being performed in 
the synaxis is the deifying grace of God upon the participant. Notice that Maximus 
does not base deification during the synaxis on the ability of the participant to 
interpret the symbols mentally or spiritually, which would lead to higher 
contemplation and union. The deifying power of God is a grace working through His 
holy Church regardless of the contemplative understanding of the faithful.31 GodÕs 
grace will never be held in check, and no one is able to hold back His ability to 
Ôactivate his grace.Õ32   
 Despite the similarities between Iamblichian, Pseudo-Dionysian and 
Maximian theurgy, their difference lies in two key areas. First, there is a 
transformation of the via universalis of the Pagan theurgists into the via ecclesia of 
Christian theurgy,33 particularly in the theurgy of Pseudo-Dionysius. The cosmic 
                                                             
30 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 702D-704A), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, pp. 206-7. 
31 Later, in chapter 23, Maximus will make a distinction between those in the service who are more 
active and those who are more gnostic, but the same grace operates in both. He also emphasizes that 
both groups begin with sensible symbols. We will address this further below. 
32 Maximus, Ad Thal. 64 (CCSG 22: 199). 
33 For an excellent survey of the Ancient Egyptian mystery rites as a Ôworld theater,Õ which 
subsequently provides the social context in later Hellenic culture for a truly Christian Eucharistic 
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dance of the Pagan gods and celestial powers gives way to the celestial hierarchies 
of the angels and heavenly powers spiralling round the Triune God and down 
through the ecclesial hierarchy and through the holy synaxis. ChristÕs Gospel brings 
about the new age of the Church (the Ônew mysteryÕ34) and the kingdom of God. 
Now, the Church is the ultimate social, the true theurgic society. Maximus will also 
go beyond the ecclesial symbols to the typoi (τύποι) found in nature (similar to 
OrigenÕs concept of this), which I believe compliments the theurgy of Pseudo-
Dionysius. This expanded sense of Christian ecclesiology to include the concept of 
theurgy truly presents a parallel alternative to Neoplatonic theurgy in that plurality 
gives way to unity, but at the same time it is a unity under Christ, which grounds a 
positive diversity with the divine love and providence.  
The second area of difference between Christian and Neoplatonic theurgy is 
the centrality of Christ. Maximus understands the liturgy from an Incarnational 
perspective. GodÕs divine works of grace, which are summed up in Christ, flow down 
through the holy symbols, but there is not a magical conjuring up of the divine 
works of grace by the bishop presiding over the liturgy. The blessed exchange in 
deification must be due to the synergistic grace of God in reciprocal descent-ascent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
drama, see Christine C. Schnusenberg, The Mythological Traditions of Liturgical Drama: The Eucharist as 
Theater (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2010). The truly theurgic and participatory elements are needed 
in SchnusenbergÕs account to give a full Eucharistic ontology in addition to the Eucharistic theater. 
See Loudovikos, Eucharistic Ontology.  
34 Maximus, Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1344D). 
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according to the proportionate fitness of the participant to receive the deifying 
powers. A viewpoint that understands the theurgical rites to be manipulative of the 
gods would be a misreading of both Christian and Neoplatonic theurgies.35 
6.2 Neoplatonic Theurgy 
The first occurrence of someone being termed a theurgist or practicing 
theurgy (θεουργός) was Julianus in the second century.36 As Dodds notes, this self-
ascribed title was probably due to a desire to be Ôacted uponÕ by the gods instead of 
merely speaking about them (θεολόγος). Little is known about the beginnings of 
theurgy, but most scholars agree that the religious underpinnings of the tradition 
stem from the Chaldean Oracles and the Corpus Hermeticum.37 One the early founders 
of theurgic Neoplatonism was the Syrian Iamblichus (c. 245-c. 325). His religious 
philosophy influenced the later Athenian school of Neoplatonism through his chief 
predecessors Syrianus and Proclus.  
Theurgy in late Neoplatonism describes various rites and rituals that evoke 
the power or presence of the gods with the goal of purifying the soul for liberation 
and achieving union, or henosis (ἕνωσις), with them. Through the rites, the 
                                                             
35 Iamblichus explicitly denies that through the rites the theurgist manipulates the gods as through 
magic. He consistently affirms that the divine powers received in the rites is the work of the gods 
alone, which one could interpret these gifts to be by grace: De Mysteriis 1.21 (66), 2.11 (96-97), 3.1 
(100), 3.22 (153), 3.31 (178).  
36 Dodds, ÔTheurgy and its Relationship to Neoplatonism,Õ p. 55. 
37 Dodds, ÔTheurgy and its Relationship to Neoplatonism,Õ pp. 55ff. 
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participant can possess the power of the gods. As Proclus says in PT 1.25, theurgy is 
Ôa power higher than all human wisdom embracing the blessings of divination, the 
purifying powers of initiation and in a word all the operations of divine possession.Õ 
Striving for divine possession, however, was not a complete abandonment of the 
intellectual mysticism of union that was characteristic of Plotinian and Porphyrian 
Neoplatonism.  
Iamblichian theurgic Neoplatonism sought to give the theurgic rites a 
philosophical underpinning while recognizing the limits of knowledge of the One 
through mind alone. This balance is seen more in Proclus due to the extensive 
writings of his that remain. With Iamblichus, we only have fragments and the De 
Mysteriis, but this is mostly a work of religion and not so much of philosophy. If the 
Theologoumena Arithmeticae is the work of Iamblichus, then we have more 
information concerning his philosophy. There are also fragments of Iamblichus 
found in the commentary on AristotleÕs De Anima by Priscianus (Simplicius?) that 
yields a lot of information about his psychology.38  
DamasciusÕs Commentary on the Phaedo is often cited as a defense of the 
theurgic over the intellectual: ÔSome honour philosophy more highly, as do 
Porphyry and Plotinus and many other philosophers; others honour more highly 
                                                             
38 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, p. 98 n. 2. 
272  
the hieratic art as do Iamblicus and Syrianus and Proclus and all the theurgists.Õ39 On 
the surface this would appear to be a straightforward division of the two strands of 
thought, but in actuality theurgy was more nuanced than this. Proclus particularly 
embraced a division between the lower and higher theurgies that unite with the 
higher world of the intelligible.40 The Athenian school of Neoplatonism, of which 
Proclus was a part, placed education in the theurgic mysteries at the end of the 
curriculum.41 Plotinus and Iamblichus, however, had different soteriologies, which 
influenced their respective philosophical approaches to noetics and theurgy.42  
Because the soul had completely descended into the body (unlike PlotinusÕs 
understanding of a higher, undescended, aspect of the soul) as an integral part of 
the human personÕs essence (also with the paradox of the soul being both mortal 
and immortal!43), the soul and the intelligible world were truly ineffable realities. 
This is why Iamblichus went to great lengths to distinguish between human 
philosophy and the experience of descending divine grace. Gregory Shaw notes that 
IamblichusÕs philosophical position here intended Ôto correct the kind of thinking 
                                                             
39 Damascius, Commentary on the Phaedo 2.1 (172), trans. Anne Sheppard, ÔProclusÕ Attitude to 
Theurgy,Õ pp. 212-13. 
40 For the argument of a two-fold theurgy of higher and lower in Proclus, see Laurence J. Rosan, The 
Philosophy of Proclus (New York, NY: Cosmos, 1949), pp. 213ff. 
41 Lucas Siovanes, Proclus and Neoplatonic Science and Philosophy, p. 192. 
42 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, pp. 108-09. 
43 See the whole chapter nine of Gregory ShawÕs Theurgy and the Soul. 
273  
that fails to distinguish between the content of a discursive statement and its 
evocative and iconic power.Õ44 Iamblichus demonstrated through philosophical 
analysis, and a re-constructed psychology of the soul, why his system of theurgy 
was a valid approach to reaching henosis with the One (or more specifically the first 
Hypothesis45), but he also understood that the ineffable gap between the One and 
the human being could not be bridged through mind and contemplation alone. 
Given the limited noetic horizon of human beings, Iamblichus underscored that the 
theurgic rites do not guarantee accurate knowledge, but they connect the 
participant with the truth as revealed in the rites themselves: 
I have laboured this point at some length for this reason: that you not 
believe that all authority over activity in the theurgic rites depends on us, or 
suppose that their genuine performance is assured by the true condition of 
our acts of thinking, or that they are made false by our deception. For not 
even if we know the particular traits that accompany each kind have we 
then hit upon the truth in regard to the performance of sacred rites. 
Effective union certainly never takes place without knowledge, but 
nevertheless it is not identical with it. Thus, divine purity does not come 
about through right knowledge, in the way that bodily purity does through 
chastity, but divine union and purification actually go beyond knowledge. 
Nothing, then, of any such qualities in us, such as humans contributes in any 
                                                             
44 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, p. 109. 
45 It is unclear in Syrianus and Proclus just how far into the first Hypothesis the soul can unite and 
participate; see Anne Sheppard, ÔProclusÕ Attitude to Theurgy,Õ pp. 214ff. This is in relation to the 
four maniai (μανίαι) in PlatoÕs Phaedrus 244ff: the mantic divination of Apollo; the telestic possession-
trance of Dionysus; the poetic from the Muses; and the erotic frenzied love of Eros and Aphrodite. 
Sheppard argues that Proclus holds theurgy to reach the first three levels of maniai, but that the final 
erotic union with the One is more of a Plotinian mystical union of mind. Iamblichus, however, did 
hold the theurgies to go all the way up through all four maniai. 
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way towards the accomplishment of divine transactions.46 
 The means of accomplishing the operations of divine possession are 
multiform; they include prayers, rites, dreams,47 sacrifices and contemplation. As 
stated in the introduction, the magical nature of the theurgy is based upon what 
Iamblichus calls a Ôdouble aspect.Õ Theurgy, Ôboth naturally invokes the powers from 
the universe as superiors, inasmuch as the invoker is a man, and yet on the other 
hand gives them orders, since it invests itself, by virtue of the ineffable symbols, 
with the hieratic role of the gods.Õ48 The gods established a hierarchic system of 
symbols, but at the same time the theurgist is skilled in accessing these divine 
systems. One can see an interplay or synergy between the theurgist and the grace of 
the gods. As noted in the introduction, Iamblichus certainly held to the position of 
grace in his system of theurgy.  
                                                             
46 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 2.11 (98), trans. Clarke, Dillion and Hershbell, On the Mysteries, pp. 115-16. 
47 Iamblichus makes an interesting statement about dreams in De Mysteriis 3.3 (106): ÔThe soul has a 
double life, the one with the body, the other apart from all body. When we are awake, in respect of 
the other life, we use mostly the life in common with the bodyÑexcept, perhaps, when thinking or 
engaging in pure thoughts, we detach ourselves wholly from the body. And in sleep we are 
completely freed, as it were, from chains confining us, and we engage in the life detached from 
generation. At this time, then, this form of life, whether it is intellectual or divine, which is the same 
thing, or each one separately, it is aroused in us, and energises according to its own nature.Õ Earlier 
in this passage, Iamblichus ties the dream state with the fitness (ἐπιτηδειότητα) of the recipient to 
receive the divinization of the gods: ÔBut dream-sleep and possession of the eyes, a seizure similar to 
a blackout, a state of between sleep and wakefulness, and presently a stirring or complete 
wakefulness, all of these are divine and fit for reception of the gods, and they are sent by the gods 
themselves, and such things precede it, a part of the divine epiphany.Õ 
48 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 4.2 (184). 
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 This viewpoint is evident in his discussion of foreknowledge in De 
Mysteriis 3.1 (100-101). The assertion that foreknowledge (πρόγνωσις) is accessible to 
the human being by nature would mean that it comes into being or exists in nature. 
Iamblichus retorts that foreknowledge is Ôa thing divine, supernatural, sent from 
heaven above; both unbegotten and eternal, it take priority by its own nature.Õ The 
divine source of foreknowledge of future events is rooted in the gratuitous gift of 
the gods in the theurgic rites. Iamblichus takes his argument one step further by 
stating that divination is not due to materiality as such but to the utter gift of the 
gods in theurgy:  
The greatest talisman, then, against all such difficulties is this: to know the 
principle of divination, to know that it is activated neither by bodies nor by 
bodily conditions, neither by a natural object nor by natural powers, neither 
by human disposition nor its related habitsÉRather, all of its supreme power 
belongs to the gods, and is bestowed by the gods. Divination is accomplished 
by divine acts and signs, and consists of divine visions and scientific insights. 
All else is subordinate, instrumental to the gift of foreknowledge sent down 
by the gods.49 
Another question concerning IamblichusÕs understanding of the grace of the 
gods in Iamblichus is that of the necessity for the emanation of divine powers as in 
Plotinian metaphysics. I believe Iamblichus most clearly points to the gratuitous 
nature of grace in the gods while still affirming that it is their nature to give, 
particularly through theurgic rites, in De Mysteriis 5.10 (211): 
                                                             
49 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 3.1 (100-01), trans. Clarke, Dillion and Hershbell, On the Mysteries, p. 119. 
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[Daemons and terrestrial or encosmic divine powers are] our most 
immediate superiors in rank; the most perfect and dominant class of causes 
of the efficacy of sacrifices, however, we declare to be linked to the 
demiurgic and supremely perfect powers. And since these embrace within 
themselves all other causes of whatever sort, we declare that in conjunction 
with these are set in motion at once all others such as have any creative 
power, and from all these there descends a common benefit to the whole 
realm of generation, sometimes upon cities and peoples, or nations of all 
sorts, or other segments of humanity larger or smaller than these, at other 
times bestowing benefits ungrudgingly upon households or individuals, 
carrying out this apportionment of their own free will, and not under any 
pressure from the would-be beneficiaries, making their judgment with an 
intellect free from passion, out of a sense of affinity and kinship, as to how 
they should grant their favours, one single bond through an ineffable 
process of communion.50 
Not only do the gods ungrudgingly offer assistance to the whole realm of 
generation, but also there are several key terms in this passage reveal a 
fundamental dimension to IamblichusÕs Hermetic cosmology.51 According to 
Iamblichus, the gods have kinship (συγγένεια), affinity (οἰκειότης), and sympathy 
(συμπάθεια) with human beings. Iamblichus rejects the horizontal understanding of 
theurgy and divine sympathy that only stays within the analogia of the material 
world, which he perceives to be sorcery.52 Instead, Iamblichus emphasizes through 
analogia the cosmogonic activity of theurgy that interacts with divine gifts and 
powers.  The body and the soul are in horizontal sympathy, but the soul and the 
                                                             
50 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 5.10 (211), trans. Clarke, Dillion and Hershbell, On the Mysteries, pp. 241-43). 
51 Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
52 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, p. 169. 
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gods are in vertical sympathy with one another. Through the theurgic rites, the 
gods chime to the soulÕs intimations of its connection with divinity,53 and the 
descent of the gods in theurgy creates a sacred space where the mystical experience 
of the soul can take place in time and space. These characteristics of theurgic 
cosmogony offer a tremendous resource for Christian theurgy and religious 
experience: 
But we encourage our awareness of this descent not when we merely look, 
but when we act in accordance with the processes of nature, which means 
being alert to the subtle affinities between matter and spirit and between 
one material thing and another. Mysticism is therefore for Iamblichus 
entirely liturgical and located, and surprisingly it appears to be this pagan 
current which bequeathed to Christian mysticism a more rigorously ritual, 
cosmic, topographical and collective focus.54  
 A final aspect of Iamblichian theurgy and grace in relation to Christian 
theurgy that I would like to address in that of Ôfitness,Õ which Iamblichus uses the 
term epitedeiotes (ἐπιτηδειότης), for the reception of the divine powers. Theurgy 
requires that theurgist not only practice the correct rites but also have a pure soul 
to be the proper receptacle for the gods. Since the Liddell and Scott Greek Lexicon 
does not have an extensive definition of epitedeiotes, Dodds offers a three option 
definition of his own in his commentary on ProclusÕs Elements of Theology: (1) an 
inherent capacity for acting or being acted upon in a specific way; (2) an inherent 
                                                             
53 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, p. 175. 
54 John Milbank, ÔTheurgy and Sophiology,Õ p. 77. 
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affinity of one substance for another; and (3) an inherent or induced capacity for 
the reception of a divine influence (c.f., Corpus Hermeticum 16.15).55 The third 
instance of epitedeiotes is most common in theurgic Neoplatonism, and Dodds even 
notes that epitedeiotes used in this sense generally refers to a person Ôbeing in a state 
of grace to perceive the divine presence.Õ56  
Fitness for divine reception can take place in a variety of contexts. 
Iamblichus uses it to refer to the magical rites themselves, to a pure soul, and even 
to matter (ὕλη) itself. In fact, Iamblichus is one of the most positive affirmers of 
material existence in the Pagan Neoplatonic tradition. In De Mysteriis 5.23 (233), 
Iamblichus describes why matter is suitable for divine action:  
Éthe primary beings illuminate even the lowest levels, and the immaterial 
are present immaterially to the material. And let there be no astonishment if 
in this connection we speak of a pure and divine form of matter; for matter 
also issues from the father and creator off all, and thus gains its perfection, 
which is suitable (ἐπιτήδειος) to the reception of gods. And, at the same time, 
nothing hinders the superior beings from being able to illuminate their 
inferiors, nor yet, by consequence, is matter excluded from participation in 
its betters, so that such of it as is perfect and pure and of good type is not 
unfitted to receive the gods.57 
The suitability of the recipient of divine action was also seen as an innate aspect of 
the human being, but it was also activated through the operation of the gods, which, 
                                                             
55 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed., revised text with intro. trans., and comm. By E. R. Dodds 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 344-45. 
56 E. R. Dodds, Elements of Theology, p. 345. 
57 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 5.23 (233), trans. Clarke, Dillion and Hershbell, On the Mysteries, p. 267. 
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in other words, would make it subject to grace. 
 In conclusion, many aspects of the theology and philosophy of mystical 
union with the divine in theurgic Neoplatonism are wholly consistent with what I 
have called ÔNeoplatonic grace.Õ Christian theurgy also affirms the necessity of grace 
in the process of deification, but of course it is much more systematized and 
developed than in Iamblichus and Proclus. However, the critique of Dodds has been 
shown to be completely without foundation. IamblichusÕs own defense of theurgy in 
the De Mysteriis demonstrates that grace and fitness are absolutely required if the 
embodied soul is to engage the powers of the gods. Maximus will develop his own 
theurgic mystagogy that brings a Christological and Ecclesial focus without loosing 
the revelation of the divine in the sensible world.  
 
6.3 Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus on Habitual Fitness 
Christian theurgy also contained the notion of epitedeiotes as a receptive and 
suitable object for divine action and illumination. In DN 4.4, Pseudo-Dionysius brings 
together mental and experiential participation in God. He declares that Ôall things 
desire [the Good]: Everything with mind and reason seeks to know it, everything 
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sentient yearns to perceive it, everything lacking perception has a living and 
instinctive longing for it, and everything lifeless and merely existent turns, in its 
own fashion, for a share of it.Õ58 In describing how the Good extends its light to all 
things, Pseudo-Dionysius states that Ôit illuminates whatever is capable of receiving 
its light and yet it never loses the utter fullness of its light.Õ59 If there is weakness of 
light in something in the cosmos, Pseudo-Dionysius believes that it is not due to 
source of light but to the ÔunsuitabilityÕ (ἀνεπιτηδειότης) of the one receiving the 
light. So, just as the cleansing of the soul is essential for the reception of the grace of 
the gods in Neoplatonic theurgy, Christian theurgy requires natural and moral 
aptitude to be open to divinization.  
Maximus also defines the extent of deification and the reception of divine 
power in analogia to the ability of the recipient. This does not mean that there is not 
a natural fitness for divine imitation, such as the virtues, but that the ability to 
move towards deification is not a natural faculty; it must be given by GodÕs grace. 
Maximus describes some of the natural capacities that are implanted60 in human 
                                                             
58 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.4 (PG 3: 700B), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 75. 
59 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 4.4. (PG 3: 697D), trans. Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 74. 
60 ÔProvidence has implanted a divine standard or law in created beings, and in accordance with this 
law when we are ungrateful for spiritual blessings we are schooled in gratitude by adversity, and 
brought to recognize through this experience that all such blessings are produced through the 
workings of divine power. This is to prevent us from becoming irrepressibly conceited, and from 
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nature: 
When God created human nature, at the same time as He gave it being and 
free will He joined to it the capacity for carrying out the duties laid upon it. 
By this capacity I mean the impulse implanted in human nature on the level 
of both being and free will: on the level of being, so that man has the power 
to achieve the virtues; on the level of free-will, so that he may use this power 
in the right way.Õ61 
In another passage, the Confessor notes how there are natural faculties to accept 
the divine gifts: 
The intellect is the organ of wisdom, the intelligence that of spiritual 
knowledge. The natural sense of assurance common to both intellect and 
intelligence is the organ of faith established in each of them, while natural 
compassion is the organ of the gift of healing. For, corresponding to every 
divine gift, there is in us an appropriate and natural organ capable of 
receiving itÑa kind of capacity, or intrinsic state or dispositionÉIn each of us 
the energy of the Spirit is made manifest according to the measure of his 
faith. Therefore each of us is the steward of his own grace and, if we think 
logically, we should never envy another person the enjoyment of his gifts, 
since the disposition which makes us capable of receiving divine blessings 
depends on ourselvesÉIn other words, divine blessings are bestowed 
according to the measure of faith in each man. Similarly, the strength of our 
faith is revealed by the zeal with which we act. Thus our actions disclose the 
measure of faith, and the strength of our faith determines the measure of 
grace that we receive. Conversely, the extent to which we fail to act reveals 
the measure of our lack of faith, and our lack of faith in turn determines the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
thinking in our arrogance that we possess virtue and spiritual knowledge by nature and not by grace. 
If we did this we would be using what is good to produce what is evil: the very things which should 
establish knowledge of God unshaken within us will instead be making us ignorant of Him,Õ Maximus, 
Philokalia, vol 2, eds. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware (London, UK: Faber & Faber, 
1982), p. 212. 
61 Maximus, Philokalia, p. 193. 
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degree to which we are deprived of grace.62 
In this passage, Maximus indicates that there are natural faculties and dispositions 
in the human person that are open to the grace of God. However, throughout his 
writings, Maximus affirms that there is not a natural potency (δύναμις) for 
deification: 
For we are active, insofar as we have an operative rational faculty, 
productive of the virtues by nature, and a intellectual faculty receptive of all 
spiritual knowledge, unlimited in potencyÉ.And we will be passive when, 
completely finishing with the logoi of beings from nothing, we come 
unknowingly into the Cause of beings, and cease, along with things limited 
by nature, from our own faculties, becoming that which is in no way the 
accomplishment of a potency according to nature, since our nature 
possesses no faculty apprehensive of what is beyond nature.63 
Here, Maximus appears to be talking about the order of grace in deification as being 
beyond nature, which would be the supernatural. Even though the human being 
may have a natural disposition, faculty or fitness for reception of the divine 
participation, Maximus affirms that the accomplishment of divinization is strictly 
by the grace of God. 
For Maximus, the natural is supernaturally orientated towards its own end 
in deification. This is why the virtues are considered natural (pre-supposing grace), 
                                                             
62 Maximus, Philokalia, p. 217. 
63 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7:141), trans. Cyril Crawford, ÔReceptive Potency in Maximus ConfessorÕ 
(forthcoming). 
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but the gift of deification is only through the grace and power of the Spirit. This is 
the summation of the whole purpose behind MaximusÕs theology of the divine logoi 
that pre-exist in God as origin, are at work in the cosmos and enable human 
understanding, and that end in rest in God through their revelation to the creature. 
The logos of human nature is fixed and naturally inheres through grace, but the 
tropos of supernatural grace relies on the free will choice of the creature (in well-
being) to live according to his or her natural beginning and end in God:64 
In such a person the apostolic word is fulfilled: In him we live and move and 
have our being. For whoever does not violate the logos of his own existence 
that pre-existed in God is in God through diligence; and he moves in God 
according to the logos of well-being that pre-existed in God when he lives 
virtuously; and he lives in God according to the logos of his eternal being that 
pre-existed in God. On the one hand, insofar as he is free of unruly passions. 
But in the future age when graced with divinization, he will affectionately 
love and cleave to the logoi already mentioned that pre-existed in God, or 
rather, he will love God himself, in whom the logoi of beautiful things are 
securely grounded.65  
The gift of deification is the supernatural consummation of creatures. Even though 
there is no natural power inherent in creatures for deification, it is their 
teleologically oriented end according to Providence. How is grace both natural and 
                                                             
64 Amb. 7 (PG 91: l081A, C), Greek inserted by me: ÔAll beings have a preliminary participation in God, 
according to the analogy of their creation especially rational beings, which according to the reason 
of creation, are seated in God himself and therefore are called portion of GodÉEvery man is a portion 
of God, but not under any condition: he was created as a portion of God and remains as such as long 
as he moves according to his logos, otherwise he collapses and may return again to non-being.Õ  
65 Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1084B), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, pp. 59-60, Greek inserted by 
me. 
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supernatural without conflation or separation?  
On the surface of things, Maximus is suggesting a contradiction, where the 
grace of God is both natural and supernatural. This is also a contrast to the much 
later neoscholastic conception of Ôpure nature.Õ Nevertheless, MaximusÕs 
metaphysics surmounts both extremes of conflation and absolute separation by 
affirming an innate logos of nature (as capacity) with the freedom of tropos to 
actualize that innate logos.66 Because the logoi of beings pre-exists in God and end in 
God, virtue and grace are natural, and because the Word became incarnate, taking 
on human existence, there is a new tropos of grace that exceeds the natural capacity 
for actualization. All of this cosmic drama hinges around the fact that deification 
and grace are not the results of a fallen creation, or the necessary reaction to it, but 
rather, creation is the result of the primordial logos for deification of human beings 
that pre-exists in God. The end is the meaning and purpose for the beginning, and 
grace lies in the consummation of all things. Grace also works naturally in the 
                                                             
66 Amb. 42 (PG 91: 1329AB), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 60, Greek inserted by me: ÔOf all 
things that do exist or will exist substantiallyÉthe logoi firmly fixed, pre-exist in God, in accordance 
with which all things are and have become and abide, ever drawing near through natural motion to 
their proposed logoi. These things are rather constrained to being and receive, according to the kind 
and degree of their elective movement and motion, either well-being because of virtue and direct 
progress in regard to the logos by which they are, or well-being because of the vice and motion out of 
harmony with the logos by which they exist. Or, to put it concisely: according to the having or the 
lack, in their natural participative faculty of him who exists by nature completely and unparticipated 
and who proffers himself entire simply and graciously by reason of his limitless goodness to all, the 
worthy and the unworthy, producing the permanence of everlasting being as each man of himself 
has been and is then disposed. For these the respective participation or non-participation of the very 
being, well-being and ever-being is the increase and augment of punishment for those not able to 
participate and of enjoyment for those who able to participate.Õ  
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creatureÕs beginning towards that end. In Neoplatonic fashion, Maximus 
understands that a creature, which proceeds from God, desires to return to its 
principle in God.67 However, Christian theology also requires that the return to God 
in beatitude be grounded in the supernatural grace of God.  
Maximus describes the soulÕs natural desire for God by discussing creaturely 
movement (he is contesting the fall of intellects from a primitive henad): ÔFor 
movement driven by desire has not yet come to rest in that which is ultimately 
desirable. Unless that which is ultimately desirable is possessed, nothing else is of 
such a nature as to bring to rest what is being driven by desire.Õ68 And a few 
paragraphs later Maximus concludes, ÔNo created thing then is at rest until it has 
attained the first and only cause (from which what exists was brought into being) or 
has possessed the ultimately desirable.Õ69 The creature naturally desires that the end 
which is the first principle of all things.70  
So, in terms of the traditional Western dialectic of nature vs. graceÑ
                                                             
67 This is also an important aspect of AquinasÕ metaphysics, Summa Theologica I. Q. 12 a. 1: ÔFor the 
ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; 
since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle.Õ 
68 Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1069B), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 46. 
69 Amb. 7 (PG 91: 1071C), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 49. 
70 In Ad Thal. 61 (CCSG 22:  85), Maximus states that the first man, Adam, squandered his spiritual 
capacity on sensible things. The capacity he is referring to is Ôthe natural desire of the mind of GodÕ 
(φύσιν τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἔφεσιν). 
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although one should be cautious of putting MaximusÕs thought in the same 
dialecticÑMaximus surmounts both the conflation and the separation of grace with 
nature. Maximus understands human beings to possess an innate capacity for virtue 
(which are natural and presuppose grace), but that there are habitudes that must be 
activated by the divine to reach the exceedingly supernatural grace of deification. 
Maximus makes this quite clear in Ad Thal. 6 when he discusses the grace of baptism. 
He says that the manner of birth is two-fold: the first is the grace of adoption, which 
is present in potency (δυνάμει); the second is the grace of the active exertion (κατ' 
ἐνέργειαν) on the deliberative will (γνωμικῶς) to be reoriented to God.71 Maximus 
relates the first birth as a grace of faith in potency, but the second grace is beyond 
faith where the divine likeness is implanted in the creature. Grace does not destroy 
or override human nature (in other words, its logos), but it carries the human being 
beyond the capacities of nature and into beatitude.   
6.4 Maximus and Theurgy 
The Myst. of Maximus begins with a humble affirmation of the greatness of 
Pseudo-DionysiusÕs own mystagogy according to the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and 
Celestial Hierarchy. Maximus notes that he does not intend to duplicate Pseudo-
DionysiusÕs luminous theological insights. Throughout the whole book, Maximus 
brings together Pseudo-DionysiusÕs mystagogy into his own reflections on the 
                                                             
71 Maximus, Ad Thal. 6 CCSG 7: 69). 
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liturgy so that he can explicate the rich spiritual meanings that lie behind and in the 
rites, which will guide the participants to understand the deifying cosmic drama 
that is being unfolded before them and through them. Although Maximus engages 
in a spiritual contemplation on the meaning and symbols (σύμβολον) of the rites 
performed during the holy synaxis, he also affirms the deifying effect that 
participation has on the material acts of worship. This moves Maximus towards a 
more theurgical ecclesiological perspective. 
6.4.1 The Linguistic Connection  
Before delving into the substance of the Myst., the issue of the connection between 
contemplation, sacramentalism and theurgy needs to be established in MaximusÕs 
theology. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, Maximus does not develop 
his ecclesiology with systematic clarity in the Myst., but he does elucidate it in his 
discussion of the ChurchÕs liturgical mystagogy.  
The Confessor does not use the word theurgy (θεουργία) in the Myst., but he 
does use it several times in Ad Thal. 22 in the context of a discussion of how human 
beings are unable naturally to induce deification in themselves; for deification is an 
act of GodÕs grace that the faithful must suffer (πάθος) in their manner of existing, 
not in their nature or logos. In the resurrection, the faithful will Ôundergo the 
transformation unto deification and no longer be active but passiveÉat this point 
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our passion will be supernatural, and there will be no principle restrictive of the 
divine works in infinitely deifying those who are passive to it.Õ72 The divine works of 
God will be fully demonstrated in the resurrection when the creatures will move to 
a completely supernatural mode of being. As stated in our discussion of Neoplatonic 
theurgy and natural fitness, Maximus understands human beings to be naturally 
orientated towards their supernatural end in union with God, but also that they do 
not contain the principle of their own deification. There are several gifts of grace, 
such as baptism, that only implant a potency in individuals. 
Generally, Maximus uses theurgy in reference to the Incarnation itself and the 
miracles that Christ performed. In Amb. 10, the Confessor states, Ô...out of his love for 
humankind he grants to human beings intimations of Himself in the manifest divine 
works performed in the flesh.Õ73 This usage in the Ad Thal. 22 and the Amb. 10 is in 
accord with the way in which Pseudo-Dionysius uses theurgy in the Ecclesiastical 
Hierarchy and Celestial Hierarchy.  
Pseudo-Dionysius uses the term theurgy thirteen times in the EH, and it mostly 
refer to the works or actions of Christ working through the sacraments instead of 
the actions specifically of the priest, which is the general function of the theurgist 
                                                             
72 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 141), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 117, slightly modified. 
73 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1168A): Ôδυναμένης πειρίας τὰς ἐκφανεῖς διὰ σαρκός θεουργίας νθρώποις 
παρέχειν φιλανθρώπως μηνύματα.Õ 
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in Iamblichus.74 It is also used as an adjective (generally in the plural), which differs 
from Pagan usages where it generally appears as a noun (e.g., a theurgist).75  
Pseudo-Dionysius is careful to use theurgy when speaking about GodÕs acts in 
the liturgy and using ieurgia (ἰερουργία, rites/service) for the celebration of the 
actual liturgy.76 Andrew Louth argues that instead of Christian theurgic acts (as 
celebrated in the liturgy) being efficacious in a performative sense,77 as pagan ones 
were, they are efficacious in the sense that they are understood.78 Performing the 
sacred rites, Ôprovides a display of sacred symbols, the understanding of which 
raises us to contemplation.Õ79 Louth further adds that this is not the complete story, 
and that if a thorough analysis is done on the Ecclesial Hierarchy, one will find that 
divine uplifting (ἀναγωγή) in the liturgy to contemplation is paired with the results 
of the uplifting: fellowship (κοινωνία) and deification (θέωσις).80 These are the gifts 
from God by grace that are given to the celebrant to be offered back in praise. In 
                                                             
74 E.g., Ôἀνδρικῆς τοῦ 'Ιησοῦ θεουργίας,Õ CH 4.4 (PG 3: 181B). See Andrew Louth, ÔPagan Theurgy and 
Christian Sacramentalism,Õ pp. 434ff. 
75 Andrew Louth, ÔPagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism,Õ p. 434. 
76 Andrew Louth, ÔPagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism,Õ p. 435. 
77 Though as we learned above, making such a clean identification of magic and theurgy in 
Iamblichus is not tenable. There is an element of the godsÕ freedom of action throughout IamblichusÕ 
De Mysteriis. 
78 Andrew Louth, ÔPagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism,Õ p. 435. 
79 Andrew Louth, ÔPagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism,Õ p. 435. 
80 Andrew Louth, ÔPagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism,Õ p. 437 
290  
this reading of theurgy in Pseudo-Dionysius, there is a real sense in which 
sacramentalism can be both participatory and efficacious when experienced as a 
whole. 
Though there are not direct linguistic references to theurgy (θεουργία) in 
MaximusÕs Myst., there are other words that point to a Pseudo-Dionysian 
understanding of Christian theurgy. In Myst. 2, Maximus describes the symbolic 
nature of the nave and sanctuary. ÔThe nave is the sanctuary in potency by the 
consecration of the sacrament being sacredly performed (μυσταγωγίας 
ἰερουργούμενον) towards its end, and in turn the sanctuary is the nave in act by 
possessing the principles of its own sacrament, which has itself as its beginning.Õ81 
According to Berthold, the word mystagogy (μυσταγωγία) is in this instance a 
Ôsacrament,Õ which would have had a technical meaning in Byzantine worship at the 
time.82 Berthold describes mystagogy in general (and the title of the work by 
Maximus) as a Ôliturgical contemplation on the mystery of the Church,Õ83 but the 
                                                             
81 Maximus, Myst. 2 (PG 91: 668D): Ôἱερατεῖον μ ὲν τ ὸν να ὸν κατὰ τὴν δ ύναμιν, τ ῇ πρὸς τ ὸ πέρας 
ἀναφορᾷ τῆς μυσταγωγίας ἱερουργούμενον, καὶ ἔμπαλιν ναὸν τὸ ἱερατεῖον κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς 
ἰδίας αὐτὸν ἔχον μυσταγωγίας ἀρχήν.Õ 
82 George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 217, n. 33. He is using this translation based upon the 
observations of R. Bornert, whom he cites in the endnote, Les Commentaires Byzantins de la divine 
liturgie du VIIe au XVe sicles (Paris: 1966), p. 29-31. 
83 George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 214, n. 1. The architecture of Byzantine churches changed 
significantly during the reign of Justinian and the building of Hagia Sophia. By the time of MaximusÕ 
Myst., the connection between liturgy and mystagogy to explain theologically both the rites and the 
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main aspect to this term in Hellenism is an Ôinitiation into divine mysteries.Õ 84 The 
idea of initiation does place a more emphasis on the rites themselves. There is for 
Maximus a mystery contemplated and a union being completed through the holy 
rites of the synaxis. The mystagogy leads to contemplation of the mysteries lying 
within it, but it is not a contemplation abstracted from bodily engagement. The 
definition of Ôliturgical contemplationÕ is certainly a reasonable start for 
understanding the full picture of worship in the Myst., but Maximus exhorts the 
faithful to Ôfrequent GodÕs holy ChurchÕ85 because of the deifying grace accomplished 
through the synaxis, especially the sacrament (μυσταγωγία) that transforms the 
nave figuratively into the sanctuary. Maximus connects the mysteries with an 
embodied liturgical act. It seems likely that mystagogy in MaximusÕs thought could 
be understood as the Christian version of the theurgic mystical system of union 
with God through grace as found in late Neoplatonism. 
Given the two specific uses of mystagogy in the Myst., we are left to fill in the 
details of this statement with the help of other passages in the work. However, in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
architecture of the building was current in Byzantine religious culture. See Robert Taft, The Byantine 
Rite: A Short History (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1992), pp. 28-38. 
84 G. W. H. Lampe, Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 890-91. 
85 Maximus, Myst. 24. 
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Neoplatonic theurgic literature, mystagogy is a synonym for the system of theurgy.86 
Maximus might have been familiar with the Neoplatonic uses of mystagogy, but he is 
obviously here using it in a Christian sense to refer to the mystery of the Eucharist 
and the whole sacramental mystical system of the synaxis. Mystagogy is coupled with 
ierurgia (ἰερουργία, as the participle ἰερουργούμενον, Ôbeing sacramentalÕ) in Myst. 2, 
which Pseudo-Dionysius uses more often for the celebration of the liturgical rites 
themselves. In MaximusÕs Myst., ierurgia is also used for the ÔsacramentsÕ as practiced 
in the Church. Maximus is describing the veiled mystery of the Church through 
                                                             
86 E.g., Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 1.1 (4), trans. Emma Clarke, John Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell, On the 
Mysteries, p. 7: ÔSome questions, then, call for the clarification of issues which have been wrongly 
confused, while others concern the reason why various things are the way they are, and are thought 
of in such a way; others, again, draw oneÕs attention in both directions at once, since they contain an 
inherent contradiction; and still others call for an exposition of our whole mystical system 
(μυσταγωγίαν).Õ In this passage Iamblichus is using μυσταγωγίαν as a synonym for the system of 
theurgy that he is proposing to Hermes. Proclus also uses this word as a synonym for theurgy in In 
Parmenides 5 (993) and On Platonic Theology 1.25-26. For the use of mystagogy in Proclus, see Trouillard, 
La Mystagogie de Proclos, (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1982). Finally, Damascius uses μυσταγωγίαν in the 
same manner in De Principiis 131. A θεουργία can include many different types of practices from 
contemplation, to prayers and sacrifices. The goal of the θεουργία is to prepare the soul for the 
divinizing powers of the gods; see Paulina Remes, Neoplatonism, pp. 170-73. This is why Iamblichus 
offered his own μυσταγωγία on the symbols of the Egyptian religious cult as a defense of theurgy in 
De Mysteriis 7.1 (250), trans. Emma Clarke, John Dillion, and Jackson Hershbell, On the Mysteries, p. 291: 
ÔI would like to explain to you the mode of theology practiced by the Egyptians. For these people, 
imitating the nature of the universe and the demiurgic power of the gods, display certain signs of 
mystical (μυστιχῶν), arcane and invisible intellections by means of symbols, just as nature copies the 
unseen principles in visible forms through some mode of symbolism, and the creative activity of the 
gods indicates the truth of the forms in visible signs.Õ Maximus emphasizes the dual function of 
created intelligible and sensible symbols in chapter two of the Myst.. Though his focus is upon 
contemplation on the meaning of the liturgy, Maximus sees the sensible typoi and symbols as the 
beginning of the movement to the intelligible causes of all creation (logoi) with the final movement 
beyond intellection and sense (though still embodied), which is the visio beatifica and union with God. 
So, in this sense MaximusÕ Mystagogy is very much a theurgy. 
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symbols and signs, but the rites themselvesÑand, in this passage in Myst. 2, the 
physical worship spaceÑalso includes a participatory element that deifies according 
to grace. Therefore, there is a great deal of commonality with the Iamblichian 
understanding of theurgy, whereby the body in material ritual act is a mediating 
conduit to the ascent of the soul and the participation in the divine works of the 
gods.  
Another usage of ierurgia appears in Myst. 21: ÔThe profession ÔOne is HolyÕ and 
what follows, which is voiced by all the people at the end of the mystical service 
(μυστικῆς ἰερουργίας), represents the gathering and union beyond reason and 
understanding.Õ87 The symbolism at this point in the liturgy (in which the Eucharist 
is consecrated here) is that of the eschaton when all will be united in Ôthe 
mysterious oneness of the divine simplicity in the incorruptible age of the spiritual 
world.Õ88 At the beginning of this chapter Maximus is speaking about the singing of 
the hymn ÔOne is Holy,Õ and how it represents the future unity the eschaton, but at 
the end of the chapter Maximus mentions the Eucharist and how it changes the 
participant, which emphasizes the connection between sacramental rite, 
embodiment and deification: 
                                                             
87 Maximus, Myst. 21 (PG 91: 697A), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 203. 
88 Maximus, Myst. 21 (PG 91: 697A), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 203. 
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After this [the profession of the ÔOne is HolyÕ], as the climax of everything, 
comes the distribution of the sacrament (μυστήριον), which transforms into 
itself and renders similar to the causal good by grace and participation those 
who worthily share in it. To them is there lacking nothing of this good that is 
possible and attainable for men, so that they also can be and be called gods 
by adoption through grace because all of God entirely fills them and leaves 
no part of them empty of his presence.89 
Maximus is describing the gift of adoption and deification that is received during 
the Eucharist.90 The μυστηρίον in this passage is the Eucharistic meal that 
Ôtransforms into itselfÕ (μεταποιοῦσα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν) the participant and renders him 
or her Ôsimilar to the causal good by grace and participationÕ (ὁμοίους τῷ κατ᾽ αἰτίαν 
ἀγαθῷ κατὰ χάριν καὶ μέθεξιν). One could not get a clearer picture of the efficacious 
nature of the Eucharist. The transformation that takes place is a participation in 
God, through grace, which comes about through the partaking of the sacred meal. 
MaximusÕs theurgic Eucharistic presence as that which deifies and connects the 
participant with God through grace is modelled on the Christian theurgy found in 
the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and Celestial Hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius, though with a 
stronger Christological centre and realism. I would argue that it is similarly the 
participatory model of deification found in IamblichusÕs theurgy, though with a 
                                                             
89 Myst. 21 (PG 91: 696D), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 203. 
90 Lars Thunberg gives an examination of the real presence (as opposed to merely a σύμβολον) of 
Christ in the Eucharist in ÔSymbol and Presence in St. Maximus the Confessor,Õ in Maximus Confessor: 
Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, ed. Felix Heintzer and 
Christoph von Schnborn, Paradosis: tudes de literature et de thologie anciennes 27 (Fribourg: 
1980), pp. 285-308.  
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Christological and an ecclesial centre. The Eucharistic meal is a mediated grace that 
is fully a participation in the divine. Such a ritual does not conjure up the divine 
power, but the particular ritual of the Eucharist is a fully deifying descent of the 
Holy Spirit that in reciprocal movement draws the body of Christ up to the 
Godhead, this foreshadows what will be experienced in the resurrection.  
The Pseudo-Dionysian ÔfellowshipÕ that results from the divine acts of God 
that are described in the Mystagogia is connected with the gift of deification that 
takes place in the Eucharist. ÔBy Holy communion of the spotless and life-giving 
mysteries we are given fellowship (κοινωνία) and identity with him by participation 
in likeness, by which man is deemed worthy from man to become God.Õ91 The gift of 
fellowship and participation in likeness to God is not just a treasure to be obtained 
at the end of all things; Maximus also affirms through the ÔOne is holyÕ that Ôin this 
present life we already have a share in these gifts of the Holy Spirit through the love 
that is in faith.Õ92 The unification and deification of the faithful is not just a mental 
contemplation observed through holy rituals and symbols, but it is a real embodied 
sharing in the grace of God that awaits fulfilment with the resurrection of the 
faithful and the second coming of Christ. The symbols found within the rites of the 
synaxis connect with the divine in a mysterious way. 
                                                             
91 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 704A), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 207. 
92 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 704A), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 207. 
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6.4.2 The Grace of Materiality and the Grace of Vision 
Though a major reading of the Myst. is oriented towards the spiritual contemplation 
of the invisible and intelligible pole of reality symbolized in the sanctuary, there is 
also the theurgic participatory pole of visible and sensible reality as experienced in 
worship and represented by the nave.93 MaximusÕs theurgy is not based upon any 
kind of magical manipulative rites; it is a Christian one that is rooted in Pseudo-
Dionysian fashion in the liturgical celebration of the acts of God in embodied rites 
that results in contemplative uplifting, κοινωνία, and deification by grace.  
The sensible symbols and images contained in the Myst. of the synaxis of the 
Church according to Maximus are far from a Gnosticizing spiritualization of 
embodiment or the liturgical practices of the synaxis. Quite the opposite, Maximus 
fully embraces the active engagement of the body in the spiritual ascent to God.94 
                                                             
93 Maximus is not exempt from a critique of dualism. The mind, or nous, is strongly emphasized in his 
ascetic spirituality. This is mostly like due to the influences of Origen and Evagrius on his own 
theology. An example of an exclusive focus on the mind can be observed at Amb. 10 (PG: 91: 1196A), 
trans. Louth, Maximus Confessor, p. 147: ÔWhen they have completely shaken off the senses and 
everything perceived through them by means of the activity that relates and inclines it to them, 
their soul can be ineffably assimilated to God by means of the mind alone, and wholly united to him 
alone ineffably, so that possessing the image of the archetype according to the likeness in mind and 
reason and spirit.Õ 
94 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1088C), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 63: ÔHe [God] gives them life, 
not the life that comes from breathing air, nor that of veins coursing with blood, but the life that 
comes from being wholly infused with the fullness of God. God becomes to the soul (and through the 
soul to the body) what the soul is to the body, as God alone knows, so that the soul receives 
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Maximus includes the body in spiritual growth through the practice of the virtues, 
which is also due to the love of God for the body: 
ÉOut of GodÕs great goodness human beings were composed of a soul and 
body. The rational and intellectual soul given to man is made in the image of 
its maker and through desire and intense love it holds fast to God and 
participates in the divine life. The soul becomes godlike through 
divinization, and because God cares for what is lower, that is the body, and 
has given the command to love oneÕs neighbour, the soul prudently makes 
use of the body. By practicing the virtues the body gain familiarity with God 
and becomes a fellow servant with the soul. God who dwells in the soul uses 
it as an instrument to relate to the body and through the intimate bond 
between body and soul makes it possible for the body to share in the gift of 
immortality. The result is that what God is to the soul the soul becomes to 
the body, and the one God, Creator of all, is shown to reside proportionately 
in all beings through human nature.95 
The mind, soul and body are integrally important for MaximusÕs spiritual theology. 
There is not a separation between the body and the soul in deification, but the unity 
of the two working in unison. The connection between the body and soul also finds 
its place in MaximusÕs theurgic ecclesiology in the Myst. Maximus even moves 
beyond Neoplatonic theurgy because he believes in the creation of the body and the 
soul together.96 The soul does not descend into the body (the Origenist controversy 
is in the background here) as Iamblichus believed, though he rejected the more 
                                                                                                                                                                              
changelessness and the body immortality; hence the whole man, and the object of divine action, is 
divinized by being made God by the grace of God who became man.Õ 
95 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1092B-C), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 66. 
96 Maximus, Amb. 7 (PG 91:1100D-1101A). 
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negative view of material existence as posed by Plotinus by emphasizing that the 
only way for the soulÕs salvation is through the body.97 In chapter 7 of the Myst., 
Maximus re-affirms this interdependent relationship between body and soul: Ôboth 
[body and soul] make up one world as body and soul make up one man, neither of 
these elements joined to the other in unity denies or displaces the other according 
to the law of the one who has bound them together.Õ98 
 Though the spiritual and intelligible aspect of human nature is the highest 
aspect of the human being, Maximus does not therefore reject the body. Instead, he 
presents the limitations of the body in the movement towards God. Since created 
intelligible reality is eternal once it comes into being, the body is meant to point the 
mind upwards to the eternal realm. God manifests these eternal aspects through 
signs and symbols as found in the sensible order of creation. Similarly, the role of 
the body in the spiritual life is to be a vehicle for the development and divinization 
of the soul. Maximus describes this through his emphasis on practicing the virtues 
in Ad Thal. 22. Since the faithful do not yet have the Ôgrace that is in Christ, the gift 
of benefits that transcend time and nature,Õ they must make use of the Ômodes 
(tropoi) of the virtues and the principles (logoi) of those things that can be known by 
                                                             
97 For more details on this dynamic with Plotinus, see Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, pp. 23-27. 
98 Maximus, Myst. 7 (PG 91: 685A). 
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nature.Õ The modes of virtues that can be known have been created Ôas types (typoi) 
and foreshadowings of those future benefits.Õ  
By practicing the modes of the virtues that are the typoi of the divine life, the 
Christian is divinized because also through them Christ becomes hominized. 
Maximus states, ÔIt is through these modes and principles that God, who is ever 
willing to become human, does so in those who are worthy.Õ99 The body practices 
the virtues so that the soul can be deified, but also so that the body can taste 
through the typoi the first fruits of eternal incorruption that lie in wait for the 
creature. Maximus connects the virtues and the receptive fitness of the participant 
together with the liturgy in an interesting passage in Ad Thal. 63: 
In a anagogical sense, the beaks of seven flames of the candlestick of the 
Church are the habitus and provisions capable of receiving the various 
principles, modes and behaviour that feed and maintain the seven flames, 
that is to say, the energies of the Spirit, those who were in the Church with 
different gifts.Õ100  
 The gift of embodiment is established in GodÕs Providential plan for the 
cosmos, and it is an important component to living the life of spiritual growth and 
progress, but it is also a gift at the end of the ages when the Ôuniversal 
consummationÕ of all things will take place.  Maximus describes the consummation 
                                                             
99 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 7: 141-42), trans. Paul Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, p. 118, Greek inserted by 
me. 
100 Maximus, Ad Thal. 63 (CCSG 22: 163). 
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of all things through the beatitude of the resurrection. The resurrection brings 
about a new mode of being that transforms all of material and sensible reality. 
Materiality, as such, will not disappear but take on the mode of incorruption. Christ 
binds all the faithful together while maintaining their natural differences (Myst. 7) 
in this life, but in the parousia, Christ will bind the faithful and separate them 
according to a Ômore mystical arrangementÕ (μυστικωτέρας οἰκονομίας):101 
Éin the time of the expected universal consummation, when the world, as 
man, will die to its life of appearances and rise again renewed of its oldness 
in the resurrection expected presently. At this time the man who is 
ourselves will rise with the world as a part with the whole and the small with 
the large, having obtained the power of not being subject to further 
corruption. Then the body will become like the soul and sensible things like 
intelligible things in dignity and glory, for the unique divine power will 
manifest itself in all things in a vivid and active presence proportioned to 
each one, and will by itself preserve unbroken for endless ages the bond of 
unity.102 
In the current age the body is limited by the senses, which lacks perspicuity of the 
spiritual world. The human being as microcosm with a rational mind can see beyond 
the senses to the eternal and incorruptible. In the next age, the body will be deified 
and radiantly glorious because it will obtain the measure of eternity that the 
intelligible and spiritual creation already has in the present age. For this reason, 
Maximus sees the Gospel as a summit beyond the letter of the law of the Old 
                                                             
101 Maximus, Myst. 7 (PG 91: 685B). 
102 Maximus, Myst. 7 (PG 91: 685B-C), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 197. 
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Testament. Through the Gospel, all of the meanings of Providence and existing 
things are united Ôaccording to a single embracing burst of meaningÕ (κατὰ μίαν 
περιοχῆς δύναμιν ἑνοειδῶς προϋφεστήκασι).103 Maximus interprets the symbolism 
of the Gospel to signify the transcending of the sensible creation.  
This does not mean that practicing the virtues and keeping the 
commandments are of little significance. As Maximus reminds the faithful in Ad 
Thal. 22, the virtues are the created and tangible modes of human existence that are 
first fruits which are encompassed in the hominization of Christ. The words of St. 
PaulÕs letter to the Romans permeates through MaximusÕs imagery in Myst. 7:  
We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labour pains until 
now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of 
the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our 
bodies. For in hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For 
who hopes for what is seen? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait 
for it with patience.104  
Although there is a share in the gifts of God for the body now in this life through 
practicing the virtues and contemplating the sensible typoi, MaximusÕs ultimate 
desideratum in the Myst. is to: 
Pass from the grace which is in faith to the grace of vision, when our Saviour 
Jesus Christ will indeed transform us into himself by taking away from us the 
                                                             
103 Maximus, Myst. 23. 
104 Romans 8:22-25, NRSV. 
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marks of corruption and will bestow on us the original mysteries which have 
been represented for us through sensible symbols here below.105 
The creature does not yet have the grace that is Christ (Ad Thal. 22), which 
will be the grace of vision, but it does have the grace of faith that is a share in the 
future benefits through the power of the Holy Spirit. The grace of faith lies in the 
sensible symbols and bodily actions, such as living the virtues and keeping the 
commandments. Maximus connects the idea of Christological grace with the grace 
of vision found in chapter 7 of the Myst.. In the next age of vision, the faithful will 
Ôhave a share in them [the present gifts as first fruits] in very truth in their concrete 
reality according to the steadfast hope of [their] faith and the solid and 
unchangeable promise to which God has committed himself.Õ106 The divine works of 
Christ will be the concrete consummation of the creature in the parousia as a gift.
  
6.4.2.1 The Visio Beatifica 
MaximusÕs emphasis on the body in the future age of resurrection and vision is an 
important compliment to the visio beatifica of The Western Christian theological 
tradition. Admittedly, the body does not play a strong enough role in the final vision 
of God in eternity according to Augustine and Aquinas. Both theologians hold to the 
                                                             
105 Myst. 24 (PG 91: 705A), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, pp. 207-08. 
106 Myst. 24 (PG 91: 704D), trans. George Berthold, Maximus Confessor, pp. 207, slightly modified. 
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belief in the intellect as the highest aspect of the human nature (although in fact so 
does Maximus), and the vision of God as intelligible is the summum bonum of all 
intellectual creatures.107 While God is completely intelligible, He is not fully 
comprehendible because of the limitation of the creature.108 For Maximus, the stable 
rest in God is paradoxically qualified as an Ôever-moving stability,Õ whereby the 
superabundant glory of God forever enraptures the creature in deification. 
Fulfilment is eternal, but at the same time the creature finds its natural 
consummation of creaturely movement in beatitude. This is yet another paradoxical 
affirmation by Maximus. The contribution that Maximus makes towards 
understanding beatitude, however, is that the body is completely transfigured into a 
stable state so that it becomes like intelligible reality.  
 According to Maximus, uniting with God requires that the Christian leave 
behind all intelligible and sensible reality, but this leaving behind in deification does 
not mean the loss of the body. Rather, union requires the faithful to pass through 
the veil or cloud, which Maximus essentially equates with sensible reality, to super-
luminous glory of the spiritual realm.109 Unlike Gregory of NyssaÕs ever dark striving 
over an endlessly receding horizon, Maximus portrays beatitude as an eternal 
                                                             
107 For Augustine, see On Ideas, Q. 46; for Aquinas, see Summa Contra Gentiles III Q. 25.3. 
108 C.f., Augustine, Sermon 117. 
109 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1105C). 
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revelation of light and clarity of knowledge beyond the limits of natural reason and 
knowledge. Maximus encapsulates this metaphor of brightness in the 
Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor. The disciples saw the light of ChristÕs face 
because the Spirit purified the Ôbodily and spiritual sensesÕ in order for the 
revelatory logoi to appear.110 Knowledge of the Word beyond form comes through 
the spiritual experience of God that is unique to deification.  
In Ad Thal. 60, Maximus describes two different types of knowledge of God. 
He says that it is impossible to have rational knowledge of God alongside direct 
experience (πεῖρα) of God, nor conceptual knowledge (νόησις) alongside perception 
(αἴσθησις) of God.111 By Ôexperience,Õ Maximus means an active engagement that 
provides knowledge beyond the rational, and by ÔperceptionÕ he means the 
experience through participation of the supernatural goods beyond 
conceptualization.112 In the current age, however, the Christian can have a true 
science of God through ascetic struggle in virtue and contemplation. In chapter 5 of 
the Myst., Maximus describes the knowledge gained through reason and the mind, 
and he summarizes the wisdom and prudence gained through these two faculties: 
ÔIn both of these things consist the true science of divine and human matters, the 
                                                             
110 Maximus, Amb. 10 (PG 91: 1128A). 
111 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 22: 77). 
112 Maximus, Ad Thal. 22 (CCSG 22: 77).
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truly secure knowledge and term of all divine wisdom according to Christians.Õ113 
Knowledge gained through human reason and mental contemplation is still 
knowledge, but it must be understood in relation to God, who is transcendent. 
Commenting on Pseudo-DionysiusÕs teaching about truth and goodness, Maximus 
notes how truth seems to reveal the essence of God because of its simplicity, and 
goodness manifests God through its activities in creation. By imitating God through 
truth and goodness, through essence and activity, the creature gains an experiential 
knowledge of divine. 
For Maximus, God is not supremely knowable in terms of natural reasonÑfor 
he must be understood through apophatic remonstrationÑbut He is supremely 
experiential. This does not mean that the Christian will not have knowledge of God 
in the resurrection, but the knowledge that the Christian will receive of God will be 
of a transcendent order beyond nature. I believe that this transcending knowledge 
is experiential because of the inclusion of the body in the deified state.  
Paradoxically, again, despite the infinite experience of God, the creature will 
have the grace of vision with the revelation of Christ and the logoi. The grace of 
vision in the Myst. is therefore three-fold according to Maximus: in the first aspect 
of vision, the creature beholds the risen Lord, who is grace, and receives divine 
                                                             
113 Maximus, Myst. 5 (PG 91: 677B). 
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understanding of their essential essence, even though God is the only one who 
knows his own essence;114 the second aspect (still connected with the first) is the 
knowledge and understanding of the Trinity due to the grace of simplicity given to 
the soul by the divine light (Maximus describes it as Ôa sole ray shining in the single 
form of one triple-splendored light.Õ);115 and the final aspect is the luminous glory of 
God revealed through the deification of the creature such that it becomes a perfect 
mirror of the divine: Ô[the soul] becomes the image and appearance Ôof the invisible 
light, an accurate mirror, very transparent, without flaw, undefiled, unstained, 
receiving in itself, if we are allowed to say this, the splendour of the divine model 
and purely illuminating in himself, as far as possible, the goodness of the silence of 
the inner recesses.Õ116  
Maximus does not describe how we see the divine light, but he does refer to 
it (citing Pseudo-Dionysius) as Ôinvisible.Õ The other two aspects of vision in 
beatitude, that of Christ and that of the creature being a deified mirror of the divine 
glory, do seem to be types of mediation. It is difficult to say whether the final vision 
in Maximus is a created one or not because in the eschaton the creature will see 
with spiritual eyes and a body that is then rendered completely intelligible, but the 
                                                             
114 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 79). 
115 Maximus, Myst. 23 (PG 91: 701B). 
116 Maximus, Myst. 23 (PG 91: 701C); quoting Pseudo-Dionysius, DN 4.22 (PG 3: 724B). 
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idea of divine revelation of the creature in the creature is at least suggestive of an 
uncreated reality being created in the creature. Despite the general theological 
differences between the Eastern and Western Christian understandings of the visio 
beatifica, Maximus adds a much-needed experiential and embodied emphasis to 
beatitude. 
6.4.2.2 Embodiment, Sensible Creation and the Church 
In chapter 3 of the Myst., Maximus makes an important addition to Pseudo-
DionysiusÕs teaching that the Church is a symbol of the world. Just as the Church is a 
symbol of the sensible world,117 so also Ôthe world is a Church since it possesses 
heaven corresponding to a sanctuary, and for a nave it has the adornment of the 
earth.Õ118 Not only are the ecclesial symbols found within the Church representative 
of the cosmos, but the symbology of the cosmos is identified as a church. From this, 
there is a new direction for theurgy in MaximusÕs ecclesiology. It is not that 
Maximus is advocating that the rites within the Church are to be taken outside to 
participate in God, but the sensible and intelligible aspects of the world are 
principles and signs pointing to the active engagement with the divine. Whether 
                                                             
117 During the sixth and seventh centuries, the notion of the church or temple as a microcosm 
developed, just as did the symbolic anthropology of man as microcosm in earlier Greek patristic 
thought. See Mircea Eliade Images and Symbols. Studies in Religious Symbolism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1952: 1991), pp. 27-51; idem., The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion 
(Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1957: 1959: 1987), pp. 172ff.   
118 Maximus, Myst. 3 (PG 91: 672A). 
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one is talking about the body, the Church or the cosmos as the house of God, there is 
an Ôopening above,Õ whereby the worshiper can move or make passage from Ôone 
mode of being to another, from one existential situation to another.Õ119 Even so, the 
rites of the holy synaxis offer a special transformation of grace because of the sacred 
order of the mysteries completed. Maximus even affirms that angels will keep the 
attendance roster! 
Not only is the cosmos a place where the divine is manifested through 
symbols, but the human being is also a symbol of the Church. Maximus describes 
the tri-partite makeup of the human being as a Church by dividing it up according 
to the sanctuary, altar and nave: Ôfor the soul it has the sanctuary, for the mind it 
has the divine altar, and for the body it has the nave.Õ120 Congruent with MaximusÕs 
dialectic of the Church-world/world-Church symbology is the affirmation that the 
human being is also Ôa mystical church.Õ121 Through the nave of the body, the human 
person can practice the virtues and be brightened through ascetic practice. The 
sensible body, like the nave of the Church, is an intricate aspect for progression to 
spiritual and mystical theology. Without the body as the initiation into the 
                                                             
119 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 180. 
120 Maximus, Myst. 4 (PG 91: 672B). 
121 Maximus, Myst. 4 (PG 91: 672B). 
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mysteries, its own μυσταγωγία, the unity of the whole person will not be 
accomplished.  
In chapter 24 of the Myst., Maximus divides the faithful into the Ôactive onesÕ 
and the Ôgnostic ones.Õ The active faithful are those who are defied by the grace of 
the liturgy even though they are immature in Christ and do not possess the 
contemplation of intelligible and spiritual realities. Such Christians cleave to the 
practice of the virtues and obeying the commandments. Maximus associates this 
group with the nave of the Church since they have not yet progressed to the 
pinnacle of the altar. In contrast, the gnostic (or contemplative) ones are those who 
have learned the practice of moving beyond the symbols and figures found in the 
liturgy and the cosmos to the intelligible and spiritual worlds operating behind and 
through them. Maximus associates this group with the sanctuary because they have 
obtained the principles of the sacrament itself. The grasp of the divine by the 
gnostic ones is still only fully realized in the eschaton, but the first fruits found in 
symbols and figures here are accessible to them.  
Despite the differences between the two groups, the Church is an image of 
God because he brings about unity among the faithful no matter what stage in 
spiritual progress they have achieved. It is also important to note that the faithful 
all must go through the nave to the sanctuary in the spiritual life. The sensible is the 
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beginning of engagement with the divine, and the body is its mechanism of virtue. 
Intelligible perception is the goal of the liturgy as the faithful moves from the nave 
to the sanctuary and to the altar, but there is one grace transforming all who come 
to GodÕs holy Church to celebrate the holy synaxis.122 
Maximus describes the spiritual movement towards unity with God as the 
movement into adoption as sons of God and by putting on the Ônew manÕ as St. Paul 
exhorts his readers to do. As an adopted child of God, the participant has Ôbecome as 
much as possible by deification in grace what God is and is believed by nature and 
by cause.Õ123 Similar to his ontology of expansion and contraction of the Logos 
through the differentiated strata of the logoi (the vertical ontologically becomes 
horizontal in expression and activity), Maximus sees the clearest proof of the grace 
of adoption and the Ônew manÕ in the ethical expansion of the love of God to others 
in need: 
Éthe voluntary disposition of good will toward those akin to us whereby the 
man who needs our help in any way becomes as much as possible our friend 
as God is and we do not leave him abandoned and forsaken but rather that 
with fitting zeal we show him in action the disposition which is alive in us 
with respect to God and our neighbour.124 
                                                             
122 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 702D-704A), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, pp. 206-07. 
123 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 702D-704A), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, pp. 206-07. 
124 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 708D), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 211. 
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The divine grace of adoptive sonship and participation is a gift to be given to others. 
Maximus bridges the connection between metaphysics, Christology and ethics in 
this passage by proclaiming, ÔAnd if the poor man is God [i.e., as the Logos present in 
all creatures], it is because of GodÕs condescension in becoming poor for us and in 
taking upon himself by his own suffering the sufferings of each one and Ôuntil the 
end of time,Õ always suffering mystically out of goodness in proportion to each oneÕs 
suffering.Õ125 The ethical expansion of divine love is the final mark of the gift of 
materiality and embodiment in the Myst.. Giving through service to another, making 
him or her Ôas much as possible our friend as God,Õ is the reciprocal synergistic gift 
offered to Christ for the grace of adoption that He extends to all human beings. 
Practicing charity to the needy is in a special and metaphysical way participation in 
ChristÕs divine works of deification for the whole cosmos, a divine gift exchange 
between the other and God. ÔFor if the Word has shown that the one who is in need 
of having good done to him is GodÉon GodÕs very word, then, he will much more 
show that the one who can do good and who does it is truly God by grace and 
participation because he has taken on in happy imitation the energy and 
characteristic of his own doing good.Õ126 Because of the wonderful grace of 
                                                             
125 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 708D), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 212. 
126 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 709A), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 212. 
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deification and the outward signs that it induces, Maximus again exhorts the 
faithful to GodÕs holy Church:  
Let us, then, not stray from the whole Church of God which comprehends in 
the sacred order of the divine symbols which are celebrated, such great 
mysteries of our salvation. Through them, in making each of us who 
conducts himself worthily as best he can in Christ, it brings to light the grace 
of adoption which was given through holy baptism in the Holy Spirit and 
which makes us perfect in Christ.127   
The typoi of sensible creation, as found in the natural world and the Church, 
signify the divine works of God in creation, and it is particularly through the rites in 
the synaxis that the grace of the Holy Spirit descends and deifies the faithful is a 
special way. For Maximus, the Ôdivine precepts of holy Church lead the soul, by a 
true and active knowledge, to its own perfection.Õ128 Maximus does not divorce the 
actual participation in the liturgy from the giving of grace in the spiritual life. The 
gifts of grace experienced in the holy liturgy are not disconnected from the spiritual 
principles and meanings that the rites communicate to the participant, but the rites 
can only take root and transform through grace if the participant has a clean heart 
and a virtuous disposition. 
With the importance of sensible reality in the Myst. is the Christology that 
undergirds it. As I stated earlier, the term theurgy appears in numerous other works 
                                                             
127 Maximus, Myst. 24 (PG 91: 708D), trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 211. 
128 Maximus, Myst. 22 (PG 91: 698B). 
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of Maximus to reference the Incarnation itself (the divine works performed in the 
flesh) and the miracles performed by Christ (affecting the mode of operation not 
nature). The activities of Christ are also not limited by the historic Incarnation 
alone, but through expansion Christ ÔplaysÕ in a thousand different places leaving 
traces of Himself through the created logoi of beings and the sensible typoi. In fact, 
according to MaximusÕs conjecture in Amb. 71, the Ôhigh WordÕ plays in the world by 
sticking to the middle of created reality, which is the Ôtotality of things visible,Õ 
which Ôsurrounds the human being or in which the human is.Õ129 Maximus is here 
focusing on the sensible world, and he reminds his reader that this is why Gregory 
Nazianzen focused on stones and living things in his Letter to the Virgins. Christ can 
play in a thousand places due to his embracing of all created reality in the 
Incarnation. This is one of the strongest passages in MaximusÕs writings on the 
importance that the Incarnation gives to sensible reality. 
Maximus also says that Christ paradoxically manifests the eternal and 
uncreated stillness in the flowing of existence.130 Grace emerges directly through 
the created sensible realm, and therein lies the paradox for Maximus. Grace is 
appearing as created even though the source on the other side of the ontological 
divide is the eternal God. There are no hinterlands between Christ and the world, 
                                                             
129 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1412 C). 
130 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1412C). 
314  
but they are not reduced to one another. The paradox of grace as a flowing that 
remains still resides in material creation, and it is through the sensible and tangible 
that Christ sparks the activity of the mind to see the invisible reality at work beyond 
the sensible, to move from phenomena to the intelligible world.131 
As we saw in the previous chapter on Christology and grace, the Incarnation 
is the necessary gift of grace for deification, and this is no less true for MaximusÕs 
theurgic ecclesiology. The continual descent of grace in the liturgy is always the 
necessary element to bring about the reciprocal ascent to God. The tantumÉquantum 
formula is very important for Maximus in the Myst. because he ties deification 
directly to the liturgical rites as we saw in the introduction of this chapter and in 
the kenotic suffering with those in need in chapter 24. 
The sensible typoi are the focus of ChristÕs divine play in the world (Maximus 
does not use θεουργία in Amb. 71), but in Myst. 2 Maximus perceives the created 
intelligible world to penetrate the sensible as well. Maximus describes this 
ÔcompenetrationÕ132 of the sensible and intelligible worlds as being like the Ôwheel 
                                                             
131 Maximus, Amb. 71 (PG 91: 1408D). 
132 A. Riou, Le Monde et lÕEglise selon Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Cerf, 1973), p. 62: ÔSaint Maxime la voit 
aussi prfigure dans la vision inaugurale dÕzchiel, dans cette compntration des deux roues, 
cette prichorse. Et cette image, comme celle du foyer et des rayons, abolit par elle-mme les 
schmas verticaux de participation et de causalit pour leur substituer le symbole dÕune union 
synergique, sans manation du suprieur dans lÕinfrieur ni assomption de lÕinfrieur dans le 
suprieur, mais par compntration collaborante, sans pour autant quÕil y ait fusion.Õ Rious is correct 
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within a wheelÕ in the vision of Ezekiel 10: 9-11. There is a mutual reflection between 
the intelligible (with its principles) and the sensible (with its figures) worlds that 
teaches the Christian to advance in spiritual contemplation. Maximus sees this 
principle of reality in St. PaulÕs affirmation in Romans 1:20, Ôthe invisible realities 
from the creation of the world have been perceived and are recognized through the 
things he has made.Õ Because of this interconnection, Ôthe symbolic contemplation 
of intelligible things by means of the visible realities is spiritual knowledge and 
understanding of visible things through the visible. For it is necessary that things 
which manifest each other bear a mutual reflection in an altogether true and clear 
manner and keep their relationship intact.Õ133 In order for the body not be led astray 
in aimless wondering, the intelligible aspects of human nature are to work in 
synergy with the body to steer the body and the senses towards knowledge of 
theology and understanding equal to the angels (in grace and deification).134    
6.5 Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                              
to note that Maximus is not describing a Neoplatonic emanation from God (as he accuses Pseudo-
Dionysius of doing, which in reality is a very generalized reading of Pseudo-Dionysius by mid-
twentieth century Orthodox scholars). The idea of ÔcompenetrationÕ of symbols with intelligible 
principle is correct in the context, but the intelligible world for Maximus is created, and thus the 
idea of participation in God needs to be modified in RiouÕs commentary. The created logoi of being are 
a participation in God as the one who holds them pre-existing in Himself. So the sensible is 
compenetrating with an intelligible principle that is a participation in God.  
133 Maximus, Myst. 2, trans. Berthold, Maximus Confessor, p. 189. 
134 Maximus, Myst. 23 (PG 91: 669C). 
316  
MaximusÕs Christo-centric metaphysics calls the Church not only to share in 
the life of the Trinity through the grace of fellowship, adoption and deification, but 
also to mediate the recapitulation of all creation into the headship and body of 
Christ. This mediation is not only accomplished through the contemplation of 
visible and invisible reality outside the Church, but it is also brought about through 
the breaking of bread and the worship of God in the Church. MaximusÕs theurgic 
ecclesiology calls the Church to the mission of mediation both in the cosmos and in 
the Church so that in the words of the Apostle, ÔChrist might fill all thingsÕ (Eph. 
4:10). Given the importance of embodiment, sensible reality and Christology in 
MaximusÕs ecclesiology, I believe it is possible to argue for a true theurgic 
ecclesiology in his thought. A theurgic ecclesiology is not just a hegemony of the 
ecclesial over the natural typoi, which reveal the divine, but it is a cosmic liturgy 
that is more deifying when practiced through embodied ritual in the ChurchÕs 
liturgy among the faithful.  
The Christian theurgic ecclesiology of Maximus is not exactly the same as 
the theurgy of Iamblichus. For while the descent of and access to the power of the 
gods is based upon grace for both thinkers, Maximus maintained the word theurgia 
for the works of Christ in the flesh and in the giving of the grace of deification. 
However, if theurgy is not the magical manipulation of the gods through particular 
rites, but the mediation of the divine through embodiment and sensible reality, 
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then Maximus is certainly a Christian theurgist. The liberation of the soul for 
Maximus does not take place without the body even though the focus on sensible 
reality is transcended to embrace the revelatory knowledge of the essence of 
created things in the grace of divine vision. The typoi are not the end of the spiritual 
journey for Maximus, but they represent the nave in process of becoming the 
sanctuary. Further, the rites of the holy synaxis for Maximus access and engage the 
grace of deification. Even if the participant does not yet fully grasp the deeper 
realities enacted through the rituals, the grace of God works through the rites and 
transforms the participant into Himself. The final hope of the grace of faith found in 
MaximusÕs Myst. on the holy synaxis is the grace of vision, when the body will be 
wholly transformed into an eternal mode of being such that it will be rendered like 
intelligible reality.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Our study on grace and metaphysics in Maximus Confessor began with an 
ancient and contemporary problem for Christian theology, that of extrincism 
between grace and nature. This worldview can manifest itself in many different 
ways, but the concern of our investigation was on MaximusÕs metaphysics. The 
proposed solution to the problem of our study is defining the nature of divine grace 
as a paradox, in that grace is both created and uncreated. However, Christology is 
the necessary component to understand grace as uncreated in the theology of 
Maximus.  
Through detailed analysis of the ConfessorÕs metaphysical principlesÑand 
those received by him from the Byzantine traditionÑI showed how grace is to be 
understood as created and uncreated at the same time. This conception of grace is 
most evident through MaximusÕs presentation of the essence and energies of God. 
While the existence of the later Palamite distinction between divine essence and 
energy could be read into several passages in the MaximusÕs oeuvre, the broader 
philosophical context of late Neoplatonism and Pseudo-Dionysius resists creating 
new ontological realities in the Godhead. Maximus does not separate the divine 
essence from His energy, and the knowledge of the seemingly infinite number of 
divine energies is through human remonstration from created effects. This 
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remonstration does not separate uncreated grace from the creation. Maximus 
affirms the implantation of the divine logoi in the creation that manifest GodÕs 
presence. Christ plays in the creation (as the embracing Logos of all logoi) in a 
thousand different places, which is manifested through created tupoi and logoi. 
Though movement and energy must be predicated of God because of the fact of 
creation, Maximus goes to great lengths to affirm that this movement and activity is 
only something that happens to the creature, not the Creator. This is solid Christian 
epistemology that allows for a true divine science while keeping knowledge claims 
in check with an apophatic reserve.  
Maximus also develops the Pseudo-Dionysian teaching of the αὐτό-realities 
(i.e., Being-itself, Life-itself, and Wisdom-itself) as being both in God as source and 
created by Him (created in the sense that the creature abstracts through title ÔBeing 
without qualification;Õ I am not saying that the αὐτό-realities are a reality between 
God and creation1) so that the creature can participate in the whole God. The divine 
processions are re-defined in terms of energy in Maximus, but the metaphysical 
                                                             
1
 Maximus notes in his scholia on Pseudo-Dionysius that he understands the αὐτό-realities as simple 
titles: ‘He [Pseudo-Dionysius] is attempting by this to explain that GodÕs being is completely without 
origin and inconceivable and that he has established the general being of all things in advance, 
through the preliminary plan of his own ineffable knowledge. For the created mind encounters this 
being [of God] first of all when it is focused on some thing, and only afterward does it come to know 
how the thing is. When Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of being-in-itself, he is referring to being as such (τὸ 
ἁπλῶς εἶναι), not to being in some way (τὸ πῶς εἶναι); so later, when, he speaks of life-in-itself, or 
similarity-in-itself, and similar concepts, he means the general character of life or life without 
qualification, not a life that is specifically determined in this or that way, and so onÕ (PG 4: 317C-
320A), trans. von Balthasar, Cosmis Liturgy, p 123). 
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construction of created perfections or universals remains the same.  
Since Maximus adopts the Proclean Neoplatonic triad of imparticipable, 
participable and participant, he is able to conceive of God as both imparticipable 
and participable at the same time. This schema does not see God as divide up into 
two different parts, one participable and the other imparticipable, but both 
completely transcendent/imparticipable and immanent/participable. Following 
Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus endorses the view that the creature participates in the 
whole God, no part is left out of its sharing. Only by being the One above all things 
can God completely share Himself with the creation. The Neoplatonic movements of 
procession and return are also critical aspects to both Pseudo-Dionysius and 
MaximusÕs metaphysics. However, with Maximus the Christian doctrine of grace 
teaches that deification, or return to God, is qualitatively different than creation.  
Participation in Maximus has a three-fold aspect: there is a Ônatural 
principled participationÕ in God through the scala naturae and the exercise of vital 
motion; there is a moral or imitative participation in God that relies on the 
principled method of participation; and finally there is the supernatural 
participation through grace in the supra-temporal works of God (logoi) that are to be 
enjoyed in the eschaton. Through realized eschatology, Maximus is able to say that 
the creature can begin to experience the future benefits now in this life even 
though the final consummation of said benefits lie await in the future. The creature 
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can contemplate their pre-existing logoi through the created logoi, forms and typoi 
present in created reality, and he or she can live, move and be in God by living and 
acting according to their purposed logoi. This is how Maximus perceives the 
creature to be a ÔportionÕ of God. Human beings are not fallen intellects or henads 
from a pre-existing state. All creatures come into existence, body and soul, at the 
proper time according the ineffable Providence of God.   
 Deification and the revelation of the divine logoi, which is also the revelation 
of the divine essence for Maximus, in the resurrection is the key to understanding 
grace as being on both sides of the ontic divide in his theology. I demonstrated in 
chapter four that divine Ôworks that did not begin in timeÕ and the Ôuncreated graceÕ 
of God cannot be understood apart from MaximusÕs doctrines of the logoi and the 
Incarnation. Maximus conceives the pre-existing logoi to manifest only in part in 
creation through tupoi. This is why the creatureÕs knowledge of God is only rational 
and conceptual through the analogia entis and the remonstration from created 
effects. This is also why the energy of God is only apparent to the mind of the 
human being through abstraction from creatures. Like Aslan creating primroses all 
around Polly from the music in his head, the Logos creates the world through the 
logoi and is active in it. The energies or graces of God really are created effects 
because mediation is necessary, but their origin is at the same time transcendent in 
God. There is not a hinterland between God and creation. Grace lies on both sides of 
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the ontological divide, but Maximus can only speak of Ôuncreated grace,Õ which I 
identified with the logoi, because of the Incarnation of Christ. This is why the 
ultimate knowledge of a creature in itself is only possible through an analogia 
Christus.       
 The Incarnation is the central manifestation of divine grace in MaximusÕs 
theology. Since the divine has fully entered time and flesh, divine grace is given at 
the core of creaturely being. The dictum of the Confessor that God comes not as an 
essence but as a human being illuminates the paradoxical nature of grace. The 
greatest paradox in the history of the universe is that God became a human being. 
This is why Christology is so important for understanding the metaphysics of grace 
as being both uncreated and created at the same time. Such a view of grace as 
paradox does not devalue the importance of the Incarnation as the unique event in 
history. Instead, the event of the Incarnation most fully manifests the grace of God.  
Because of the kenotic descent and assumption of all aspects of human 
nature by Christ, except sin, the deepest meanings (logoi) that every creature longs 
to know are revealed. Grace transforms the manner of existing for the creature 
because it grants a transcendent knowledge of his or her nature in itself (i.e., logoi). 
The grace of the Incarnation becomes the full revelation of what each individual 
human being is in nature. The divine grace of God is thus forever a mediation 
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because Christ is the eternal Logos made flesh. The uncreated nature of God is given 
and revealed to the creature in deification at the eschaton through the logoi (which 
is also what Maximus means by divine energy and the Ôworks that do not begin in 
timeÕ). The logoi are revealed through the face-to-face vision of the Incarnated 
Christ. Because the uncreated God unites with created nature in Christ, Maximus 
can describe grace as uncreated. This whole dynamic is encapsulated in Ad Thal. 60 
on the cosmic mystery of Jesus Christ: 
For it was fitting for the Creator of the universe, who by the economy of his 
incarnation became what by nature he was not, to preserve without change 
both what he himself was by nature and what he became in his incarnation. 
For naturally we must not consider any change at all in God, nor conceive 
any movement in him. Being changed properly pertains to movable 
creatures. This is the great and hidden mystery, at once the blessed end for 
which all things are ordained. It is the divine purpose conceived before the 
beginning of created beings. In defining it we would say that this mystery is 
the preconceived goal for which everything exists, but which itself exists on 
account of nothing. With a clear view to this end, God created the essences 
of created beings, and such is, properly speaking, the terminus of his 
providence and of the things under his providential care. Inasmuch as it 
leads to God, it is the recapitulation of the things he has created. It is the 
mystery which circumscribes all the ages, and which reveal the grand plan 
of God, a super-infinite plan infinitely pre-existing the ages. The Logos, by 
essence God, became a messenger of this plan when he became a man and, if 
I may rightly say so, established himself as the innermost depth of the 
FatherÕs goodness while also displaying in himself the very goal for which his 
creatures manifestly received the beginning of their existence.2 
Finally, given the mediated nature of divine grace in the Incarnation, 
Maximus offers one of the best theological perspectives on the grace of embodiment 
                                                             
2 Maximus, Ad Thal. 60 (CCSG 22: 75), trans. Blowers, Cosmic Mystery, pp. 124-25. 
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and materiality that cuts off the extrincism of grace and nature. First and foremost, 
Maximus holds to the natural unity of the body and soul together and created ex 
nihilo. A human being is only predicated or identified through its union of body and 
soul together. Also, even in beatitude the body is wholly transfigured into the 
stability of intelligible reality. Deification comes to the body, soul, and mind.  
The most pervasive affirmation of the coinherence of grace and nature in 
MaximusÕs theology is found in his theurgic Ecclesiology as presented in his 
Mystagogy. Maximus already understands ChristÕs manifestation in sensible and 
material reality as Ôdivine play,Õ but in worship he sees the full deifying effect of the 
sacramental rites on the participant. The symbols and typoi of the Church guide the 
participant in ascent to God regardless of his or her gnosis the transcendent natures 
behind the symbols. The Church for Maximus is a theurgic society where Christ is 
always being revealed and accomplishing His divine works. Maximus expands the 
Pseudo-Dionysian locality of theurgy to include the sensible world outside the 
Church and even the human being as microcosm and mediator.  
Divine Grace in theology of Maximus Confessor is not an extrinsic 
participation in God. Divine grace is the participation all the way up into mystical 
union with God and all the way down into the extremities of created reality. 
Maximus does not conceive of a hinterland between God and the creation, as would 
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be the case with a Palamite distinction between the divine essence and energies. He 
teaches the direct and intimate touching of the creation by the divine. However, 
this touching is always mediated; grace includes both sides of the ontological divide. 
Like two sides of the same coin, grace is simultaneously uncreated and created. 
MaximusÕs vision of an enchanted cosmos that manifests and mediates the presence 
and grace of the divine is an enduring one for our world today. By recognizing the 
human vocation of cosmic mediation of all things back to Christ, perhaps the 
blindfold of extrincism will fall off, and the brilliant illumination of the resurrected 
Christ will reveal grace and blessing of life. 
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